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Abstract 
Background: Risky security behaviour displayed by end-users has the potential to leave 
devices vulnerable to compromise, despite the availability of security tools designed to aid 
users in defending themselves against potential online threats.  This indicates a need to 
modify the behaviour of end-users, allowing them to consider the security implications of their 
actions online.  Previous research has indicated affective feedback may serve as a successful 
method of educating users about risky security behaviours.  Thus, by influencing end-users 
via affective feedback it may be possible to engage users, improving their security awareness. 
Aims: Develop and apply knowledge of monitoring techniques and affective feedback, 
establishing if this changes users’ awareness of risky security behaviour in the context of a 
browser-based environment. 
Methodology: The methodology employs the use of log files derived from the monitoring 
solution, and information provided by users during the experiments.  Questionnaire data was 
compared against log files and information provided during experiments, providing an overall 
quantitative approach. 
Results: In the case of the log files and questionnaires, participants were found to have 
engaged in instances of risky security behaviours, which they were unaware of, and this 
indicated a low-level of awareness of risky security behaviour.  Whilst the results indicate the 
affective feedback did not make a difference to behaviour during the course of the 
experiments, participants felt that the affective feedback delivered had an impact, raising their 
security awareness, encouraging them to learn about online security. 
Conclusions: This body of research has made a novel contribution to the field of affective 
feedback and usable security.  Whilst the results indicate the affective feedback made no 
difference to behaviour, users felt it had an impact on them, persuading them to consider their 
security behaviours online, and encouraging them to increase their knowledge of risky 
security behaviours.  The research highlights the potential application of affective feedback in 
the field of usable security.  Future work seeks to explore different ways in which affective 
feedback can be positioned on-screen, and how feedback can be tailored to target specific 
groups, such as children, or elderly people., with the aim of raising security awareness. 	  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1.  Background 
Risky security behaviour displayed by end-users has the potential to leave devices vulnerable 
to compromise (Li and Siponen 2011). Despite the availability of security tools designed to aid 
users in defending themselves against potential online threats (such as firewalls and virus 
scanners), these tools cannot stop users engaging in risky behaviour.  This indicates a need 
to modify the behaviour of end-users, allowing them to consider the security implications of 
their actions online. 
 
1.1.1.  Risky security behaviour 
What constitutes risky behaviour is not necessarily obvious to all end-users and therefore, it 
can be difficult to recognise.  Examples of behaviour which could be perceived as risky 
include: interacting with a website containing coding vulnerabilities (Hadnagy 2011), 
downloading data from unsafe websites (Fetscherin 2009) or, creating weak 
passwords/sharing passwords with colleagues (Stanton 2005) (Payne and Edwards 2008). 
A number of studies have been conducted, in an attempt to define and categorise risky 
security behaviour.  In 2012, a taxonomy was developed by Padayachee (2012) to categorise 
compliant security behaviours whilst investigating if particular users had a predisposition to 
adhering to security behaviour. The results of the research highlighted elements which may 
influence security behaviours in users e.g. extrinsic motivation, identification, awareness and 
organisational commitment. 
Another study was documented in a 2005 paper by Stanton et al. (2005).   Interviews were 
conducted with IT and security experts, in addition to a study involving end-users in the US, 
across a range of professions. The findings produced a taxonomy, consisting of 6 identified 
risky behaviours: intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, naïve 
mistakes, aware assurance and basic hygiene. 
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These taxonomies present an abstract model of risky security behaviours.  This piece of 
research seeks to explore a subset of such behaviours, which can be found within the context 
of a browser-based environment.  Risky behaviours in this context may include visiting social 
media websites, revealing too much information online, and choosing a poor password.  
Vulnerable areas where users may place themselves at risk are discussed in more detail in 
section 2.2. There are a number of potential threats users may encounter when browsing the 
internet, and the following section provides an overview of further risks. 
 
1.1.2.  Potential threats 
Whilst browsing the web, end-users may find themselves exposed to various security threats.  
Should users choose to download pirated films or software, in addition to breaking the law, 
they are also engaging in risky security behaviour, placing their system at risk.  There is the 
potential for files from an unverified source to contain viruses or malware (Fetscherin 2009). 
Poorly constructed websites featuring coding vulnerabilities also pose a risk to end-users.  
Generally, users are unaware of the existence of such flaws.  If an application contains 
vulnerabilities, users may expose themselves to an attack by simply visiting a site e.g. users 
may fall victim to an XSS attack or a session hijacking attempt.   Social engineering attempts 
are also closely linked to technology flaws. Often, users divulge too much information about 
themselves on social networking sites (Kaspersky Lab 2013). An attacker could gather this 
information to produce a directed attack against a user e.g. sending the victim an email 
containing a malicious link about a subject they are interested in (Hadnagy 2011).  Sending a 
user an email of this type is known as a phishing attack. The malicious link contained within 
the email may link to a site asking users to enter information e.g. bank account details. As 
such, many average-users would fail to identify a phishing email, potentially revealing private 
information (Schechter et al. 2007) (Kaspersky Lab a) 2013). 
Owing to the number of attacks directed towards users, various browser-based tools have 
been developed, with the intention of educating users, reducing the likelihood that they 
become a victim of an attack.  The tools developed span a number of years, indicating that 
this is still a growing problem, and that perhaps a different approach to user feedback is 
needed.  This research project seeks to explore the potential role affective feedback can have 
in educating users regarding security awareness in the context of a browser-based 
environment. 
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1.1.3.  Affective feedback 
Affective feedback is defined as “the process of using technology to help people achieve and 
maintain specific internal states” (McDarby et al. 2004) i.e. using signals to alter user 
behaviour. There are a number of affective feedback techniques which can be implemented in 
an attempt to alter a user’s behavioural state. These include the use of virtual human 
characters, avatars, textual content (Dehn and Van Mulken 2012) as cited in (Jameson and 
Riedl 2011), and the use of colour and sound (McDarby et al. 2004) to influence state. 
Specifically, Dehn and Van Mulken (2012) state that “...the simple question as to whether an 
animated interface agent improves human–computer interaction does not appear to be the 
appropriate question to ask. Rather, the question to ask is: what kind of animated agent used 
in what kind of domain influence what aspects of the user’s attitudes or performance...”. 
Avatars provide affective feedback and have been seen to be beneficial in educational 
environments (McDarby et al. 2004) (Robison et al. 2009) (Hall et al. 2005). Textual 
information with the use of specific words also has the potential to alter a user's 
state/behaviour e.g. a password may be described as "weak" and this can encourage them to 
create a stronger password (Ur 2012). Colour is also often utilised, with green or blue used to 
imply a positive occurrence, with red indicating a negative outcome (Ur 2012). 
Previous research has indicated affective feedback may serve as a successful method of 
educating users about risky security behaviours (McDarby et al. 2004) (Robison et al. 2009) 
(Hall et al. 2005).  Users’ attitudes regarding risky security behaviour must be modified in a 
bid to keep them safer online.  Thus, by influencing end-users via affective feedback it may be 
possible to engage users into changing their behaviour. 
To further the argument for use of affective feedback Wixon (2011) discusses its benefits but 
also calls for more studies into the role of affective computing, placing emphasis on the need 
for empirical data. This is an argument also put forward by Beale and Creed (2009) in their 
overview of emotional simulations. Additionally, it has been highlighted that users may interact 
with machines for greater periods of time if a computer appears to respond to their emotions 
(Robison et al. 2009), indicating that affective feedback would be an appropriate route to take 
when getting users to consider security mechanisms which are in place on machines.  In turn, 
this may encourage users to reduce their risky security behaviours online. 	  
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1.2.  Project aim 
The issues identified throughout the previous section lead to the following research aims, and 
subsequently, the overall research question. 
 
The research aim: 
Develop and apply knowledge of monitoring techniques and affective feedback, establishing if 
this changes users’ awareness of risky security behaviour in the context of a browser-based 
environment. 
 
The research objectives: 
• Consider the current awareness of risky security behaviours in end-users and 
examine differing affective feedback techniques 
• Develop a user monitoring system for use within a browser-based environment 
• Develop prototype software containing affective feedback agents 
• Construct an experimental design to address the research question 
• Quantify the difference in awareness in end-users using statistical analysis and draw 
conclusions 
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The overall research question: 
“Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users via dynamically provided 
affective feedback?” 
 
 
1.3.  Project tasks 
The project has been split into several phases which are outlined below: 
• Phase one- literature review 
o Investigate current awareness of risky security behaviours in end-users 
o Examine differing affective feedback techniques 
 
• Phase two- preparatory work 
o Restrict the scale of the research and focus specifically on a browser-based 
environment 
o Establish a monitoring system for a browser-based environment 
o Develop prototype software containing affective feedback agents  
o Create an experimental design to address the research question 
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• Phase three- experimental work 
o Utilise several affective and non-affective feedback agents within a browser-
based environment 
o Evaluate the effectiveness of each of these agents via user trials 
o Quantify the difference in awareness using statistical analysis and draw 
conclusions 
 
1.4.  Dissertation structure 
The subsequent section of the thesis, Chapter 2, contains the literature review.  This section 
aims to provide an overview of the security issues end-users may face when browsing the 
internet, alongside a definition of risky security behaviours users may engage in whilst online.  
The role of affective feedback will be investigated, with examples of how it has been used in 
the past, notably in scenarios requiring the use of learning tools. 
This project seeks to utilise affective feedback in the context of a web browser.  In recent 
times, a number of tools have been created to assist users in learning about staying safe and 
secure whilst browsing the web.  Previous research will be analysed, providing a critique of 
methods developed in an attempt to keep users safer online. Solutions created to reduce 
specific types of attack will be discussed, highlighting plausible issues these tools fail to 
resolve. 
The project will focus on the development of a tool for a web browser, specifically Mozilla’s 
Firefox browser, and an overview of the software will be included within Chapter 4.  A number 
of prototype extensions were developed prior to creating the final tool and these will be 
outlined in this section, providing a rationale and a purpose as to why each of these smaller 
tools was created.   
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By outlining the background of the project in the literature review, and by revealing various 
tools which could be suitable for targeting such a problem, the research goal is outlined in 
Chapter 3.  This covers the key issues, the research question and the way in which the project 
seeks to address the problem, and how a result is achieved.  Chapter 5 will then go on to 
discuss the final implementation of the monitoring solution and Chapter 6 outlines the delivery 
of the affective feedback system. 
Following on from this, Chapter 7 will discuss the methodology and the experimental design, 
outlining the implementation of the project, in terms of the experiments conducted, the 
rationale behind the experiments, and details of the software and hardware used to capture 
the experimental data. 
The results section, Chapter 8, will detail the results gained from the experiments, prior to the 
discussion and analysis of the findings in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 seeks to provide an 
evaluation of the results gained, considering future work which could be undertaken.  Finally, 
conclusions will be drawn as to whether end-user security awareness can be improved via the 
use of affective feedback, potentially improving overall system security.   	  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This section documents previous research, providing an overview of the security issues users 
face when browsing the internet, and the risky security behaviours they may inadvertently 
engage in.  Subsequently, there will be an examination of what is classed as risky security 
behaviour within the scope of a web browser, and a comparison of ways in which previous 
studies have attempted to measure the perception of risk in users is included.  Various 
monitoring solutions utilised will also be covered and there will be a discussion regarding 
Mozilla's Firefox browser as this piece of software is integral to the project.  The literature 
review will conclude with an overview of tools which have recently been designed to help 
users online, in terms of security, highlighting the key problems with traditional security tools 
and advice.  By reviewing the literature, this will illustrate potential areas for research into 
affective feedback. 
 
2.1.  Security issues users face 
Whilst users are browsing the web, there are a number of security issues they may potentially 
be subjected to. In addition to breaking the law, should users download illegal files such as 
pirated movies or software, they are also engaging in risky security behaviour, placing their 
system at risk. The files downloaded may contain viruses or malware (Fetscherin 2009). 
 
Interaction with websites featuring coding vulnerabilities is also risky and users are generally 
unaware of such flaws (Imperva 2016). If an application is poorly constructed, users may 
expose themselves to an attack by simply visiting a site e.g. vulnerability to cross-site scripting 
(XSS) attacks or session hijacking. XSS attacks are common on the web and may occur 
where users have to insert data into a website e.g. a contact form. Attacks related to social 
engineering are also linked to technology flaws. Often, users divulge too much information 
about themselves on social networking sites (Kaspersky Lab 2013) e.g. it is possible to extract 
geolocation data from a specific Twitter account to establish the movements of a user. Such 
patterns have the potential to highlight the workplace or home of a user. An attacker could 
target a user, gathering the information shared to produce a directed attack against the victim 
e.g. sending the victim an email containing a malicious link about a subject they are interested 
in (Hadnagy 2011). Sending a user an email of this type is known as a phishing attack (a 
spear phishing attack when it is targeted towards specific users). The malicious link contained 
within the email may link to a site asking users to enter information such as bank account 
details. As such, many average-users would fail to identify a phishing email, potentially 
revealing private information (Kaspersky Lab a) 2013) (Schechter et al. 2007). The rise in 
spear phishing attacks has led the FBI to warn the public regarding this issue (FBI 2013). 
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Perhaps one of the most common risky security behaviours involves poor password hygiene.  
There can be a trade-off between the level of security of a password provides and its usability 
(Payne and Edwards 2008). Passwords which are shorter are less secure however, they are 
easier for users to remember and are therefore usable. Users may also engage in the practice 
of sharing passwords. When Stanton et al. (2005) interviewed 1167 end-users in devising a 
taxonomy of risky behaviours, it was found that 23% of those interviewed shared their 
passwords with colleagues. 27.9% of participants wrote their passwords down. 
These are just a sample of the attacks users may be subjected to whilst browsing the web on 
a daily basis.  Owing to these types of attacks, there is a need to utilise tools to educate users 
regarding risky security behaviours.  Potentially, such attacks could be incorporated into a 
model, and subsequently translated into a monitoring solution, and an affective feedback 
system. 
 
2.2.  Risky security behaviour 
Prior to discussing risky security behaviour, the differences between security and privacy 
should be defined, in the context of this research project.  Security is expectation end-users 
have that their data will be held safely, an in appropriate format e.g. if a website holds a 
password, it should be salted and hashed.  Privacy is the expectation that users should be 
able to control who they share their data with. 
There have been several attempts to categorise behaviours displayed by users which could 
be classified as risky (summarised in Table 1).  Papers contained within this table were 
chosen as they present a number of different ways to classify security behaviours, which 
could be applied to the context of a browser-based environment.   Such attempts include a 
2005 paper by Stanton et al. (2005).  Following interviews with both security experts and IT 
experts, and a study involving end-users in the US, across a range of professions, a 
taxonomy of 6 behaviours was created: intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous 
tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance and basic hygiene. 
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Padayachee (2012) provides a breakdown of compliant security behaviours whilst 
investigating if certain users had a predisposition to adhering to security behaviour. A 
taxonomy was developed, highlighting elements which may influence security behaviours in 
users e.g. extrinsic motivation, identification, awareness and organisational commitment.  The 
paper acknowledges the taxonomy does not present a complete overview of all possible 
motivational factors regarding compliance with security policies.  Despite this, it may provide a 
basis as to how companies could start to improve their security education, with a view to 
gaining the attention of end-users. 
A trade-off exists between the usability of passwords and the level of security they provide 
(Payne and Edwards 2008).  Usable passwords are easier for users to remember however, 
this can mean they are short and therefore less secure.  Users may also engage in 
questionable behaviour regarding passwords.  Other researchers have explored the usability 
of passwords and have acknowledged the difficulties end-users experience in choosing a 
password.  Researchers noted that “length requirements alone are not sufficient for usable 
and secure passwords” (Shay et al. 2016).  A 2015 paper concurs with this argument, 
recognising the issues users may have in creating complex passwords which will stand 
against malicious cracking tools (Al-Ameen,  Wright and Scielzo. 2015).  
Another of these categories is related to how users perceive technology flaws, e.g. 
vulnerability to XSS attacks or session hijacking, whereby users may inadvertently reveal 
information to untrusted websites (Table 1.- naïve mistakes).  Potentially, just visiting a 
webpage containing flaws such as XSS is enough to place the end-user at risk.  Social 
engineering can also be considered to fall into the naïve mistake category listed in Table 1: 
e.g. an attacker could potentially clone a profile on a social networking site and use the 
information to engineer an attack against a target (e.g. via the malicious link technique) 
(Hadnagy 2011). Such attacks can be facilitated by revealing too much personal information 
on social networking sites (Balduzzi 2011). 
Downloading illegal files such as music/software can be classed as risky behaviour:  in 
addition to breaking the law, users are potentially exposing their system to viruses or malware 
that the downloaded files may contain (Fetscherin 2009). 
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Table 1 - comparison of terminology describing risky security behaviours 
 
 
Stanton, J.M. 
et al. (2005) 
Padaya
chee,K. 
(2012) 
Payne, 
B. and 
Edward
s, W 
(2008) 
Balduz
zi, M. 
(2011) 
Hadnag
y, C. 
(2011)  
Fetsch
erin, 
M. 
(2009)  
Herath, T. 
and Rao, 
H.R. 
(2009) 
Bubas et 
al. (2008) 
Milne, 
Labrecque 
and 
Cromer 
(2009) 
Willison 
and 
Warkentin 
(2013) 
Intentional 
destruction: 
intention to 
harm IT 
resources in a 
company 
Amotiva
tion 
- - - - - - - Formation 
of 
behavioura
l intention 
to abuse. 
Computer 
abuse. 
Undetected 
abuse. 
Detrimental 
misuse: using 
IT for 
inappropriate 
purposes 
Amotiva
tion 
- - - Downlo
ading 
illegal 
files 
- Sharing 
files which 
may be 
malicious 
- Formation 
of 
behavioura
l intention 
to abuse. 
Computer 
abuse. 
Undetected 
abuse. 
Dangerous 
tinkering: 
accidentally 
configuring IT 
resources with 
security flaws 
- - - - - - - - - 
Naïve mistakes: 
user doesn’t 
realise their 
behaviour is 
flawed 
- Passw-
ord 
usability 
Sharing 
too 
much 
on 
social 
netwo-
rks 
Sharing 
too 
much on 
social 
networks 
- - Privacy 
violation 
awareness 
Saving 
passwords, 
revealing 
private 
information 
to 
untrusted 
sites, 
password 
usability 
- 
Aware 
assurance: 
wants to protect 
company IT 
systems- 
recognises 
security issues. 
Extrinsi
c 
motivati
on 
- - - - Intrinsic 
motivation: 
perceived 
effectivene
ss 
- - - 
Basic hygiene: 
user is 
educated about 
security issues 
and adheres to 
security policies 
Extrinsi
c and 
intrinsic 
motivati
on 
Passw-
ord 
usability 
- - - Extrinsic 
motivation: 
social 
pressures 
- - - 
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A paper by Bubas et al. (2008) analysed and modelled a number of factors which are related 
to online security behaviour and privacy behaviour online.  The paper notes that “computer 
security is becoming an increasingly more complex problem owing to the amounts and types 
of information that have to be secured and types of threats to computer systems”.  To 
investigate the issue, a survey was developed to ascertain how the habits and assumptions of 
internet users could help in producing a list of known behaviours.  The following factors 
(beliefs) which can lead to engagement in risky behaviours were discussed- 
• F1- conscientiousness in the maintenance of the operating system, upgrading of the 
internet browser and use of antivirus and antispyware programs. 
• F2- engagement in risky and careless online activities with lack of concern for 
personal online privacy. 
• F3- disbelief that privacy violations and security threats represent possible problems. 
• F4- lack of fear regarding potential privacy and security threats with no need for 
change in online behaviour. 
In particular, the factor 2 was of the most interest because it links directly to risky security 
behaviours.  The survey confirmed a list of known risky security behaviours such as visiting 
untrustworthy sites, sharing files via peer-to-peer networks, or simply believing that the user 
was not at risk of a privacy violation.  These factors also correlated with the fact that people 
who engage in such behaviours and beliefs are more likely to have a virus/malware infection 
on their home computer.  These people are also more likely to have suffered from a loss of 
data on their personal computer. 
A paper by Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) also investigated the area.  One particular 
study investigated both risky behaviours and protective behaviours, then compared these with 
self-efficacy.  The paper highlights that depending on the demographic and the self-efficacy of 
the end-user, this causes different types of behaviour to be exhibited online.  449 people 
participated in the web-based study.  During the survey, participants were asked if they had 
engaged in specific risky behaviours online, drawn from previous research into risky 
behaviours (LaRose and Rifon (2007), and a previous paper by Milne, Rohm and Bahl, 
(2004)). 
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Specific risky security behaviours users were asked about in the survey included using 
revealing private email addresses to register for contests on websites, passwords consisting 
of dictionary words, and accepting unknown friends on social networking sites.  The most 
common risky behaviour which participants admitted to was allowing the computer to save 
passwords, in which 56% of participants admitted to this. 
Willison and Warkentin (2013) performed an empirical review relating to staff members within 
a company who purposely engage with malicious use of computers.  By exploring previous 
research, they were able to understand security issues which may occur within companies, 
and discern threats.  By understanding the thought processes of the potential offender, they 
were able to consider how the role of self-efficacy was linked to deterring the offender from 
committing computer misuse, or more seriously, a crime.  Work conducted by Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) is based upon Straub and Welke’s (1998) security action cycle.  In 
extending this model, they looked at 3 areas which are potential motives: criminal justifications 
and deterrence, expressive and instrumental motives and deterrence, and injustice and 
disgruntlement as motives.  Research found that there was a link between these motives, and 
that understanding motives behind computer misuse could lead to further research projects 
regarding how to tackle the issue. 
This section has outlined various attempts to categorise behaviour.  However, when exploring 
risky security behaviours, the perception of risk which the end-user possesses must be taken 
into consideration.  Further work is outlined in the following section in an effort to quantify 
behaviours and to measure perception of risk.  This indicates there is still a need to 
investigate end-user behaviour and awareness. 
 
2.3.  Measuring perception of risk 
It can be hard for the user to recognise their security behaviour as risky.  A number of 
techniques have been used to gauge the perception of risk (summarised in Table 2). Papers 
presented in the table have been chosen as they present research regarding perception of 
risky behaviour which may apply to the context of a browser-based environment. Farahmand 
et al. (2009) explored the possibility of using a psychometric model originally developed by 
Fischoff et al. (1978) in conjunction with questionnaires, allowing a user to reflect on their 
actions and gauge their perception, providing a qualitative overview.  Such an approach could 
be utilised in this research project. 
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Farahmand, Atallah and Spafford (2013) investigated models of risk perception in relation to 
incentives.  To achieve this, a revised model based upon the work of Fischhoff et al. (1978) 
was developed.  During the extension of this model 42 US-based information security 
executives were interviewed to determine how incentives (e.g. motives for adhering to a 
policy) and risk perception can help inform security decisions.  The paper cites Schneier 
(2008) and the possible areas where reality of risk could diverge from perception of risk.  
These areas include: the severity of the risk, the probability of the risk, the magnitude of the 
costs, how effective the countermeasure is at mitigating the risk, and the tradeoff itself.  
Results from the study highlight a number of key areas which managers in a company should 
consider when encouraging employees to consider risk perception.  These areas include 
making security part of the work environment, and having an understanding of perception of 
risk and values. 
Takemura (2011) also used questionnaires when investigating factors determining the 
likelihood of workers complying with information security policies defined within a company, in 
an attempt to measure perception of risk.  Participants were asked a hypothetical question 
regarding whether or not they would implement an anti-virus solution on their computer if the 
risk of them getting a virus was 10%, 20% and so-on.  Results revealed that 52.7% of users 
would implement an antivirus solution if the risk was only 1% however, 3% of respondents still 
refused to implement antivirus, even when the risk was at 99% which displays a wide range of 
attitudes towards risk perception.  The study concluded that risk perception was a 
psychological factor with the potential to influence problematic behaviours. 
San-José and Rodriguez (2011) used a multimodal approach to measure perception of risk.  
In a study of over 3000 households with PCs connected to the internet, users were given an 
antivirus program to install which scanned the machines on a monthly basis.  The software 
was supplemented by quarterly questionnaires, allowing levels of perception to be measured 
and compared with virus scan results.  Users were successfully monitored via the use of a 
number of security indicators.  These security indicators (SI.) included: 
• SI. 1 Tools and security measures indicator- comparison of an optimal set-up vs. the 
current set-up of the end-user. 
• SI. 2 Security behaviour and habits indicator- viewing end-user behaviour when 
browsing the web, or opening emails/attachments e.g. do users scan email 
attachments with an antivirus tool before opening them? 
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• SI. 3 E-trust indicator- users’ subjective perception of security whilst browsing the 
web. 
• SI. 4 Malware incidents indicator- percentage of computers in the study which 
contained malware following a scan. 
• SI. 5 Computers at high risk indicator- percentage of devices which contained a 
potentially high risk malware incident. 
• SI. 6 Computers with high dissemination indicator- takes users behaviour into 
consideration- does the device contain a malicious file which has the potential to be 
shared across other machines?  To provide an example, if an end-user utilises 
messaging services and is communicating with others, there is the potential for the 
malicious file to be sent to someone else. 
Taking the indicators into account, results showed that the antivirus software created a false 
sense of security and that users were unaware of how serious certain risks could be.  
Additionally, in this study, it was highlighted that the installation of security tools is necessary, 
but more needs to be done in relation to end-users.  The authors suggest end-users should 
be provided with technical education about threats and insecure behaviours.  This would 
supplement active and passive methods of defending against threats. 
Labunets et al. (2013) conducted a small-scale experiment to compare the effectiveness and 
perception of two differing risk-based methods: visual methods (CORAS, a method for 
security risk analysis) and textual methods (Security Requirements Engineering Process-
SREP).  28 participants were split into 4 groups, and were asked to carry out a number of 
tasks relating to a Smart Grid application scenario (an electricity network-based scenario) e.g. 
groups had to identify security threats and requirements.  During this process, they also had 
to answer a questionnaire relating to the methods they were testing.  Additionally, the 
experimental process was also supplemented by interviews with participants in order to 
determine influences which lead to the effectiveness of the tools. 
Analysing the interviews and the questionnaires, results from this study concluded that when 
identifying threats in the Smart Grid scenario, the visual method is more effective.  
Conversely, in extracting security requirements of a system, the text-based method performs 
better than the visual method.  However, in relation to perception and intention in end-users, 
the participants preferred the visual method. 
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Hibshi, Breaux and Broomell (2015) investigated risk perception whilst eliciting security 
requirements.  Networks consist of a number of devices and set-ups, all of which interact with 
each other, therefore analysts looking after such a system must have a level of risk perception 
to consider the number of security requirements needed for a complex system.  The results 
discuss the results from two user surveys carried out, looking at the way in which security 
risks are perceived and how decisions are made by analysts in relation to changing threats 
and requirements.  Several areas were identified are priorities when considering security 
environments: requirements composition (overall combination of security requirements for a 
complex system), requirements ambiguity (conflicting requirements from different parts of a 
complex system), requirements completeness (have all requirements for the system been 
met?) and distributed knowledge (the number of people who have an overall understanding of 
the system). 
During the study containing security vignettes ("scenarios comprised of discrete factors that 
contribute to human judgment"), 174 participants were exposed to 64 of these vignettes, 
alongside 2 threat scenarios.  Results of the study proved the approach developed allowed for 
the effective elicitation of security requirements, and measure security adequacy ratings, 
which in turn can help inform the risk perception levels of the analyst. 
Ng, Kankanhalli and Xu (2009) examined the use of a health belief analogy when explaining 
the perception of risk in terms of cyber security.  The perception of falling ill was directly 
related to a) the perceived susceptibility of falling ill and b) how severe the illness is perceived 
to be.  When translated to the field of cyber security, it was discovered these factors along 
with perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to action, general security orientation and 
self-efficacy can help to determine the riskiness of user behaviour.  Experiments were 
conducted with an example based upon email attachments.  It was concluded that users’ 
security behaviour could be determined via perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, and 
self-efficacy. 
Hill and Donaldson proposed a methodology to integrate models of behaviour and perception 
(Hill and Donaldson 2015).  The research attempted to assess the perception of security the 
system administrator possesses, and create a trust model which reduces the threat from 
malicious software.  The methodology engaged system administrators whilst developing the 
threat modelling process, and quantified risk of threats, essentially creating a triage system to 
deal with issues. 
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Ur et al. (2016) investigated the correlation between users’ perceptions of password strengths 
and their actual strength on smartphones.  The research employed the use of an online study 
to measure users’ thoughts on password strength and memorability, and their understanding 
of potential attacks.  This data was compared against to users’ perceptions regarding how 
passwords would fare against password cracking attacks.  Comparing the data, allowed for 
the perception of risky behaviours to be determined.  Outcomes highlighted serious 
misconceptions regarding dictionary passwords, and common passwords, and generally 
users didn’t understand attacks. 
 
Table 2 - comparison of methods used for measuring perception of risky behaviour 
 
Technique Description 
Psychometric model 
(Farahmand 2009) 
(Fischoff 1978) 
Farahmand, Atallah 
and Spafford (2013) 
Used the models to determine characteristics relating to 
gauging perception of security and privacy risks. 
Questionnaires 
(Fischoff 1978) 
(Takemura 2011) (Ur 
2016) 
Hibshi, Breaux and 
Broomell (2015) 
Labunets et al. 
(2013) 
Subjects were assigned questionnaires to allow them to 
reflect on their perception of risk. 
Used to determine the likelihood of workers complying with 
information security policies. 
Used quarterly questionnaires to gauge perception of risk.  
Compared these to anti-virus scan results. 
Used to gauge perceptions on the strength and 
memorability of smartphone passwords. 
Used to gauge security requirements of a complex system. 
Technology-based 
(San-José and 
Rodriguez 2011) 
Installed antivirus software on over 3000 internet 
connected PCs which were scanned on a monthly basis. 
Health belief model 
(Ng, Kankanhalli and 
Xu 2009) 
The model was used as an analogy to explain perception 
of risk. 
Threat model (Hill 
and Donaldson 2015) 
Utilised system administrators and quantified risk to 
produce a triage system 
Interviews (Labunets 
et al. 2013) 
Determine effectiveness of visual and textual risk-based 
methods. 
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Thus far, background research has identified a number of security issues the end-user may 
be subjected to whilst browsing the web.  Attempts have been made to categorise such 
behaviour, and measure the perception of risk which the end-user may possess.  These 
sections have highlighted that it can be difficult for the end-user to recognise that their 
behaviour is placing them, and their devices at risk.  This suggests that end-users require 
some form of security education.  A number of tools have previously been developed in 
attempt to improve end-user security awareness (discussed in detail in the following section, 
and to raise perception of risk.  These tools developed span a number of years, and yet some 
of them still present issues when raising security awareness.  Such issues suggest a different 
approach is required.  Affective feedback has been used in academic environment to aid 
students in learning.  Owing to the use of affective feedback in this environment, it is plausible 
it could be utilised and applied to the domain of security awareness and education. 
 
2.4.  Tools created to help users in terms of security 
2.4.1.  Keeping users safe and preventing attacks 
2.4.1.1.   Password tools 
Many users participate in risky security behaviour, particularly when it involves passwords, as 
highlighted by Stanton et al. (2005). A number of attempts have been made to understand the 
problems users face when dealing with passwords, with tools developed to aid users. Furnell 
et al. (2006) conducted a study, to gain an insight into how end-users deal with passwords. 
The survey found that 22% of participants said they lacked security awareness, with 13% of 
people admitting they required security training. Participants also found browser security 
dialogs confusing and in some cases, misunderstood the warnings they were provided with. 
The majority of participants considered themselves as above average in terms of their 
understanding of technology, yet many struggled with basic security. As a result of confusion 
in end-users, a number of studies have been conducted in an attempt to improve users’ 
security awareness in terms of passwords.   
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Bicakci et al. (2009) explored the use of using graphical passwords built into a browser 
extension, based on the notion that humans are better at memorising images than text. The 
aim of the software developed was to make passwords more usable, decreasing the likelihood 
of users engaging in risky security behaviour. Participants could select 5 points on an image 
with a grid overlay to produce a password, which was compared against previous research 
conducted with plain images. Results from the study showed the grid had little effect on the 
password chosen however, in a survey of end-users, the grid proved to be more successful 
than an image without a grid in terms of usability when rated using a Likert scale.   
 
Others have also utilised a visual approach.  To demonstrate the strength of a chosen 
password, Ur et al. (2012) investigated how strength meters placed next to password fields 
improved the security and usability of passwords. Participants were asked to rate their 
password security perceptions on a Likert scale. Immediately after creating a password with 
the aid of a meter, they were surveyed regarding their opinion of the tool. The tool was 
deemed to be a useful aid in password creation with participants noting that use of words 
such as "weak" encouraged them into creating a stronger password. However, the study was 
repeated the following day and between 77% and 89% (depending on the different groups) 
were able to recall their passwords, which fails to sufficiently test the memorability of a 
password at a much later date. Additionally, 38% of participants admitted to writing down their 
password from the previous day, highlighting that despite the encouragement of the password 
meter, complex passwords are still difficult to remember.  Therefore, users still participated in 
risky security behaviour, despite the fact a tool was developed to help them, 
The concept of password meters has been explored by multiple researchers.  Work was 
carried out by Egelman et al. (2013), exploring whether the use of password meters had an 
impact upon the password selected.  Two different password metering systems were also 
implemented: one which looked like a traditional password meter (i.e. providing a meter with 
colours and text such as “weak”, “good”) and another, which compared password strengths to 
other users of the tool (e.g. “weaker than 40% of users”).  An initial experiment was conducted 
where users were asked to change their real passwords.  In this experiment, users were not 
told the purpose of the study, to avoid the introduction of bias.  It was shown that the 
implementation of password meters caused users to create stronger passwords.  Another 
experiment was run following the initial experiment.  In this scenario, users were asked to 
create a password for an account they deemed to be unimportant.  Results showed that 
password meters did not have an impact for these types of accounts.  Again, this highlights 
that security tools such as password meters may not have an impact on end-user behaviour. 
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Vance et al. (2013) explored the use of fear appeals in relation to password security.  Fear 
appeals are messages which seek to highlight or raise perception of a threat, and aid the user 
in dealing with the potential threat.  In an experiment, users were asked to register for an 
account, and the password strength chosen by the end-users was observed.  Users were free 
to choose any password they wanted e.g. there was no minimum length required.  
Participants were split into different groups: the control group were given no guidance on 
password creation, the static fear appeal treatment group received security information that 
did not change on user input, an interactive password meter group received an interactive 
password meter, and finally a group which received an interactive fear appeal treatment which 
provided security guidance which updated on user keypress.  Results found that the 
interactive fear appeal treatment performed better in terms of choosing stronger passwords, 
and such an approach may aid in raising end-user security awareness.  This approach utilised 
a text and colour to provide a visualisation of security advice. 
Ciampa (2013) performed a study to explore the impact of different password strength meters, 
outwith the use of the traditionally used horizontal bar meters commonly seen online when 
registering for an account on a website.  Specifically, he investigated whether or not password 
strength feedback prompted users to create stronger passwords.  In the study, participants 
were asked to record 4 passwords they may use online for accounts.  Subsequently, they had 
to visit websites which offered password strength checking services.  Users also had to record 
if the password strength checks encouraged them to change their passwords.  Results from 
this experiment showed that "any feedback mechanism can influence users to create 
passwords with higher entropy".  Participants also noted that websites which indicated how 
long it would take to crack a particular password were useful, and had an impact. 
Steinbart, Keith and Babb (2016) researched the use of models representing secure 
behaviour in a bid to discover what makes a user continue/discontinue to behave in a secure 
way.  Experiments were conducted which sought to determine the way in which users logged 
into websites.  To achieve this, a mobile app was created, named "findamine" which required 
participants to login on a regular basis.  Participants were also able to log into a desktop-
based website.  Results found that the type of interface users logged into produced different 
results.  When engaging in a security behaviour such as logging to a website, it was found 
that users desire a usable interface.  In relation to mobile devices, if a password is too 
complex to enter on a small or limited keyboard, and the interface does not provide the option 
to store credentials, users will change their password to something which is weaker, and will 
thus engage in a risky security behaviour.  This indicates that the design of a password area 
on a website has some impact in terms of whether the end-user engages in risky security 
behaviours. 
21 
 
De Carné De Carnavalet and Mannan (2015) investigated the use of password meters, 
performing a large-scale evaluation.  An empirical analysis was conducted in this paper to 
determine how password meters function, ultimately highlighting how they can be improved.  
To achieve this, a number of factors were considered: meter characterisation (gauged 
characteristics of 22 meters analysed during the study), reverse engineering of password 
meters where possible, empirically evaluating password meters (by utilising millions of 
passwords against the meters, drawn from several password dictionaries) and meter 
weakness (taking into consideration the fact that some meters may mark trivial passwords as 
safe e.g. a password may be short but if it has lower and uppercase letters, numbers and 
symbols, it's still marked as secure). 
Overall results from the study highlight a number of key issues.  One such issue notes that 
password meters need to be improved, and potentially redesigned.  To provide an example, 
checking if the entered password has previously been found on a leaked password list, and 
providing a notification to the user could be a potential change.  Results also found that 
commonly used password managers such as LastPass and 1Password provide inaccurate 
measures of password strength, and should be redesigned, given how prominent they are.  
Despite the prevalence of password strength meters on the web, the flaws pointed out in this 
research indicate there needs to be another way of conveying security information to the end-
user. 
This section has provided an overview of recent research conducted into the use of security 
tools to help users choose stronger, more effective passwords.  As the literature shows, 
password hygiene is still a problem for end-users, despite the number of approaches which 
have been taken to help them.  Much of the research conducted into keeping users safe 
online, educating them about risky security behaviour has also revolved around phishing 
attacks. Recently, a number of solutions have been developed to gauge how best to inform 
users about the dangers of phishing attacks, with the hope that education will reduce 
participation in risky security behaviours. 
 
2.4.1.2.   Phishing tools 
Unknowingly engaging with a phishing attempt, and potentially revealing personal information 
is another risky security behaviour.  A number of tools have been developed in an attempt to 
educate users, teaching them how to spot a phishing attack.  An overview of some of these 
tools has been provided in this section. 
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Dhamija and Tygar (2005) proposed the use of a method to enable users to distinguish 
between spoofed websites and genuine sites. A Firefox extension was developed which 
provided users with a trusted window in which to enter login details. A remote server 
generated a unique image which is used to customise the web page the user is visiting, whilst 
the browser detects the image and displays it in the trusted window e.g. as a background 
image on the page. Content from the server is authenticated via the use of the secure Remote 
Password Protocol. If the images match, the website is genuine and provides a simple way for 
a user to verify the authenticity of the website.  At the time the paper was written, user 
evaluations had not been conducted, therefore the effectiveness of the tool could not be 
determined. 
Sheng et al. (2007) tried a different approach to reducing risky behaviour, gamifying the 
subject of phishing with a tool named Anti-Phishing Phil. The game involves a fish named Phil 
who has to catch worms, avoiding the worms, on the end of fishermen’s hooks (these are the 
phishing attempts). The study compared 3 approaches to teaching users about phishing: 
playing the Anti-Phishing Phil game, reading a tutorial developed or reading existing online 
information. After playing the game, 41% of participants viewed the URL of the web page, 
checking if it was genuine. The game produced some unwanted results in that participants 
became overly cautious, producing a number of false-positives during the experimental 
phase. 
PhishGuru is another training tool designed by Kumaraguru et al. (2009) to discourage people 
from revealing information in phishing attacks. When a user clicks on a link in a suspicious 
email, they are presented with a cartoon message, warning them of the dangers of phishing, 
and how they can avoid becoming a victim. The cartoon proved to be effective: participants 
retained the information after 28 days. The tool did not cause participants to become overly 
cautious and they continued to click on links in genuine emails however, a longer study is 
required to fully gauge the success of the tool. 
Similarly, an Android app called NoPhish (Canova et al. 2015) has been developed to educate 
users about phishing on mobile devices. The game features multiple levels where users are 
presented with a URL and are asked if it is a legitimate link or a phishing attempt. In a study 
conducted after playing the game, participants gave significantly more correct answers when 
asked about phishing. A further long-term study was conducted 5 months later. The long-term 
outcomes showed participants still performed well however, their overall performance 
decreased.  This suggests there are issues with long-term retention. 
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Basnet and Doleck (2015) investigated the use of machine learning for the development of an 
anti-phishing URL tool.  Work proposed the use of a heuristic approach, classifying a URL via 
the information available about it, utilising a training dataset from a website containing a 
repository of known phishing sites.  The URL was checked against a number of features, 
including its positioning in other databases of known phishing sites, and its positioning in 
search engine results.  Results found that these features are useful in the automatic 
classification of URLs as phishing attempts, producing an error rate of <0.3%.  The authors 
state the approach discussed could be implemented into a tool to help end-users identify 
phishing attempts. 
In 2016, Volkamer, Renaud and Reinheimer (2016) proposed the use of a just-in-time tool, 
TORPEDO, to provide tooltips in relation to potential phishing links in emails.  This was 
implemented via a Thunderbird extension.  URLs within emails are disabled for a short period 
of time, in the hope that users will consider checking the URL before clicking on what could be 
a potential phishing attempt, and, redirects are detected.  This approach was compared 
against the end-user seeing the email URL within the status bar, without any tooltip feedback.  
When comparing the two approaches, TORPEDO performed better: 85.17% correct answers 
for identifying phishing emails, in comparison to the 43.31% who correctly identified phishing 
emails via the status bar. 
An automatic phishing detection and incident response framework was created by Husák and 
Cegan (2014).  This is based upon an automatic phishing incident processing tool named 
PhiGARo (Cregan et al. 2012).  The aim of the framework was to utilise honeypots to capture 
email messages containing phishing attempts, rather than waiting for a user to report a 
phishing attempt, therefore eliminating the human factor.  Use of the tool proved victims of 
phishing could be notified via email using this approach, and future phishing messages could 
be blocked to prevent end-users from further engaging in risky security behaviour. 
The findings of research conducted on educating users about phishing attempts have had 
mixed results.  Whilst they may potentially be useful in educating end-users, there are a 
number of problems with such tools.  In some cases, users become overly cautious, and find 
it difficult to identify phishing attempts from genuine emails.  Another issue highlighted is 
retention.  Whilst some of these tools have an impact in the short-term, user performance 
diminishes over time.  In developing a tool which utilises a monitoring solution and affective 
feedback, these issues should be taken into consideration whilst analysing the impact of such 
a tool. 
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2.4.1.3.   Privacy issues 
Information that allows phishing emails to be targeted towards specific users can come from 
revealing too much information online. A proposed series of nutrition labels for online privacy 
have been designed in an effort to reduce risky behaviour (Kelley 2009). While it has been 
shown users do not fully understand privacy policies online, the nutrition labels seek to 
present the information in a format which is easier for users to understand. Labels were 
designed using a simplified grid design with a series of symbols representing how a site 
utilises data: how it is collected and used, and whether data is required (opt-in or opt-out). 
Results from a small study found that visually, the labels were more interesting to read than a 
traditional security policy and presented an easier way for users to find information. 
Besmer et al. (2009) acknowledged that various applications may place users at risk by 
revealing personal information. A tool was developed and tested on Facebook to present a 
simpler way of informing the user about who could view their information. A prototype user 
interface highlighted the information the site required, optional information, the profile data the 
user had provided and the percentage of the user’s friends who could see the information 
entered. The study showed that those who were already interested in protecting their 
information found the interface useful in viewing how applications handled the data. 
 
2.4.1.4.   General warning tools 
In addition to security tools which have been developed to target privacy issues on social 
networking sites, studies have also focussed on more general warning tools when the user is 
browsing the web. A Firefox extension developed by Maurer (2011) attempts to provide alert 
dialogs when users are entering sensitive data such as credit card information. The extension 
seeks to raise security awareness, providing large JavaScript dialogs to warn users, noting 
that the use of certain colours made the user feel more secure. 
More recently, Volkamer et al. (2015) developed a Firefox Add-On, called PassSec in attempt 
to help users detect websites which provided insecure environments for entering a password.  
The extension successfully raised security awareness and significantly reduced the number of 
insecure logins. 
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2.4.2.  Issues with traditional security tools and advice 
Some of the tools discussed in the previous section provided unwanted results, in particular, 
studies found that, users became overly cautious when browsing the web and produced a 
number of false positive results when detecting phishing attacks (Sheng 2007). Another study 
highlighted that although the tool developed for submitting private information online 
performed well in experiments, it was difficult to encourage users to make use of it. Instead, 
several participants continued to use web forms which they were more familiar with (Wu, 
Miller and Little 2006). 
There are a number of issues with traditional security advice, namely long term retention, long 
term behavioural change and security fatigue.  Furnell and Thomson (2009) discussed the 
term "security fatigue" in relation to computer security in 2009.  Even though companies try to 
educate employees about security, they may still fail to engage with the good practice they 
have been taught.  There are a number of issues which can cause non-compliance in an 
employee.  Such issues include a lack of awareness of security issues, and a lack of training 
in regards to computer security.  Even if these issues are not at play, security fatigue may still 
set in.  The work considers that there may be a "threshold at which it simply gets too hard or 
burdensome for users to maintain security.". 
Potential security measures which can cause security fatigue include: firewall/antivirus (these 
can become intrusive), automatic software updates (these are becoming more frequent), and 
anti-phishing tools (which may cause browser latency).  The reason why such measures 
cause fatigue must be explored.  These factors include effort (how much does the user have 
to try to comply), difficulty (how easy is it to comply with the security measure), and 
importance (the priority given to secure an asset/account).  Conclusions from the paper notes 
that a user will become less fatigued with security if they believe it is an important task. 
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Parkin et al. (2016) further investigated the concept of "security fatigue".  Whilst Parkin et al. 
(2016) agrees with the work by Furnell and Thomson (2009) through the use of a model the 
paper identifies potential sources of this fatigue.  These sources include an excessive 
cognitive load (e.g. trying to remember a password), excessive physical load and 
preparedness (e.g. having to remember to carry an authentication token), distraction from 
time-sensitive tasks (e.g. security policies can be seen as a burden due to work pressures), 
blocking of tasks and missed opportunities (e.g. waiting for IT to be set-up properly in a 
business), and potential embarrassment (e.g. being unable to access data when a client 
requests it). 
Work by Stanton et al. (2016) builds upon the aforementioned research.  Several hundred 
participants were interviewed with regard to perception of privacy and cybersecurity.  The 
study was not initially designed to investigate security fatigue however, results began to show 
this as a recurring theme.  In this study, security fatigue manifested as decision fatigue e.g. 
avoidance decisions which were unnecessary, and choosing the easiest option.  This linked 
with a key finding from the paper by Furnell and Thomson (2009)- there is a cost-benefit issue 
in place, and users will choose to ignore security advice if it is too complex or requires a 
considerable amount of effort in comparison to the asset which they are trying to protect. 
Many of the tools created focus on one specific area where users are vulnerable e.g. they 
educate people about privacy, passwords or phishing attempts. These tools come with 
additional problems such as security fatigue and issues with long term retention.  Despite the 
number of tools created and designed to help protect users online, users continue to engage 
in risky security behaviour, placing their information and devices at risk. The tools developed 
span a number of years, indicating that the issue of risky security behaviour has yet to be 
resolved.  Issues surrounding security fatigue must be considered when developing a suitable 
monitoring and affective feedback delivery system for this research project. 
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2.5.  Monitoring Behaviour 
To provide affective feedback to users in a timely manner, a monitoring solution must be 
constructed, to detect the moment a user has engaged in potentially risky security behaviour.  
Multiple approaches have been used in the past to monitor user behaviour.  Fenstermacher 
and Ginsburg (2002) have experimented with the use of a system event-based approach 
(originally designed for gathering usability information) which linked applications running 
across the operating system.  Each application invoked several method calls and functions, 
making use of Microsoft’s Component Object Model and Python.  An XML-based log file was 
then generated based-upon the actions of the user, containing information such as a 
timestamp, the application used and which event was triggered.  This suggests a similar 
technique could be applied when monitoring risky security behaviour. 
Additionally, a combination of video and task monitoring could be used to view user behaviour 
(Heishman, Z. and Wechsler 2007).  In a study by Heishman, the eye movement of 
participants was monitored to interpret the affective state of the user.  Results of the study 
found it was possible to detect the affective and cognitive states of users and that such a 
technique may be used when exploring further HCI concepts. 
Doubleday et al. also successfully used both video and task monitoring to observe behaviour 
(Doubleday 1997).  In this study, users were given a series of tasks to complete e.g. retrieving 
information from a database.  Whilst completing the assigned tasks, users were asked to 
provide a running commentary of their thoughts.  They were observed via a video camera 
during this process to gauge their level of interaction with the system.  Additionally, they were 
provided with a questionnaire on completion, comprising of a 7-point Likert scale regarding 
usability aspects of the system e.g. the appeal of the system used.  The research highlights 
that when monitoring risky behaviour, a multimodal approach is useful, allowing a comparison 
of results from each monitoring method. 
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2.6.  Affective feedback 
A possible method of educating end-users is through affective feedback, which belongs in the 
field of affective computing. Other methods of educating users in relation to security can 
include gamifying a specific threat such as phishing (Sheng et al. 2007), creating security 
policies (Kelley 2009), and the use of tooltips to present contextual text-based information 
(Volkamer, Renaud and Reinheimer 2016). 
Affective computing can be defined as, “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately 
influences emotions” (Picard 2000). Affective feedback is an aspect that can influence the 
end-user and as such is defined as, ”the process of using technology to help people achieve 
and maintain specific internal states” (McDarby et al. 2004). Thus, by influencing the end-user 
through affective feedback it may be possible to engage them into changing their behaviour. 
Work by Iovane et al. (2012)   proposes a methodology which attempts to identify and quantify 
the emotional state of the learner.  The paper highlights the field of affective computing, 
stating that it has the potential to create systems which can adapt to the emotion state of the 
user.  The authors note that emotion is "assumed to play a major role for learning processes", 
and the work states that "feedback is an important mechanism in learning.".  Arguedas et al. 
(2015) concur with this sentiment- "emotion has emerged as a vital element in the learning 
process".  Again, this suggests that affective feedback could be applied to a learning 
environment, and in the case of this PhD project, to the field of security education and 
awareness. 
Selmi, Aïmeur and Hage (2013) explored the use of a theoretical framework in relation to an 
intelligent tutoring system, employing the use of peer affective feedback.  Privacy issues were 
raised, to ensure learners were supported without bias.  In connecting peers in an e-learning 
environment it was proposed that affective feedback, such as positive comments, and 
expressing concern for a peer in distress could be helpful in facilitating learning. 
The use of affective feedback is not limited to educational systems.  Novak, Nagle and Riener 
(2014) applied the concept to people playing a variant of the classic Nokia game, Snake.  
Users can self-report their current state, and the computer running the game has a probability 
of agreeing with the opinion of the user.  Subsequently the level of difficulty in the game can 
be increased or decreased as a result of this outcome. 
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Ranieri and Romero (2016) discuss the use of affective feedback in relation to human-robot 
interaction.  The authors applied an emotion-aware interaction strategy to a virtual agent 
within an Android application.  The application inferred the emotional state of the end-user by 
mapping feature points on the face of the user, running it against a classification process.  
This means the on-screen avatar can respond appropriately to the end-user.  Future work 
seeks to build and adapt the platform before additional studies are conducted. 
In relation to security, several methods can be deployed to inform the user that they are 
exhibiting risky behaviour (summarised in Table 3).  Ur et al. (2012) investigated ways in 
which feedback could be given to users, in the context of aiding a user in choosing a more 
secure password.  Research conducted found that users could be influenced into increasing 
their password security if terms such as “weak” were used to describe their current attempt.  
In the research, colour was also used as a factor to provide feedback to users.  When test 
subjects were entering passwords into the system, a bar meter was shown next to the input 
field.  Depending upon the complexity of the password, the meter displayed a scale ranging 
from green/blue for a good/strong password to red, for a simplistic, easy to crack password.  
Data gathered from the experiments showed that the meters also had an effect on users, 
prompting them to increase system security by implementing stronger passwords, although 
long term retention was an issue. 
Multimedia content such as the use of colour and sound can also be used to provide feedback 
to the user” (McDarby et al. 2004).  In a game named “Brainchild” developed by McDarby et 
al., users must gain control over their bio-signals by relaxing.  In an attempt to help users 
relax, an affective feedback mechanism has been implemented whereby the sounds, colours 
and dialogues used provides a calming mechanism e.g. blue can be seen as a calming colour 
(Adams and Osgood 1973). 
Textual information provided via the GUI can be used to communicate feedback to the user 
(Dehn and Van Mulken 2012). Dehn and Van Mulken conducted an empirical review of ways 
in which animated agents could interact with users.  In doing so, they provided a comparison 
between the role of avatars and textual information in human-computer interaction.  It was 
hypothesised that textual information provided more direct feedback to users however, 
avatars could be used to provide more subtle pieces of information via gestures or eye 
contact.  Ultimately it was noted multimodal interaction could provide users with a greater 
level of communication with the computer system. 
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Previous research has indicated that affective feedback can be utilised when aiding users in 
considering their security behaviour online, since it can detect and help users alter their 
internal states (McDarby et al. 2004).  Work conducted by Robison et al. (2009) used avatars 
in an intelligent tutoring system to provide support to users, noting that such agents have to 
decide whether to intervene when a user is working, to provide affective feedback.  However, 
there is the danger that agents may intervene at the wrong time and in doing so, may cause 
some negative affects when attempting to aid a student. In the context of learning 
environments, Iovane et al. (2012) also discussed this potential issue e.g. if the end-user 
appears to be bored, then a learning system should recognise and intervene to ensure they 
are appropriately challenged, keeping them engaged. 
Hall et al. (2005) concurs with the notion of using avatars to provide affective feedback to 
users, indicating that they influence the emotional state of the end-user.  Avatars were 
deployed in a personal social and health education environment, to educate children about 
the subject of bullying.  Studies showed that the avatars produced an empathetic effect in 
children, indicating that the same type of feedback could be used to achieve the same result 
in adults. 
Table 3 - comparison of feedback techniques 
Technique Description 
Textual Specific words were chosen to persuade participants to consider password 
security i.e. participants would not want a password to be described as 
"weak" (Ur 2012). 
Textual data can provide more direct feedback (Dehn and Van Mulken 2012). 
Colour Used colours in bar meters to indicate password strength (Ur 2012). 
Specific colours used to allow users to control their state (McDarby et al. 
2004) 
Sound Specific music used to allow users to control their state i.e. calming music 
(McDarby et al. 2004) 
Avatars General overview of the role of animated agents in HCI (Dehn and Van 
Mulken 2012). 
Avatars were utilised in an intelligent tutoring system, to support users 
learning about microbiology and genetics (Robison et al. 2009) 
Avatars were deployed in a personal social and health environment to provide 
education on bullying (Hall et al. 2005) 
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2.7.  Attitude vs. behaviour 
Although it may be possible to utilise affective feedback to raise end-user security awareness, 
the relationship between attitude and behaviour must be considered.  A number of studies 
have been carried out in this area, and some of the findings may relate to this research 
project. 
In section 6 of Mostyn's "The attitude behaviour relationship" paper (1978), she examines the 
links between attitude and behaviour in relation to advertising.  She notes that there is a 
wealth of literature on the subject, documenting instances where persuaders have 
successfully and unsuccessfully changed the attitudes of people.  In order for an attitude to 
change, she refers to two key components which seem to cause an attitude shift.  These are 
that firstly, a person must gain experience of the area the attitude is related to, and secondly, 
the person must come to terms with dissatisfaction which surround the old attitude they 
possessed. 
Her work also discusses that it can be difficult to accurately measure change of attitude.  This 
is typically done via the use of Likert scales and semantic differentials.  However, results from 
these can vary differently when measuring attitude change, and attitudes should be measured 
on a number of occasions to build-up a true picture.  Despite these points, she highlights that 
perhaps the act of measuring an attitude or behaviour will change the behaviour exhibited.  
These different views presented in the same paper show that this is a complex issue which 
researchers have been considering for years. 
Others have also looked at this link between attitudes and behaviour.  Hini, Gendall and 
Kearns (1995) examined this relationship in the context of attitudes in relation to the 
environment.  1449 participants took part in the experiment where there were asked a total of 
188 questions in reference to behavioural measures or attitude measures in relation to the 
environment e.g. use of packaging materials.  Results of the research showed there was a 
link between attitude and behaviour.  Such a link has also been identified in other studies. 
Olson and Zanna (1993) reviewed existing literature and found that there is a link between 
behaviour and attitude, stating "behavior affects attitudes, not just the reverse".  However, the 
link found in Hini, Gendall and Kearns’ study (1995) was weak.  Specific to the context of this 
study, it was shown that environmental attitudes were not a consistent predictor of participant 
behaviour. 
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Myers (2004) provided a discourse regarding the relationship between attitude and behaviour.  
In discussing if attitudes will predict behaviour, they noted they may, given certain 
circumstances: if outside influences are minimised, if predicted behaviour corresponds to an 
actual attitude, and if the attitude held is strong.  Despite these factors, he concurs with work 
by Hini, Gendall and Kearns (1995) noting that such a connection is often weak. 
The issues of attitude and behaviour were explored by Avey, Wernsing and Luthans (2008), 
relative to organisational change.  The level of positivity (psychological capital) exhibited by an 
employee was investigated in a bid to see if this had an impact on attitudes and behaviours.  
After surveying 132 employees from a number of different organisations, it was found that an 
employee’s underlying level of psychological capital was directly linked to attitudes and 
behaviours within a company.  Furthermore, these employees were more mindful.  Overall, it 
was shown employees with a positive attitude exhibited less deviant behaviours, and were 
more committed to the company.  In a separate study which sought to predict if people would 
purchase organic foods, conducted by Arvola et al. (2008) similar results were noted.  
Participants exhibiting positivity and the need to "do the right thing" predictively purchased 
organic food. 
By understanding the relationship between attitude and behaviour, findings can be applied to 
the context of security awareness.  Alkaldi and Renaud (2016) looked into reasons behind 
why people might decide to utilise or reject security tools on their smartphones.  The work 
reviewed proposed models of security on mobile devices, before presenting the concept of a 
new model, termed the Integrated Model of Behaviour Prediction (IMBP).  Such reasons, or 
background factors included the attitude the user had towards adopting the security behaviour 
and the intention to adopt the security behaviour.  Future work by the researchers seeks to 
test the performance of such a model. 
Despite being provided with security advice, it is possible this will change neither the attitude 
or the behaviour of the end-user.  Herley (2009) investigated rational reasons as to why users 
may reject perfectly reasonable security advice in the context of mobile phones.  Essentially, 
the paper posits that security advice can prevent users from falling victim to an attack, 
however, attacks are relatively rare, therefore users perceive adhering to security advice as a 
burden.  This is a potential issue which could apply to this research project. 	  
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2.8.  Summary of issues 
Previous work has highlighted the multitude of flaws which users may encounter whilst 
browsing the web.  Users may interact with poorly coded websites, exposing themselves to 
websites which are susceptible to XSS attacks.  They may reveal too much information about 
themselves online, which may lead to them becoming targets in a spear phishing attempt.  
Additionally, end-users may be careless with their passwords, sharing them with colleagues, 
or selecting weaker passwords which are deemed to be more memorable or usable.  This 
suggests that users need to be educated regarding such risky security behaviours. 
As users are often unaware of the risky security behaviours they may exhibit, attempts have 
been make to quantify the perception of risk which users have.  Various methods have been 
used, such as questionnaires used in conjunction with psychometric models, which allow 
users to take a reflective approach in measuring their perception of risk in a qualitative 
manner (Farahmand 2009).  Several other studies have also used questionnaires, measuring 
different factors such as if risk perception was a psychological factor with the potential to 
influence problematic behaviours (Takemura 2011), or how anti-virus tools could lull users into 
a false sense of security regarding the security of their system (San-José and Rodriguez 
2011). 
Over the years, a number of tools have been developed to keep users safe online.  The use of 
graphical passwords as a browser extension was explored by (Bicakci 2009), based on the 
notion that humans are better at memorising images than text.  The extension sought to make 
passwords more usable and reduce the occurrence of risky security behaviour. Ur (2012) took 
a different approach, utilising password meters and words such as "weak" or "good" to denote 
strong/weak passwords, and to again make passwords more usable, reducing the need for 
risky behaviour.  Others such as Sheng et al. (2007) have tried to educate users about 
phishing attacks gamifying the subject of phishing with a tool named Anti-Phishing Phil.  In 
addition to this, approaches have also been taken to prevent users divulging too much 
information about themselves online in the first place.  A series of food nutrition style labels 
were proposed to educate users about online privacy, providing a simple way of displaying the 
information users were making available about themselves (Kelley 2009).  Another study in 
this area by Besmer et al. (2009) attempted to develop a simpler way of alerting users about 
the information they revealed about themselves. 
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Despite the various educational tools developed, there are several issues with some of the 
software created.  Many of the tools seek to train the user about one specific area, such as 
phishing or poor password management.  Users may be educated regarding one aspect of 
their security behaviour but may continue to engage in risky security behaviours in other 
ways.   The tools developed span a number of years, indicating that the issue of risky security 
behaviour has yet to be resolved, and more education is needed.  Integrating both a 
monitoring solution and an affective feedback system is a potential solution to this problem.  
Potentially, existing research could be applied to the problem of educating users about their 
risky security behaviours. 
As more and more business is carried out online, it is important that average users are 
educated in how to behave safely online.  In a study conducted by Ofsted in 2010 (cited by 
(Hoffman 2011)), it was reported that some children are now receiving security awareness 
education in schools, with a view to them maintaining such awareness when left unsupervised 
on machines. However, a large proportion of the population do not have access to this type of 
training. It is clear that education is required to help improve a user’s understanding of 
security, a sentiment which has been echoed by the likes of Leah Hoffman who questioned: 
“What if we had cybersecurity education programs, like we do for fire safety and AIDS?” 
(Hoffman 2011). 
Any system giving feedback on security behaviour must be able to a) monitor a users’ 
behaviour and b) recognise it as insecure, and provide feedback.  The first problem can be 
tackled using the event based approaches (typified by Hilbert and Redmiles (2000) and 
Fenstermacher and Ginsburg (2002) in which both the operating system and applications are 
instrumented so as to collect data on interface events and function calls (originally with the 
intention of extracting usability information).  The analysis of such data into recognizable 
patterns of behaviour has been examined from a user perspective by Stanton et al. (2005), Ng 
et al. (2009) and more recently by Padayachee (2012). 
The implementation of a monitoring framework is a necessary precursor to the work on 
affective feedback and is based upon known techniques as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. 
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A possible method of educating end-users is through affective feedback, which belongs in the 
field of affective computing.  Previous research utilising affective feedback considers a 
number of areas. As an example McDarby et al. (2004) considered the general benefits of 
affective feedback e.g. technology being used to help users alter their internal states. Robison 
et al. utilised avatars in an intelligent tutoring system and noted that “throughout learning 
interactions, affect support systems continually encounter situations in which they must 
determine whether to intervene to provide affective support” (Robison et al. 2009).  Other 
research by Hall et al. (2005) indicates that affective feedback and interface characters are a 
suitable method for interacting with end-users and influencing their emotional state. 
It has been highlighted that users may interact with machines for greater periods of time if a 
computer appears to respond to their emotions (Jameson and Riedl 2011), indicating that 
affective feedback would be an appropriate route to take when encouraging users to consider 
security mechanisms which are in place on machines.  The relationship between attitude and 
behaviour must also be taken into account.  Previous research has indicated that whilst there 
is a link between these factors (Myers 2004), the connection may be weak (Hini, Gendall and 
Kearns 1995). 
Acknowledging that even intermediate/advanced users struggle with security and the obscure 
terms which surround it (Furnell et al. 2006), this identifies that there is a need to interact with 
users and aid them in enhancing security in this respect. Given the nature of affective 
computing, this is a possible solution to interacting with end-users. 	 	
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Chapter 3. Research Goals 
 
3.1.  Project focus 
The aim of this research project is to ascertain whether or not dynamically provided affective 
feedback enhances awareness of risky security behaviour in end-users.  Furthermore, the 
project seeks to evaluate the possibility that by enhancing security risk awareness in end-
users, the overall security of the computer system will also be enhanced as a result.  
Considering the research which has previously been conducted in the field of both affective 
computing and security risk awareness, the experiments conducted in this project will follow a 
similar approach.  
The developmental process involves the creation of a monitoring solution in a vein similar to 
one proposed by Fenstermacher and Ginsburg (2009) which utilises an event-based 
approach whereby events triggered will be written to a log file for further analysis.  An affective 
feedback mechanism will be constructed on top of the monitoring solution, delivering affective 
feedback at appropriate intervals. 
During the experimental phase, users will be asked to complete a questionnaire, to quantify 
opinions regarding potential feedback received.  Following the multi-modal approach taken by 
San-José and Rodriguez (2011), log data will be compared to questionnaire results, allowing 
both user behaviour and user security awareness to be measured.  Conclusions will be drawn 
as to whether or not it is possible to utilise affective feedback in enhancing the security risk 
awareness in end-users. 	  
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3.2.  Research Question 
Factors discussed such as the need for security education in end-users, and the prospect of a 
monitoring solution, coupled with affective feedback being a suitable solution to the issue, this 
leads to the research question-  
• “Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users via dynamically 
provided affective feedback?” 
 
3.3.  Addressing the issues 
To address this question, several steps were completed in the development of a potential 
solution. Chapter 2 looked at the background of the risky behaviour of users in the context of 
a web browser, and possible methodologies which could be used to persuade users to 
change their behaviour online, including monitoring solutions and affective feedback.  Since 
security awareness in the context of a web browser is being investigated, a solution to the 
problem in the form of a Firefox browser is a potential solution. Chapter 4 outlines small test 
extensions which were developed in order to prove an extension was able to monitor and 
capture risky security behaviours, and could deliver suitable methods of affective feedback 
when required. 
To address the problems identified by this project, initially, a sub-domain of the security-risk 
problem was identified.  The project addresses the issue of security and risks within the web 
browser, owing to the ubiquitous use of the internet in the 21st century. 
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Due to this a piece of software, a browser extension was developed which will act as a testing 
harness for alternative feedback agents. Again the project was restricted to a manageable 
size, investigating the sub-domain of risky security behaviour in terms of a web-browser 
environment.  Specifically, the browser chosen for the project was Mozilla Firefox, as it had 
the necessary low-level hooks which would allow for rapid development of a system which 
could monitor user behaviour and trigger affective feedback at opportune moments.  In 
monitoring user interaction, the software can compare this to models of known risky 
behaviour. It will then send a message to the agent under trial requesting feedback delivery.  
Mozilla Firefox is merely a method of delivering such a warning system. 
Additionally, Mozilla Firefox was chosen as when the research project was proposed in 2012, 
Firefox retained the second largest browser share worldwide (behind Internet Explorer) 
(ARSTechnica 2012).  The cross-platform nature of the browser also means that those who 
use Windows, OS X, and Linux operating systems may be aware of the browser. 
A number of feedback agents were developed in order to assess the impact of affective 
feedback.  These include a control extension (which monitors users’ actions but provides no 
feedback), an extension which provides text-based affective feedback, an extension which 
provides text-based and colour-based affective feedback, an extension which provides text-
based and avatar-based affective feedback and finally, an extension which provides text-
based, colour-based and avatar-based affective feedback (Chapter 6 provides a full overview 
of the agents utilised).  Previous research indicates that both avatars and textual feedback 
appear to be appropriate methods of educating users in regards to their behaviour when 
interacting with a device, prompting users to change their behaviour (Hall et al. 2005) 
(McDarby et al. 2004) (Dehn and Van Mulken 2012). This suggests that such an approach 
would be applicable for this project also. Their performance was evaluated against each other 
via user evaluations. 
Each of the extensions were tested with users.  Initially the evaluation was qualitative, utilising 
questionnaires. Several studies conducted in the field of affective feedback advocate the use 
of questionnaires and Likert scales to evaluate the effectiveness of an agent (Pfleeger and 
Caputo 2012) (Robison et al. 2009) (Wixon 2011) (Lottridge, Chignell and Jovicic 2011).  
Therefore, a comparable approach has been undertaken within this project. 
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Specifically, the questionnaires used with the Likert scales attempt to address components of 
the research question, covering areas such as: how a user perceived their initial behaviour 
when interacting with a web browser, whether users found affective feedback provided to be 
helpful and whether the feedback given highlighted issues, and allowed them to reconsider 
their security behaviour. The difference between what the users said they did was compared 
against the actual logs for each of the experiments and the difference in awareness in risky 
actions between groups of users was quantified.  The user tests involved a number of groups. 
Each group was assigned a different feedback agent to use (including a non-affective agent to 
serve as a control group), and the results were then compared. 
Users’ actions were logged via the monitoring system during the experimental phase, and 
users were subsequently provided with a questionnaire to determine their level of security 
awareness. Based on the data, it was possible to determine if a monitoring agent with 
affective feedback can be used to enhance security awareness.  The final aims of the 
research project are to a) assess if security risk awareness improves in end-users and b) if 
overall system security improves through the use of affective feedback.  A full description of 
the methodology used is described in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  The results 
gained as a result of the methodology will be presented in Chapter 8, prior to them being 
discussed, analysed and broken down in Chapter 9.  Finally, Chapter 10 will provide overall 
conclusions, as to the answer to research questions, along with some careful consideration of 
future work which could be conducted.  
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3.4.  Summary 
To investigate the research goal and provide an answer to the research question, the section 
below provides an overview of the methodology which will be followed. 
• Research aim: 
o Develop and apply knowledge of monitoring techniques and affective 
feedback, establishing if this changes users’ awareness of risky security 
behaviour in the context of a browser-based environment. 
• Research question: 
o “Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users via 
dynamically provided affective feedback?” 
• Issues which highlight the need for research: 
o there's a multitude of flaws which users may fall victim to whilst browsing the 
web 
o users are often unaware of the risky security behaviors they may exhibit 
o a range of tools, created over a number of years have been developed to 
keep users safe online- this highlights there still a problem with online security 
o more and more business is carried out online: there is a need to educate 
users regarding online safety 
o affective feedback has previously been used in educational environments 
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• How will the issues be addressed? 
o consider the current awareness of risky security behaviours in end-users and 
examine differing affective feedback techniques 
o  develop a user monitoring system for use within a browser-based 
environment 
o develop prototype software containing affective feedback agents 
o construct an experimental design to address the research question 
o quantify the difference in awareness in end-users using statistical analysis 
and draw conclusions 
 
• Features of tool developed: 
o ability to monitor end-user behaviour via the use of a browser extension 
o in relation to existing research (Bubaš, Orehova and & Konecki 2008) (Milne, 
Labrecque and Cromer 2009), the following behaviours will be monitored, 
owing to the fact these behaviours can occur within the context of a browser-
based environment 
§ if there are commonly used words in a password 
§ if a password contains personal information 
§ password length 
§ if there are malicious links found on a page 
§ if the current page visited is malicious 
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§ if a site is served via HTTP 
§ if the current page is a top 20 social media site 
o on detection of an occurrence of the aforementioned behaviours, an affective 
feedback mechanism will be triggered 
o types of affective feedback which will be delivered to end-users on-screen 
(outlined in diagram 1) 
§ colour 
§ text 
§ human avatars 
Diagram 1- overview of the tool developed 
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• Outcomes of the research: 
o an understanding of users’ awareness of risky security behaviours  
o determine if affective feedback provided had an impact on the data recorded 
regarding the actions and behaviour of users 
o determine if affective feedback had an impact on the end-users and 
subsequent behaviour 
o provide an overall conclusion as to whether affective feedback enhances 
security risk awareness in end-users and improves security behaviour  
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Chapter 4. Mozilla Firefox and Prototype Browser 
Extensions 
The research project sought to develop a software prototype which was composed of a 
monitoring solution, and eventually an affective feedback delivery system within the confine of 
a browser-based environment.  If the user partakes in potentially risky security behaviour 
whilst browsing the web, e.g. revealing login credentials on an untrusted website, then an 
affective feedback mechanism is triggered, alerting the user regarding their behaviour.  Owing 
to the open-source nature of Mozilla Firefox and the ease of creating extensions with hooks to 
the necessary low-level components, the browser was an ideal development platform to allow 
for the implementation of a user behaviour monitoring system and an affective feedback 
delivery system. 
 
4.1.  Mozilla Firefox- a brief history 
The Mozilla Firefox browser was originally a branch project, created from the release of the 
Mozilla Application Suite browser code. Prototype versions of the browser were released 
under the name of Phoenix in 2002. After a period of development, the first official version of 
Firefox was released in 2004: Firefox 1.0 (Mozilla a) 2015). As of April 2016, the browser 
holds an approximate market share of 15.6% (ARS Technica UK 2016), coming in second 
place to Google’s Chrome, and narrowly rising above Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Edge 
browsers.  Table 4 contains an overview of different web browsers, and the add-on 
technologies they utilise. 	  
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Table 4 – Summary of browsers and add-on features 
 
Browser Cross Platform 
Support 
Add-on Technology Market Share (ARS 
Technica UK 2016) 
Mozilla 
Firefox 
Yes XUL-based 15.6% 
Google 
Chrome 
Yes 
WebExtensions (HTML, 
JavaScript, CSS). 
60.5% 
Microsoft 
Internet 
Explorer 
No .NET Framework 15.5% 
Opera Yes 
WebExtensions (HTML, 
JavaScript, CSS). 
8.4% (listed as “others”) 
Safari No 
Safari Extensions (HTML, 
JavaScript, CSS). 
8.4% (listed as “others”) 
 
The browser offers cross-platform support, with the ability to run on a number of different 
operating systems e.g. Microsoft Windows 98 and onwards, Apple's OS X and a variety of 
Linux distributions. In addition to this, Firefox provides users with the opportunity to customise 
the browsing experience, allowing extensions to be readily installed. Mozilla describe 
extensions as add-ons which "add new features to Firefox or modify existing functionality" 
(Mozilla b) 2015). New features that extensions may add to the browser can include additional 
search tools, increased security (blocking adverts and scanning sites for malicious links), 
download management and, integration with social media websites.  XUL-based extensions 
allow access to low-level components, and allow the developer increased flexibility in 
customising the extension. 
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4.1.1.  Mozilla Extensions: how are these constructed? 
There are a number of ways of developing a Firefox extension: utilising XUL (XML User 
Interface Language), or developing in Mozilla's Add-on SDK (software development kit), which 
was previously called Mozilla JetPack (Mozilla Developer Network 2015). 
Extensions developed using the Add-on SDK are more limited in their functionality in 
comparison to XUL-based extensions, restricting how users can interact with the user 
interface (i.e. they must strictly follow usability guidelines for Firefox). The Add-on SDK 
environment makes development easier, providing the developer with access to JavaScript 
APIs, allowing them to make use of commonly used functions. Additionally, it provides access 
to UI components recommended by the usability guidelines, with the aim of ensuring that the 
extension developed integrates with the existing browser interface. Mozilla also claim that 
whilst it is still possible to develop an insecure extension under the SDK, it is harder to write a 
malicious extension which could do serious damage (Mozilla Developer Network 2015). 
Most traditional extensions, now known as legacy extensions, are written using XUL. XUL-
based extensions allow the developer to extensively customise the user interface, owing to 
the fact that this type of extension is not restricted to the APIs supported by the Add-on SDK. 
Additionally, the developer also has access to the XPCOM (cross platform component object 
model) (Mozilla Developer Network 2015). When developing Firefox extensions, there are a 
number of key files which are required and can be modified, allowing the extension to 
potentially monitor behaviour, provide the user with feedback, or modify the user interface. All 
XUL-based extensions follow a similar structure, where a number of necessary files must be 
included in order for the extension to run (outlined in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 - overview of file structure 
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Before an extension can be installed to the browser, the various files and folders it consists of 
must be packaged into a Firefox browser extension archive file.  This file takes the form of a 
.xpi file, which stands for a XPInstall (or cross-platform) install file. 
The Browser.xul file within the content folder contains hooks which are required to link to other 
files. This file has the ability to link to multiple JavaScript files, such as the Bootstrap and 
jQuery libraries. The file also allows additional XUL constructs to be added, allowing the 
menus and toolbars within Firefox to be modified e.g. adding a new menu item which, when 
clicked, allows a user to run an extension.  These factors make Mozilla Firefox extensions a 
suitable method of monitoring user behaviour and delivering affective feedback at appropriate 
moments. 
In order to begin investigating how best to assemble a XUL-based extension, a basic template 
created by Robert Nyman (Nyman 2009) was investigated and reconstructed. 
 
Figure 2 - architecture of the linkTargetFinder extension 
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This extension was named the linkTargetFinder and its main purpose was rather basic. When 
run, it simply searched the page for the target URL of any links which may be on the page.  If 
links were found, the JavaScript file embedded within the extension produced an alert box 
noting that links had been found on the page.  If there were no links to be found on the page, 
similarly, the JavaScript file embedded within the extension produced an alert box saying that 
no links had been found.  Figure 2 provides an overview of the key files involved with 
checking the content of the webpage, and subsequently producing the alert both on-screen, 
highlighting whether there are/are not any links on a particular web page. 
After successfully compiling this extension, this template was used as the basis for the rest of 
the prototype extensions, and both the final monitoring solution and delivery of the affective 
feedback mechanism. 
 
4.2.  Prototype extensions 
A number of small prototype extensions were created during the research to test the 
functionality of the Firefox extension platform to ascertain if it was suitable for the scope of the 
project.  The end goal of the project was to create a final prototype with the ability to a) 
monitor the actions of the user and b) provide affective feedback at appropriate intervals in a 
bid to encourage the end-user to think about their online security awareness and, considering 
the overall level of security of their system.  It should be noted that whilst Firefox was used to 
create prototype extensions, the concept of the research project was to create a monitoring 
solution and an affective feedback mechanism; to this end, Firefox was merely the vehicle for 
delivering the overarching idea. 
This section will discuss each of the small prototypes developed and will explain the rationale 
and the purpose behind each of the tests.  Table 5 provides an overview of each of the 
prototype extensions, and their purpose.   	  
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Table 5- overview of prototype extensions	
Extension Name Purpose 
multiplejs Check multiple JavaScript files could be used in an extension. 
hideAllTheThings Check it was possible to manipulate the DOM by hiding 
elements. 
injectGifs Check it was possible to inject GIFs into a webpage, with a view 
to adding animated agents at a later date. 
highlightTags Manipulate the DOM to highlight specific tags on the page.  
Could be used t.o highlight malicious links in the final extension 
developed 
secureLink Checks if a page is HTTP/HTTPS.  Could be used to warn users 
if they are submitting information over an unencrypted 
connection. 
captureStoreLinks Grabs all links on a page.  Compared them against a blacklist 
and determines of they are malicious.  Could be used to warn 
users about malicious links in the final extension developed, 
mouseNearLink Adds an extra border to all links on a page.  When the cursor 
approaches a link, it is checked to determine if it's malicious.  If 
the link is malicious, it is highlighted, warning the user. 
autoRunExtension Checks a Firefox extension can automatically run when a web 
page is loaded.  Will be used to automatically run the final 
extension developed. 
Logging Keystrokes Logs keypresses, and writes them to a file.  Shows a log file can 
be utilised, and the actions of the user can be recorded.  Acts as 
a precursor to the aspect of the monitoring solution in the final 
extension developed. 
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4.2.1.  Prototype- multiplejs 
The multiplejs extension was created to test that an extension could link to and utilise multiple 
JavaScript files within a Firefox extension.  Within the structure of the extension, the 
browser.xul file links to a number of different JavaScript files: both file1.js and file2.js contain a 
single function which produces an on-screen alert, the jQuery library, and main.js (Figure 3).  
The extension does not run automatically when a webpage is loaded however, when a button 
on the toolbar is pressed, browser.xul calls main.js and an alert box is produced.  The main.js 
file then calls a function from file1.js, producing a second alert box.  Finally, main.js calls a 
function from file2.js which again produces a final alert box. 
Figure 3 - overview of the extension testing multiple JavaScript files 
 
This extension shows that it is possible to link to multiple JavaScript files from within a Firefox 
extension and utilise functions from each of these files.  In addition to this, it also highlights 
that JavaScript libraries such as jQuery can be embedded within a Firefox extension, 
increasing the functionality of the software developed. 	  
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4.2.2.  Prototype- hideAllTheThings 
In order to deliver affective feedback to users via the browser based on their actions, it was 
identified there was a need to manipulate the DOM (document object model) of the webpage.  
To test whether or not this was possible from a Firefox extension, a small prototype extension 
was developed called hideAllTheThings. 
Figure 4 - overview of the extension which hides all Firefox components 	
The browser.xul files contains links to both the main.js file and the jQuery library.  When the 
extension is manually run on a webpage, a function in the main.js file removes all elements 
from the screen (Figure 4). 
hideAllTheThings was an important extension developed during the prototyping process as it 
demonstrated how an extension handles working with the jQuery library and how it 
manipulates part of the DOM.  A small test was conducted whereby jQuery was added into 
the extension, denoted by $ff (standing for Firefox in Figure 5).  The no conflict function 
ensured the jQuery library running within the extension does not interfere with a webpage 
which might be running a version of jQuery itself. 
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If jQuery was used to hide an element on a webpage, the line of code $ff("*").remove(); would 
be used.  This would hide all elements included in the DOM of a web page.  As this prototype 
runs jQuery within a browser extension, entering this line of code produces a different effect.  
Instead, every element within the Firefox window is hidden.  This includes the actual browser 
window, along with every single component which creates the chrome (user interface of the 
browser).  When run manually on a webpage, the user is left with nothing but a blank white 
screen, with no access to even the menu buttons to close the window. 
 
Figure 5 - code to remove elements on page 
To enable affective feedback to be implemented at a later stage, JavaScript must skip outside 
the chrome of the browser and target the DOM directly.  This was achieved by modifying the 
original line of code to read $ff("*", window.content.document).remove(); which targets the 
webpage loaded in the window.  This removes every element from the web page, and leaves 
the chrome of the browser and menu systems intact, allowing affective feedback to be 
integrated later e.g. highlighting a link in red to denote that it is malicious.  It is possible to 
remove any HTML element from the webpage, e.g. a paragraph tag, or an anchor tag.  If the 
ID or the class of the element is known, then it can be targeted, and subsequently removed. 	
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4.2.3.  Prototype- injectGifs 
This extension, when run, manipulates the DOM of a web page and appends a selected GIF 
to every paragraph element.  Whilst this may seem like a meaningless extension to develop in 
the context of this PhD project, the original intent behind it was to discover if the DOM could 
be manipulated with a view to adding animated affective agents to a web page, depending on 
user behaviour. 
The browser.xul files contains links to both the main.js file and the jQuery library.  When the 
extension is manually run on a web page, a function in the main.js file pulls in a GIF from an 
external URL, finds all paragraphs on the web page, and then finally appends the GIF onto 
the page (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 - overview of the injectGIFs extension 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Figure 7 shows the injectGIFs extension running on a web page.  In this instance, every 
paragraph tag on the Google home page has had a GIF of a cartoon banana attached to it.  
Although this may not seem like the most serious of examples, it provides a small proof of 
concept, showing that animated avatars can be appended to a web page when a Firefox 
extension is run. 
Figure 7 - screenshot of injected GIFs 
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4.2.4.  Prototype- highlightTags 
When run, this extension highlights tags on a website which may have the potential to be 
malicious, and cause problems for the end-user.  A number of HTML tags are highlighted by 
the extension and these include the <a>, <form>, <input>, <textarea> tags.  Highlighting a 
form clearly displays to the user that there is one on the page and that they should be wary of 
entering information into the page.  If the code behind a particular website is insecure or is 
poorly developed, then any of these tags can be manipulated by those with malicious intent, 
for example, the anchor tags could be used as part of an XSS (cross-site scripting) attack.  
Figure 8 - overview of the highlightTags extension 
 
The extension does not run automatically on every website the user visits, as it is a prototype 
extension, however, when its manually run by pressing a button on the main toolbar, Figure 9 
provides an example of the way in which tags are highlighted on a page.  It should be noted at 
this stage that the colours chosen to highlight each of the tags were chosen randomly and 
have no affective motive behind them. 
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Figure 9 - select tags highlighted 
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4.2.5.  Prototype- secureLink 
The basic secureLink extension was designed 1) to check whether a website was encrypted 
or not by performing a simple check to determine if the URL protocol used was HTTP or 
HTTPS (whereby HTTPS denotes an encrypted page, unless there are some issues with the 
server) and 2) to check and see if the current URL is malicious. 
The browser.xul file links to the main JavaScript file within the extension and when the 
extension is manually triggered on a website, it parses the DOM of the site and creates an 
array consisting of the URL of the current page, along with all the other links which are on that 
particular webpage.  JavaScript loops through the array, and determines if each of the links 
have either the HTTP or a HTTPS protocol.  Following this, an AJAX request sends the array 
of links to a web server, where a PHP file processes each of the links. 
The PHP file stores all links in the url_capture.sql database, which could potentially be used to 
develop a personalised profile for a user in the future, depending upon links they have visited 
previously.  Additionally, the PHP file checks all links on the page against a large text file of 
known malicious links.  The malicious sites in the text file were gathered from the hpHosts 
database which is a "community managed and maintained hosts file that allows an additional 
layer of protection against access to ad, tracking and malicious websites" (hpHosts 2016).  
Utilising this information, this allows the links stored in the url_capture.sql database to be 
marked as safe/or unsafe. 
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Figure 10 - overview of the secureLink extension 
There is the potential for an unsafe link to be marked as safe in the database.  Such an issue 
may occur if the hpHosts database is unaware of a new malicious link and has not yet 
updated.  It should be noted that the hpHosts database is also used by the anti-malware tool, 
MalwareBytes, therefore the database itself has been deemed to be reasonably robust. 	  
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4.2.6.  Prototype- captureStoreLinks 
The captureStoreLinks prototype extension provides similar functionality to the 
aforementioned secureLink extension.  Again, when the extension is run manually via a button 
on the toolbar, the main JavaScript file is triggered, as it parses the DOM of the site and 
creates an array consisting of the URL of the current page, along with all the other links which 
are on that particular webpage.  When run, the extension grabs the URLs of all the links on 
the page. These links are passed to a PHP processing script on a server which inserts them 
into the url_capture.sql database and, checks if the links are potentially malicious (against 
hpHosts file).  Again, the purpose of the prototype extension was to create a small proof of 
concept showing it was possible to determine if links were malicious via a Firefox extension. 
Figure 11 - overview of captureStoreLinks extension 	  
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4.2.7.  Prototype- mouseNearLink 
When run via a button on the toolbar, the mouseNearLink extension retrieves the URL of the 
link the user's cursor is closest to.  On detecting a URL, the extension passes it to the server; 
if the link is found to be malicious in some way, the DOM of the current website the user is 
visiting is manipulated, highlighting the dangerous link in red. 
To delve into the technical details (Figure 12), when run, browser.xul within the extension is 
linked to both a main JavaScript file and the jQuery library.  When the user loads a web page, 
a JavaScript function parses the DOM of the browser and adds a unique event listener to 
every anchor tag on the page, and pads the margin of each link slightly.  When the cursor 
encroaches the space around the link, the event listener is triggered, prompting the JavaScript 
to pass the link via AJAX to the process_url.php page residing on a server. 
Figure 12- overview of mouseNearLink extension 
On reaching the server, the link is stored in the url_capture.sql database.  The link is also 
passed to another PHP function, in the check_link_safety_function.php file, where it is run 
against the dodgy_links.txt file (this file is a blacklist of malicious links and has been sourced 
from the hpHosts database).  If the link is found to be malicious, a notification is passed back 
to the main JavaScript file which then utilises jQuery's CSS() function, manipulating the DOM 
of the browser, clearly highlighting the malicious link on the web page (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 - effects of the extension 
The mouseNearLink prototype extension proves that it's possible to detect malicious links on 
a page a user is visiting, highlighting them in a bid to warn users that they should not click on 
them.  The basis of this concept was used to deliver some affective feedback in the final 
version of the tool developed to ascertain if such feedback had an impact on the users.  This 
also presents a full example of how a Firefox extension may be developed to monitor user 
behaviour and provide basic feedback.  
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4.2.8.  Prototype- autoRunExtension 
Until this point during the development of the small prototype extensions, each of them had to 
be run manually by the user i.e. the extensions did not run automatically on page load.  
Instead, users had to either click on a toolbar button, or select a menu item from within the 
chrome of the browser every time they visited or reloaded a new web page.  This is 
cumbersome and would defeat the purpose of a monitoring solution if the user had to enable it 
every time. 
A solution was found in the form of a code snippet on the Mozilla website (Mozilla c) 2015) 
which suggested the extension could be triggered to run automatically on page load.  In order 
to do this, the extension adds an event listener to the page, and waits for the DOM content to 
load before proceeding with the function of the extension. 
Figure 14 - overview of the autoRun extension 
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In the case of the autoRunExtension prototype, browser.xul within the extension is linked to a 
main JavaScript file and a copy of the jQuery library.  When the user visits a new page and 
the DOM content has finished loading, a function from the main.js file is called automatically 
and in this case, the function produces an alert box on-screen every time a user visits a new 
page. 
Without the aid of the event listener which tells the extension to wait for the DOM, it would 
have been impossible to develop a tool to deliver automatic affective feedback.  Instead, the 
project would have had to rely on the end user clicking a button on the toolbar every time they 
visited a new page.  Ultimately, this would have become irritating, and the users would have 
failed to trigger the feedback.  Though this is a simple extension, this was a huge 
development in terms of the research project. 
 
4.2.9.  Prototype- Logging Keystrokes 
A keystroke logging prototype extension was developed in an attempt to provide a very basic 
monitoring solution to ascertain what a user is typing on a web page, with a view to 
determining whether or not they are revealing information in a password/login field and to 
illustrate that a log file can be utilized on the server.  This extension was developed with the 
concept of delivering affective feedback to the end-user in mind.   
If a form field is requesting sensitive information such as a password, an affective agent will 
be triggered to warn users about the potential dangers of risky security behaviour.  In this 
extension, jQuery is included as one of the JavaScript files which the browser.xul overlay file 
imports.  The keypress() function within the jQuery library has been used and each time the 
event is triggered, it generates a host of information, including the key pressed, the character 
code of the key pressed, the time stamp of when a user pressed the key and the type and ID 
of the HTML element in which the keypress was triggered e.g. <div id="test_div"> (Figure 15 
shows the keypress event). 
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Figure 15 - code snippet showing that the keypress function is called when the user 
types anywhere within the body of a webpage 
 
In the case of the keypress extension, keystrokes are written to a log file on a server, along 
with a timestamp (Figure 16).  The extension passes keypress information to a PHP file via 
AJAX.  The PHP script separates the contents of the keypress array, and attaches a 
timestamp, before appending it to a log file, illustrating how simple it is to develop a simple 
keystroke logger within a Firefox extension.  In the prototype extension, this process is 
repeated for each individual key pressed. 
 
Figure 16 - the AJAX call to the PHP file which handles the keypress array 
 
Figure 17 - sample data from the log file 
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Again, this was a very important prototype extension in terms of the development of the 
project as a whole.  By demonstrating that users’ actions could be written to a specifically 
chosen file on a server, it proved that this could be an important part of a monitoring solution.  
Furthermore, the extension also displays that it’s possible to investigate and determine what 
the user is typing in particular fields.   This extension has the potential to be used as a 
malicious keystroke logger, since it has the ability to store the contents of a password textbox 
in plaintext on a server.  However, with modification, the basis of the extension could be 
extended, checking the password a user has entered against a list of commonly used 
passwords, without storing the actual password.  Therefore, this could be used as part of a 
larger extension which with monitors user behaviour and delivers affective feedback for 
example if a user has a short, a weak, or a common password. 	  
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4.3.  Summary of Mozilla Firefox and prototype extensions 
The testing of these small prototype extensions confirmed the model of Mozilla Firefox 
extensions were suitable for the scope of the PhD project.  During the development phase of 
the prototype extensions, knowledge was gained by the creation of small proof of concepts.  
Several of these concepts were then deemed suitable to utilise in the main body of the final 
version of the developed prototype extension, such as the auto run functionality, which any 
developed monitoring solution will need to do.  
Browser extensions which provide feedback regarding certain risky security behaviours 
already exist.  These include TORPEDO (Volkamer, Renaud and Reinheimer 2016), 
PhiGARo (Cregan et al. 2012), GPEX (Bicakci et al. 2009), and PassSec (Volkamer et al. 
2015).  However, the browser extension developed as part of this research project makes use 
of feedback which is considered to be affective, which makes it different. 
Affective feedback mechanisms which will be utilised in the final prototype extension include 
colour-based feedback (e.g. green indicating good behaviour), text-based feedback using 
specific terms and avatars using subtle cues within the browser window.  Chapter 6 will 
discuss why these types of feedback have been chosen for inclusion in the prototype, and will 
detail the specific colours, text, and avatars chosen. 
Experiments using these agents will investigate a) if security risk awareness improves in end-
users and b) if overall system security improves through the use of affective feedback 
(Shepherd, Archibald and Ferguson 2014). 	  
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Chapter 5. Monitoring Solution 
The work developed as part of the research project proposes the use of a browser extension 
to automatically detect risky security behaviour.  Previous research has indicated affective 
feedback may serve as a suitable method to educate users regarding risky security 
behaviours (Hall et al. 2005) (McDarby et al. 2004) (Robison et al. 2009).  Within the scope of 
the browser environment, it is proposed that on detection of risky security behaviour, the 
browser will be used as a delivery mechanism for affective feedback, warning users about the 
risk of taking action. 
This section will discuss the technological aspects of the system in detail, providing a full 
explanation of how the monitoring solution was implemented. 
 
5.1.  System overview 
The research project proposed the creation of a software prototype in the form of a browser, 
including the ability to monitor user behaviour and provide suitable affective feedback.  The 
prototype extension developed will utilise several feedback agents.  Should the monitoring 
system detect a users' engagement in known potentially risky security behaviour whilst 
browsing the internet e.g. entering a commonly used password into a website, an affective 
feedback mechanism will trigger, warning users regarding the dangers of their actions ( Figure 
18). 
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 Figure 18 - overview of system architecture 
 
The aforementioned feedback mechanisms have been explored in previous pieces of 
research (Shepherd, Archibald and Ferguson 2014).  Feedback will include the use of text-
based feedback using specifically chosen words with a positive/negative weighting and, 
avatars, with subtle facial cues, expressing to users that they have engaged in safe/unsafe 
behaviour.   
Additionally, colour-based feedback will be used, with green indicating a positive action.  Red 
will be used to highlight a dangerous action, owing to its use as a warning colour in Western 
society, and its history as a warning colour in evolutionary psychology Kralik, J.D. et al. 
(2011).  At this stage, colours used in the research will not take colour-blind users into 
account. 
Risky behaviours which the monitoring solution seeks to detect include using common 
passwords or a password containing personal details, or visiting a malicious site.  Full details 
of the behaviours the monitoring solution detects can be found in section 5.2.2.  
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Experiments conducted using these affective feedback agents investigate if security risk 
awareness improves in end-users (see  Figure 18). The success of the software will be 
gauged via a series of end-user experiments followed by a questionnaire utilising a Likert 
scale.  Logs created by the monitoring solution will be compared against answers given in the 
questionnaires.  This allows a comparison between how users thought they performed vs. 
how they actually performed, giving an overall representation of the impact of the software.	
 
5.2.  Monitoring Solution 
5.2.1.  Overview of the monitoring system 
In order to detect potentially risky security behaviours and trigger affective feedback at 
opportune moments, a monitoring system had to be created within the confines of a browser-
based environment.   Owing to the functionality and necessary low level hooks which the 
Mozilla extension framework possesses, outlined in section 4.1.1.  of this document, a Firefox 
extension was deemed to be a suitable environment, and would ultimately allow the impact of 
affective feedback on end-user security awareness to be measured. 
Despite the suitability of the environment, creating the software presented challenges when 
integrating such a tool into the confines of a browser-based environment. 
 
5.2.2.  Actions the monitoring solution oversees 
The literature review identified papers (Bubaš, Orehova and & Konecki 2008) (Milne, 
Labrecque and Cromer 2009) which define specific risky security behaviours.  A smaller 
subset of these behaviours were chosen for implementation, owing to their suitability for 
monitoring in the content of a web browser.  Checks for the following behaviours were built 
into a monitoring solution and each of the behaviours chosen has been backed-up with a 
rationale.  The technical details will be explained in section 5.2.5.  
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5.2.2.1.   Commonly used words in a password 
One of the risky behaviours listed in a paper by Milne Labrecque and Cromer (2009) asks 
users if they have "Used a password that is a word that can be found in a dictionary".  By 
simply checking the encrypted contents of a password field on a web page, a test to check if a 
user has engaged in this behaviour has been built into the monitoring solution. 
 
5.2.2.2.   Password contains personal information 
Again from the paper by Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009), users were asked if they have 
ever "Used a password or login that contains personal information".  Again, functionality to 
check if this is the case has been built into the prototype monitoring solution. 
 
5.2.2.3.   Password length 
The OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) (OWASP 2016) guidelines state that 
the minimum recommended length for a password is 8 characters.  A simple length check has 
been built into the monitoring solution. 
 
5.2.2.4.   Malicious links found on page 
Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009), asked users if they had ever "Clicked on links in an 
email without knowing the sender".  Although the prototype extension Firefox extension can 
handle malicious links within a webmail-based page, the concept has been extended to check 
all links found on the web page a user is visiting, and to check them against the hpHosts 
database of known malicious links (hpHosts 2016). 
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5.2.2.5.   Current page is a malicious link 
Again, similar to the aforementioned paragraph, the concept of malicious links in emails noted 
in Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009), has been extended to checking the current page the 
user is visiting against the database of known malicious links. 
 
5.2.2.6.   Site is served via HTTP 
A check to verify if a page is served via HTTP has been implemented into the extension.  This 
has been added because most modern web browsers have some warning notification 
between HTTP and HTTPS on the address bar however it can be difficult for users to find an 
explanation of what that actually means.  The HTTP check will be there to warn users they 
should not reveal private/important information because a HTTP connection is unencrypted. 
 
5.2.2.7.   Current page is a top 20 social media site 
Many users reveal too much information about themselves online which can be used to build 
up a profile about them via OSINT (open source intelligence), with the potential to target users 
via specifically crafted malicious links in email addresses.  Milne, Labrecque and Cromer 
(2009), also ask in their paper if users have "Used social networking sites", linking to the fact 
people reveal a lot of information about themselves online (Kaspersky Lab 2013). The 
extension has built-in functionality which will check to see if users have visited a top 20 social 
media website (as of the first-quarter of 2016). 
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5.2.3.  Utilities used 
To effectively monitor end-users and provide the necessary trigger warnings, some external 
utilities were required to the delivery this information.  Each utility required is discussed in this 
section. 
 
5.2.3.1.   Top passwords 
To perform a check to ascertain if a user's password contained a commonly used dictionary 
word, it was necessary to obtain a list of commonly used passwords.  Such a list was obtained 
from Daniel Miessler's GitHub repository (Miessler 2014).  This list is maintained by Daniel 
Miessler and Jason Haddix (both information security specialists) as part of the SecLists 
project and both of the aforementioned authors are part of the OWASP (Open Web 
Application Security Project) community. 
The list used from the repository was the 10k_most_common.txt file, which provided a 
suitable number of commonly used passwords to check user passwords against.  To make 
querying the list more efficient in terms of the research project (owing to the fact PHP was 
used), the list was converted into a MySQL database residing on a server.  The database was 
named top_passwords.sql. 
 
5.2.3.2.   Personal information 
One of the password criteria for checking passwords in this extension was to see if the 
password contained personal information.  There was some consideration given to using 
OSINT to build up a profile on each of the participants during the experimental phase 
however, this proved to be difficult, as participants may not have had a Twitter, Facebook 
account etc.  Instead, a form was created asking users to provide information about 
themselves on a voluntary basis (for more information about the experimental process, see 
(Chapter 7). 
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Any information the users provided was stored in a MySQL database table named initial_form.  
The database stores multiple pieces of information- users’ first name, middle name, surname, 
mother's maiden name, names of pets, phone number, any hobbies they may have.  Of 
course, if the user chooses, all of these fields can remain blank.  Having such a database 
allows the monitoring solution to check if any part of a password entered during the 
experiments contains any of this personal information they have revealed. 
 
5.2.3.3.   Known malicious links 
Another of the features built into the extension is the ability to check if a) the current website 
the user is on is malicious and b) if any of the subsequent links on the page are malicious.  To 
enable this feature, a database of known malicious links was required.  The database which 
was used as part of this research project was the hpHosts (2016) database, maintained by the 
anti-malware company MalwareBytes. 
The database is constantly updated with the latest sites which are deemed to be malicious in 
some way.  The site classifies the ways in which links it stores are potentially malicious 
(hpHosts 2016).  The types of links included are- 
• Ad or tracking servers 
• Sites which distribute Malware 
• Sites which distribute or develop exploits 
• Sites which provide fraudulent services 
• Spamming servers 
• Servers which spam the hpHosts forums 
• Browser, DNS, operating system hijacking sites 
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• Sites which use misleading marketing tactics 
• Illegal pharmacy sites 
• Phishing sites 
• Sites distributing copyrighted material illegally 
The browser extension developed during this research project does not filter by individual 
classifications and instead takes the database as a whole.  During the development process 
the decision was made to utilise a static version of the database for prototyping purposes.  
The hosts.txt from the hpHosts website was downloaded in January 2016.  Again, to make the 
list of hosts integrate into the project, the list of malicious links was copied into a MySQL 
database residing on the server.  All 350,898 links were stored in a database named 
malicious_urls. 
 
5.2.3.4.   Top 20 social media websites 
To determine if a user had interacted with social networking sites, a method was required to 
identify these sites during the monitoring process.  To facilitate this, a list of top social 
networking sites was gathered, with a view that this subset of social networking sites would be 
the ones users were most likely to visit during the experimental process; it would be 
impossible to gather a list of every social networking site available on the internet at this 
current time. 
A list of the top 20 social media sites as of March 2016 was gathered from the Alexa website 
(Alexa 2016).  Alexa is a company owned by Amazon and the list is created from traffic 
estimated based on a sample of millions of internet users.  Businesses can use the website to 
benchmark and optimize the browsing experience for users, and as such, the Alexa website is 
deemed to be a useful tool in determining the number of site visitors. 
The current top 20 list includes social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.  To 
integrate the list into a format usable with the monitoring solution, the list was converted into a 
MySQL database on a server named social_media_urls.  
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5.2.4.  The logging process 
The development of a monitoring solution required a method of logging what the users had 
been doing.  Previous research conducted (Fenstermacher and Ginsburg 2002) noted the use 
of an XML log file generated by the users’ actions within a particular application.  Drawing 
inspiration from this approach, a logging system was developed for the Firefox monitoring 
solution whereby a unique log is generated on a server for each user and their actions are 
recorded there. 
Difficulties were encountered whilst developing a log for each user.  In an early version of the 
extension, a path was coded to an activity.log file stored on the server, with the activity.log file 
created manually, and having content appended to it via information passed from the 
JavaScript of the extension to the PHP files on the server via AJAX.  This however posed 
problems when multiple users need to engage with the extension: all behavioural information 
was redirected to the activity.log file and it became impossible to differentiate one user from 
the other. Entry and exit timestamps also became mixed and a better solution was needed; 
one log per user. 
Mozilla suggested the use of Local Storage for logging, as the Firefox browser is equipped 
with a directory service and the nsIFile interface allowing the creation of a log file (Mozilla d) 
2015).  Utilising this method would have had disadvantages.  It is recommended that log files 
are stored in the local profile of Firefox.  During the experiments, this would make the retrieval 
of data rather difficult, with each machine the users had used being physically checked. Log 
files would then be saved to a USB stick manually, and stored in one central location.  It would 
also have been impossible for PHP and AJAX to write to the log file owing to security 
concerns.  Due to these reasons, a better solution was needed. 
With the advent of HTML 5, web applications now have the ability to store data locally within a 
browser.  Previously, some information could be stored via cookies, and had to be included 
with every single request to a server however, local storage allows data of up to 5MB to be 
saved.  In terms of security, it does not have to be sent to the server.  The concept of local 
storage was utilised in the research project as a method of generating a new log for each end 
user.  Due to the nature of the system, the design was more complex. 
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The monitoring solution must automatically run every time the user loads a new page.  
Initially, there was an attempt to invoke local storage within the main JavaScript file running 
the Firefox extension, as opposed to in the code of a specific website.  Normally, a developer 
would use local storage on a website they had created, for example to store a name or some 
other details.  Since the Firefox extension can target any website, and the developers of this 
research project cannot modify the code of just any website, this method did not work as local 
storage is tied to a specific page e.g. www.abertay.ac.uk.  Additionally, the Gecko web 
browser engine which powers Firefox (and branches of the browser such as SeaMonkey) 
does not support saving information from locally-based extensions. 
A workaround was required to allow the JavaScript within the extension to label all websites 
as http://example.com.  Essentially, all sites loaded during the experimental process were 
treated as http://example.com within the JavaScript code, and all sites referred to this for local 
storage. One method of achieving this was discussed by the Fartersoft website in great detail 
(Farter 2011), and the implementation used in the research project is outlined in the 
paragraphs below. 
 
Figure 19 - the workaround code to allow Firefox extensions to access local storage 
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In the code snippet displayed in Figure 19, a URL is defined which will act as the URL for the 
extension.  In this case, every page visited by the user will be called http://example.com in the 
view of the browser and local storage.  It is important not to choose a URL which the user may 
end up visiting- if for example the URL google.com was chosen, this could potentially cause 
conflicts with local storage as it is a real website.  In addition to this, if a second extension is 
running within the browser concurrently and it used the same workaround, it would also need 
to have a unique, non-real-world, dummy URL.  Issues could be caused owing to the same 
origin rule.  It would be beneficial to generate a random string based upon the current UNIX 
timestamp to create a non-real-life URL. 
Various interfaces are then imported for use within the extension- 
• nsIIOService- provides access to URL parsing utility functions 
• nsIScriptSecurityManager- enforces security within the extension, including same-
origin 
• nsIDOMStorageManager- manages storage, including local storage 
The code then assigns the URL variable, in this case is example.com as the site to be used 
for localstorage within the extension.  Following this, a unique ID is generated for use in the 
experimental process of testing the extension, creating a value which ends in .log.  The 
logname variable then stores the generated unique log id within localstorage. 
Utilising the jQuery library within the extension, the DOM of the web page is also manipulated.  
A small grey box is appended to the top-right-hand corner of the screen, along with the log ID, 
as illustrated in Figure 20.  This has been placed here as part of the experimental design and 
aids users in finding out their unique log number. 
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Figure 20 - screenshot of the appended log ID 
 
Furthermore, the logging process then creates a log file with the same unique ID for the user 
on a server.  Once local storage has been checked, another function is triggered to verify if a 
log file of the same name appears on the server which the extension is linked to.  The 
checklog function utilises an AJAX request and passes the name of the log in localstorage to 
a set_log.php file residing on a server, which contains processing scripts for the monitoring 
solution.  The PHP file_exists function is called: if a file with the same log name resides on the 
server, the script does nothing, else, a new log file is created with the same name as logNme 
in localstorage, and it also has the necessary write permissions for the user and the 
extension.  When this has been completed, the extension can begin writing user behavioural 
information to the log file.  An overview of this is given in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21 - generating a unique ID for localStorage and creating a log on the server 
Each time a user loads a page, and before they engage in any further behavioural activity, 
there is some basic information which is recorded.  This includes a timestamp of when the 
user entered the given website, the actual URL of the website visited, a notification if the site 
is served via HTTP and the user agent behind the browser (in this example, Mozilla, Gecko 
engine and the version of Firefox which was used).  It should be noted that the user agent can 
be faked although in this scenario, the user agent is just recorded, and nothing is done with 
the information gathered.  The other piece of basic information which is recorded is the 
timestamp of when a user leaves the page, so if necessary the time the user spent on a page 
can be calculated.  This might be applicable in future work which is why the functionality was 
built-in.  One of these records is generated for each website the user visits. 
 
Figure 22 - the basic information which is recorded when a user visits a website 
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When the extension automatically detects any of the risky behaviours outlined in section 
5.2.2. , further log entries are triggered.  During the experimental phase, these will help reflect 
what the user has actually done in the web browser, vs. what they say they have actually 
done in the questionnaire.  The subsequent information recorded is outlined in Table 6.  The 
triggers which have been outlined in Table 6 have been drawn from existing literature 
reviewed during the research project.  Papers by Bubaš, Orehova and & Konecki (2008) and 
Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) specifically identified risky security behaviours which 
could be implemented into an extension, and detected in the context of a browser-based 
environment. 
Table 6 - risky security behaviour triggers and the subsequent information recorded in 
the log 
 
Trigger Sample information recorded in log 
Password contains a 
commonly used 
password 
[22-04-2016 15:29:13] - Common password entered 
Password contains 
personal information 
[24-04-2016 15:48:12] - Personal details in password entered 
Password is too short [24-04-2016 15:48:12] - Password is short 
Malicious links found on 
page 
[22-04-2016 15:38:48] - Potentially malicious link detected on 
page: driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages 
/end_experiment/end1.php 
Site is served via HTTP [22-04-2016 15:25:13] - HTTP: this site is served via http 
Current site is a top 20 
social media site 
[22-04-2016 15:38:52] - User visited a top 20 social media site. 
Current site is malicious [22-04-2016 15:38:49] - User visited potentially malicious link: 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/end_experiment/end1.php 
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5.2.5.  Identifying behaviour in the context of the browser- technical 
details 
This section will explain the technical details behind the detection of risky security behaviour 
within the web browser.  Each section contains a diagram, discussing how detection of that 
particular threat has been constructed.  A diagram showing the inner workings of the 
monitoring solution as a whole can be found in Appendix (i) . 	  
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5.2.5.1.   User enters page trigger 
When a user enters a page, the monitoringSolution.js file firstly triggers a check to ensure 
local storage has been set-up correctly, and that a log file exists on the server (see section 
5.2.4.  for full details of the logging process). 
When a unique log file has been generated, the pageDetails function is called, which gets the 
details of the current page the user is visiting.  This appends the timestamp, the current URL, 
whether the site was served via HTTP, and the user agent, and passes it to a PHP 
logger_script on a server via AJAX.  This also triggers the HTTP warning.  The PHP script 
appends the information to the correct log file and awaits further behavioural information to be 
logged via triggers.  The process is outlined in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23 - process triggered when user enters a page 
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5.2.5.2.   User exits page trigger 
Similar to when a user enters a page, the exit timestamp is also recorded.  The 
monitoringSolution.js file triggers the pageExit function when the window event handler 
onbeforeunload is called.  pageExit grabs the current timestamp, and passes it to the PHP 
logger_script via an AJAX request.  The PHP script appends the information to the correct log 
file.  The process is outlined in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 24 - process triggered when user exits page 
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5.2.5.3.   Password triggers 
There are a number of ways in which a password can trigger text to be written into the log file 
for the user, as shown in Figure 25.  The monitoringSolution.js firstly has to ascertain if there 
is a password field on the page a user is viewing by utilising the jQuery library and the 
input:password selector.  When the id of the password field has been gained, the 
passwordCount function is triggered, which will aid in alerting if a user password is too short.  
In turn, the updateCount function is called to keep an accurate count of the password length, 
making use of the keyup functionality in jQuery.  When a password is less than 8 characters in 
length it will trigger a message stating the password is too short. 
Additionally, each time the user types another character into the password field the password 
is encrypted and checked to see if it is a commonly used password as the 
checkCommonPassword function is also called.  The passwordChecker.php script checks the 
current password against the database of top 10000 used passwords (Daniel Miessler, 2014).  
If the encrypted password is found in here, another alert is triggered and information is written 
to the log file. 
Finally, the password is compared against a database of personal information the users may 
have revealed during the experimental process.  If the user's password matches any of the 
information in the database, a further alert is triggered and information reflecting this is written 
to the log. 
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Figure 25 - password processes which trigger information to be written to the log file 
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5.2.5.4.   Malicious site triggers 
The first way in which the extension can check for malicious links is when a user loads a page 
in the browser.  When a user has loaded a new page, and the pageDetails function has 
passed information to the PHP logger script via AJAX, the logger script then calls a function in 
another PHP file on the server: the checkMalCurrent.php file.  This file takes the current URL 
of the page the user is on, and checks it against a database of known malicious links 
(hpHosts, 2016).  If the current website the user is on is malicious, a trigger writes information 
to the log stating that this is the case, as outlined in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 - malicious site trigger 
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5.2.5.5.   Malicious links trigger 
A second way of checking for malicious content on a page involves checking for malicious 
links which a page may contain.  When a new page is loaded, the monitoringSolution.js file 
calls the maliciousLinkChecker function grabs all hyperlinks on a page and combines them 
into one JavaScript array.  This array is then passed to a PHP file called 
maliciousLinkChecker.php via an AJAX request.  The PHP file takes each of these links and 
checks them against a database of known malicious links (hpHosts 2016).  Each time a 
malicious link is detected on the page, a note is made of it in the users log file.  The process is 
outlined in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 - malicious link trigger 
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5.2.5.6.   Social media trigger 
The extension can also detect if the current page a user is on is a top 20 social media 
website. When the user loads a page in the browser and the monitoringSolution.js file has 
established local storage has been set-up correctly and that a unique log has been generated, 
pageDetails function is called.  pageDetails passes general page information to the PHP 
logger script via AJAX,and  the logger script then calls a function in another PHP file on the 
server: the socialMediaCheck.php PHP file.  This takes the current URL of the webpage and 
runs it against a database of the top 20 social media websites (as of the first-quarter of 2016) 
(Alexa 2016).  If the current site is found to be in this database, this information is written to 
the log file.  The process is outlined in Figure 28. 
Figure 28 - social media trigger 
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5.3.  Summary of the monitoring solution 
To validate the plausibility of monitoring user behaviour, and subsequently detecting risky 
security behaviour within the realms of a browser-based environment, a platform for creating 
an appropriate browser-based extension was required.  In this instance, a Mozilla Firefox 
browser was deemed an appropriate testing harness for verifying known risky security 
behaviours which could be identified in the context of a browser. 
The monitoring solution testing-harness within the browser is successfully able to detect a 
number of previously identified risky security behaviours, including if a user has visited a 
malicious link, if they have a commonly used password, if they have personal information in 
their password, or if they have visited social media websites where they have the potential to 
reveal information about themselves. 
In addition to this, the monitoring solution has the ability to generate a unique log file for each 
user, providing a timestamp of each website visited and including information such as whether 
or not the site visited was malicious, or if any link on the web page was deemed to be 
malicious. 
The crux of the research project is to test whether or not affective feedback has an impact on 
the security behaviour of the end-user.  To this end, the monitoring solution is ultimately a 
vehicle for the delivery of a system which provides dynamic affective feedback on detection of 
risky security behaviour. Chapter 6   will explain how an affective feedback mechanism was 
integrated with the existing browser-based monitoring solution, discussing the types of 
affective feedback delivered. 
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Chapter 6. Delivering Affective Feedback 
 
6.1.  Overview of the affective feedback system 
During the research project, the initially developed monitoring solution was built upon, 
delivering dynamic affective feedback on detection of known risky security behaviours.  This 
section seeks to provide an overview of this system, discussing the types of affective 
feedback which are delivered.  It will go on to discuss the utilities and resources used in 
delivering affective feedback, before explaining how the feedback was delivered in the context 
of a browser-based environment. 
  
6.2.  Types of affective feedback utilised 
Rosalind Picard is one of the pioneers in the field of affective computing.  In her ground-
breaking text Affective Computing, she defines affective feedback as “computing that relates 
to, arises from, or deliberately influences emotions” (Picard 2000).  A further definition by 
McDarby et al. (2004) notes that affective feedback is also “the process of using technology to 
help people achieve and maintain specific internal states”. 
Previous research has indicated there are a number of types of affective feedback which 
could be utilised within the web browser window, to help guide users into making more 
appropriate decisions, based-on the situation they encounter.  Depending on the actions of 
the user, they may be offered positive reinforcement because of their behaviour, negative 
reinforcement, or a mixture of both positive and negative.  Specifically, the 3 different methods 
which were chosen were colours, avatars and text.  The feedback provided is visual.  
Excluding the use of screen readers for those who are visually impaired, users will generally 
use the PC/laptop monitor.  Consideration was also given to the use of auditory feedback, 
such as a warning sounds to alert users to their actions.  Since the PC/laptop sounds does 
not have to be switched on for the user to browse the internet, this was ruled out as a possible 
feedback method.  The following section will discuss each type of feedback in more detail. 
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6.2.1.  Colour choice 
As discussed in the literature review, there are multiple methods of providing affective 
feedback to the end-user.  One such method involves the use of certain colours in a bid to 
influence users.  In Western culture, the colour red has long been associated with danger.  
Research carried out by Kralik, J.D. et al. (Association for Psychological Science 2011) has 
even proposed that the link between red and dangerous situations may be rooted in 
evolutionary psychology. 
Adams and Osgood (1973) performed a cross-cultural study, focussing on the affective 
meanings of colours.  The work attempted to gauge feelings about the use of specific colours, 
by performing a comparison of results from 89 previous studies.  Results were mixed for some 
colours, highlighting multiple meanings.  They found that green is seen as a good colour (blue 
and white also fall into this category), yellow is weak (as is grey and white), and red is seen as 
active and strong. 
A more recent research paper by Kumi et al. (2013) examines how colour and affect can 
influence learning outcomes.  The study acknowledged that affective reactions to colour must 
be taken into account when designing/delivering visual presentations, noting that the use of 
colours can have an impact on behaviour/attitude.  In this study, 79 participants were asked to 
observe a lecture with a yellow, or a blue background, prior to completing a questionnaire on 
their attitude and affective reaction.  In this instance, it was found that blue helped participants 
remember information that was delivered during the presentation. 
In terms of security, a number of studies have been conducted, into the use of colour-based 
feedback.  A paper by Ur (2012) explored the effectiveness of coloured bar-meters to indicate 
password strength.  Results showed colour had an impact on the users where green/blue 
indicated a strong password and red indicated a weak password.  Colour-based feedback, in 
combination with sound, was also one method of affective feedback successfully implemented 
in a game called “Brainchild” developed by McDarby et al. (2004) which attempts to help 
users relax. 
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6.2.2.  Avatar 
Several papers in the literature review also indicate human avatar-based feedback may be an 
appropriate form of affective feedback when attempting to educate users.  Again the 
Brainchild tool by McDarby et al. (2004) indicated affective feedback can help users alter their 
internal states.  Avatars have been used to good effect in intelligent tutoring systems (Robison 
et al. 2009), with Hall et al. (2005) agreeing that the use of avatars may prove effective in 
influencing the emotional state of the end-user, thus forming part of this research. 
 
6.2.3.  Text 
Past research in the literature review has also indicated text-based feedback as an 
appropriate form of affective feedback for disseminating information to the end-user.  Again in 
Ur et al. (2012) paper when investigating password strength meters, text-based feedback was 
also applied to describe user passwords e.g. "weak".  Again, the results highlighted this had 
an impact on the end-users as they did not like their passwords being described as “weak”.  
Other research, like the work conducted by Dehn and Van Mulken (2012) concluded that 
textual information provided more direct feedback to end-users. 
 
6.3.  Utilities used 
6.3.1.  Colour Lovers 
On integrating colour into the Firefox extensions, the standard CSS values for red, yellow and 
green (as outlined in Table 7, column 2), proved to be high contrast and distracting.  The 
Colour Lovers website (Colour Lovers 2016) was used to find slightly toned down version of 
these colours and ultimately the hex values found in column 3 of the table were used. 
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Table 7 - colours used in extension 
 
 
6.3.2.  Avatar research 
The avatars chosen for use in this research project come from a paper by Sacharin et al. 
(2012).  The paper was produced by members of the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences 
which explored the perception of how people reacted to changing emotional expressions.  In 
the paper a number of avatars were generated by FACSGen 2.0 at the Swiss Center for 
Affective Science: derived from Ekman's theory of basic emotions (Ekman 1999).  These 
emotions were happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust and fear.  Since the paper was 
also studying transitionary emotions, it included avatars which were 50% anger-happiness, 
(61%/39%) happiness-disgust, 50% happiness-fear. 
Ultimately, the paper revealed that participants were uncertain about each of the emotions 
that were included in the mixed-expression avatars, and that this was more prevalent in 
expression sequences in comparison to simple static images.  Due to this conclusion, static 
images of avatars were chosen from this paper to be delivered as a form of affective feedback 
on detection of risky security behaviour. 
 
Colour Basic RGB hue Softer Hue (used in feedback) 
Red #FF0000 #CF4250 
Yellow #FFFF00 #EBA560 
Green #00FF00 #78BF60 
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6.3.2.1.   Avatars used in the extension 
To allow for delivery of avatar-based affective feedback within the browser-based 
environment, 2 avatars displaying subtle facial cues were selected from the paper by Sacharin 
et al. (2012).  The paper makes reference to the previously identified 6 basic emotions: 
happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and surprise, and also includes a neutral avatar, 
devoid of any such emotion.  The avatars selected for inclusion in this research project are 
happiness (Figure 29) and sadness (Figure 30), to denote positive and negative feedback 
accordingly.  The avatar representing sadness (as opposed to anger or disgust) was chosen 
as sadness is generally seen to be the opposite of happiness. 
 
 
Figure 29 - image of happiness from Sacharin et al. (The perception of changing 
emotion expressions, 2012) used to denote positive affect 
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Figure 30 - image of sadness from Sacharin et al. (The perception of changing emotion 
expressions, 2012) used to denote negative affect 
 
6.3.3.  AFINN sentiment analysis 
To provide the appropriate level of text-based feedback to end-users, a suitable source of 
affective text was needed.  During the development phase of the project, two main wordlists 
were viewed with the aim of utilising them to produce affective text. 
The first of these wordlists is known as ANEW (Affective Norms for English Words) which was 
developed by Margaret M. Bradley, and Peter J. Lang in 1999 at the University of Florida.  
The words in this list have been weighted by a number of participants, and compiled into a 
paper with a list of weightings (Bradley and Lang 1999).  Despite being a widely used source 
of affective text, the terms of use stated that the wordlist is to be used only in "basic and 
health research projects" (ANEW 2015).  Therefore, it was decided to use a different wordlist 
which may be more applicable to a cyber security/browser-based project.   
Instead, a wordlist initially developed in 2011 was chosen, called AFINN, which is a play on 
the ANEW project, although it is not affiliated with it in any way.  The AFINN database was 
developed by Finn  ̊Arup Nielsen at DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark 
(Nielsen 2011).  A 2011 paper describes the construction of the wordlist, scoring of the words, 
and the overall impact.  Specifically, it was the AFINN-111.txt wordlist which was used in 
during the experimental design process.  This is the newest version of the wordlist, 
succeeding the AFINN-96.txt.  The AFINN-111.txt wordlist has 2477 words in it, providing 
more of a selection. 
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The wordlist was specifically developed for microblogs e.g. services such as Twitter where 
users post short messages.  This concept fits in nicely with this research project as the 
affective feedback solution aims to regularly updates end-users with short messages 
depending upon their actions. 
The wordlist was compiled from a number of sources, including Urban Dictionary in a bid to 
incorporate some internet slang terms.  Again, internet terms have the potential to be useful in 
delivering affective text in the context of a browser-based environment.  In addition to Urban 
Dictionary (Urban Dictionary 2016), the wordlist all made use of the Original Balanced 
Affective Word List (Siegle 1994), Twitter feeds and, the Compass DeRose Guide to Emotion 
Words (DeRose 2005) to provide a mix of words. 
The author of the AFINN wordlist notes that words on the list were scored via the 
SentiStrength system, ranging from −5 (very negative) to +5 (very positive).  Each of the 
words were rated on valence only i.e. on their intrinsic attractiveness (positive weighting) or 
their aversiveness (negative weighting).  In evaluating the wordlist against ANEW, the author 
thought that whilst AFINN performed better across the entire lexicon (potentially due to the 
fact internet slang/obscene words were included) however it was deemed that ANEW scoring 
was better overall (Nielsen 2011).  Since the publication of the paper by the wordlist author, 
AFINN has been used in a number of other papers, to good effect. 
Since publication of the wordlist, several papers have investigated its use, and implemented it 
in studies.  One such study by (Ozdemir and Bergler 2015), compared the wordlist against a 
variety of lexica available to researchers.  Despite AFINN being one of the smallest wordlists 
available to researchers, it was the best solo performer when analysing tweets and figurative 
language. 
The wordlist was also used as part of an attempt to analyse sentiment in Shakespeare's plays 
(Nalisnick and Baird 2013).  The wordlist was used to try and define the sentiment of 
characters towards others and although the paper noted that "AFINN is designed for modern 
English", it proved it was still plausible to determine affect. 
In addition to this, the AFINN wordlist was also used in an approach to classify Ekman’s 
emotional categories in user text (Gievska, Koroveshovski and Chavdarova 2014).  Multiple 
wordlists were utilised, with AFINN being one of them, as part of a hybrid approach to make 
the results as accurate as possible.  
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6.3.3.1.    Text used in the extensions 
During the development of the affective feedback software, a number of placeholder phrases 
were used until the final version of the affective text was constructed.  These phrases were 
used to show a piece of trigger text could be displayed on-screen.  Only the developer could 
view the placeholder phrase.  Each placeholder phrase was linked to one of the 
aforementioned triggers, outlined in 5.2.2.    When a specific behaviour was triggered, the 
appropriate version of these phrases appeared. 
The placeholder phrases were initially used in the extension and are shown in Table 8.  These 
are non-affective phrases. 
Table 8 - triggers and placeholder text 
 
Risky security behaviour trigger Placeholder text 
Password commonality 
 
Password is common 
Password is uncommon 
Password with personal details Password contains personal details 
Password does not contain personal details 
Password length Password is too short 
Password is equal to or longer than the minimum 
length 
Malicious links No malicious links on the page 
Malicious links found on page 
HTTP site Site served via HTTP 
Social media site Site is top 20 social media site     
Malicious website Current site is malicious 
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6.3.3.2.    Splitting the wordlist 
The AFINN wordlist comes as one large text file, and the words within the file are ordered in 
an alphabetical fashion, meaning that it can be difficult to pick out positive and negative words 
whilst scrolling through the file because they are all mixed in together.  A suitable script was 
needed in order to first of all split these words into 2 separate text files: one for positively 
weighted words, and one for negatively weighted words.  A small python script was created to 
achieve this goal. 
The python script developed initially reads in the AFINN wordlist.  Following this, it assesses 
the score given to each of the words, and converts this score to an integer value.  If the 
integer value of the score is less than 0, the word must have a negative weight, and so it is 
appended to a file named afinn_neg.txt which stores a complete list of negative words derived 
from the initial word list.  In all other cases, the score given to a word must be a positive value, 
thus these lines are appended to a file named afinn_pos.txt, which stores a list of positively 
weighted words derived from the original text file.  Finally, both afinn_pos.txt and afinn_neg.txt 
files were compared to ensure the number of words included added up to the number of 
words found in the original AFINN-111.txt wordlist. 	  
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6.3.3.3.    Identifying words to construct phrases 
After splitting the lists into both positively and negatively weighted words, the words on the 
lists then had to be used in the construction of appropriate affective sentences.  Not all of the 
words included in the separate text files were suitable for inclusion in affective text, therefore 
basic criterion had to be developed in order to choose appropriate words. 
Owing to these factors, the following criteria were decided upon: 
• Words chosen had to make sense in terms of the warnings the affective text 
• Words chosen had to be syntactically correct when disseminating information to users 
• No offensive words (e.g. swear words) 
The researcher conducting the project, read the negative word list line-by-line, and words 
outlined in Table 9 were chosen for potential inclusion in the affective feedback tests.  The 
words were chosen as there was an assumption that these words would make syntactic 
sense in the context of a browser-based feedback system.  In the table, each of the words are 
sorted by negativity, from least negative to most negative (with -1 being least negative).  
Variations of the same word have been grouped together for conciseness. 	  
100 
 
 
Table 9 - list of negative words 	
Negative word(s) Weighting 
attack, attacked, attacking, attacks -1 
avoid -1 
expose, exposed, exposes, exposing -1 
hacked -1 
hide -1 
accident, accidental, accidentally -2 
complacent -2 
discouraged -2 
dodgy -2 
danger -2 
exploit, exploited, exploiting -2 
harm, harmed, harmful, harming, harms -2 
stolen -2 
threat -2 
insecure -2 
vulnerability -2 
warn -2 
weak, weakness -2 
bad -3 
criminal -3 
illegal -3 
warning, warnings -3 
fraud, fraudster -4 
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Similarly, the positive words chosen have been outlined in Table 10.  Again, variations of the 
same word have been grouped together, and words are ranked from least positive to most 
positive. 
 
Table 10 - list of positive words 
 
Positive word(s) Weighting 
increase, increased 1 
safe, safely 1 
trust 1 
adequate 1 
validated 1 
careful 2 
positive 2 
recommend, recommended 2 
secure 2 
strong 2 
trusted 2 
excellent 3 
good 3 
brilliant 4 
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6.3.3.4.    Construction of final affective phrases 
The final pieces of affective text which were integrated into the extension had to be designed 
in such a way that when weighted words were placed into the phrases, the phrases 
themselves still made sense.  In addition to this, positive and negative versions of phrases 
were required for password commonality, password with personal details, password length, if 
malicious links were present on a page, or if a user was visiting a malicious website.   
In the case of unencrypted sites (HTTP) and social media sites, users were provided only with 
negative feedback.  The theory behind this is that these two warnings are more of a grey area.  
A user can visit a social media site and be perfectly safe, provided you are mindful regarding 
the information you are sharing with others.  Similarly, a user can visit an unencrypted website 
and behave in a completely safe way.  This is the rationale for providing warnings for these 
categories only. 
When writing an affective phrase for one of the triggers, care was taken to provide balanced 
phrases.  To give an example, the positive malicious links message telling users they are safe 
has a positive rating of 2.  Conversely, the negative message for the same trigger has a 
negative rating of -2, meaning the warnings carry the same severity.  In some cases, multiple 
weighted words were added to affective phrases to provide the same level of weighting. An 
assumption was made by the researcher that the impact of using multiple weighted words was 
summative.   Again, with the positive malicious links message, the weighted words "validated" 
and "safe" have been included.  These each carry a weighting of 1, giving an overall score of 
2.  In terms of the opposing, negative message, the only weighted word which has been used 
is "harmful", which has a negative weighing of -2. 
The difference in weighting between triggers does not represent the severity of the risk 
associated with engaging with a particular trigger.  An example of this can be seen with the 
password commonality rating.  This has a rating of positive or negative 1.  A different trigger, 
password length, has a rating of positive or negative 4.   In terms of this research project, this 
does not indicate that a short password is much worse than having a common word in your 
password.  The severity of triggers has not been evaluated in this research project. 
The final affective sentences implemented into the research project are listed in Table 11.  
The words listed in bold in the table are ones which have been drawn from the affective 
wordlist. 
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Table 11 -  final affective phrases and overall weighting 
 
Risky security  
behaviour trigger 
Final affective text chosen Overall 
sentence score 
Password 
commonality 
 
Your password is a commonly used word. In an 
attack, it may be easier for hackers to guess. 
-1 
Adequate- your password is not a common word. 1 
Password with 
personal details 
Your password contains personal details.  In an 
attack, it may be easier for hackers to guess. 
-1 
Adequate- your password does not contain 
personal details.   It will be harder for attackers to 
guess. 
1 
Password length Your password is too short.  A weak password is 
insecure 
-4 
Your password is equal to or longer than the 
minimum length.  A strong password is more 
secure 
4 
Malicious links Links found on the page have been validated and 
deemed safe. 
2 
Harmful links have been found on the page. -2 
HTTP site Warning: this website is not encrypted. Other 
users can potentially see information you are 
sending to the site. 
-3 
Social media site Warning: this website is a popular social media 
site.  Consider how much information you are 
divulging about yourself- attackers can potentially 
use this against you to gain access to your 
accounts. 
-3 
Malicious website The current website you are visiting is malicious 
and is potentially harmful 
-2 
The current website you are visiting is not 
malicious and is trusted 
2 
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Figure 31 - example of the affective text in use during experiments 
 
 
6.4.  The logging process 
During the end user experiments (see Chapter 7), on beginning the questionnaire as part of 
the experiment, users must take note of the number of the USB they have been given.  USB 
sticks have been labelled with numbers 1-5 and correspond to a version of the final research 
tool developed.  This determines the specific type of feedback the user will receive during the 
experiment  e.g. USB no. 2 refers to text-based affective feedback only.  Please see 7.2. for 
the full list of USB stick numbers and the corresponding feedback type. 
As an additional method of associating log files with the user questionnaire responses, the 
type of feedback the user receives is also written into the unique log file generated for each 
user (as shown in Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32 - sample log file with affective feedback type written to it 
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The affective feedback type was added to the log via the checkLogExists function in the 
original MonitoringSolution.js file which is one of the building blocks of the extension (see 
section 5.2.4. for details of the full logging process).  When a user starts a new experiment/or 
loads a new web page, the extension must run a check to ensure local storage has been set-
up correctly, and that an appropriate log file already exists on the server.  For each of the final 
extensions developed, an extra variable named extensionFeedback has been added which 
simply contains the value "Affective Feedback: <feedback type here>".  This value is passed 
to the set_log.php file on the server via AJAX, and the appropriate line of text is added to the 
correct log file.  It is added for every new site the user loads. 
 
6.5.  Delivery of affective feedback in the context of the 
browser 
In order to implement an affective feedback delivery methodology in the context of a browser-
based environment, the initial monitoring solution outlined in Chapter 5 had to be created.  
This monitoring system provides the basic framework on top of which the affective solution is 
built.  The monitoring system allows for detection of risky behaviours, and embeds specific 
triggers which are fired on detection of a known risky security behaviour on the user’s part. 
This section will detail how the affective solution was integrated into the original monitoring 
solution which was created.  It will go on to detail how affective feedback such as specific text, 
colours, and avatars are delivered on detection of risky security behaviour: what triggers it, the 
types of feedback delivered and how it is displayed on-screen to the user. 
 
6.5.1.  Integrating the monitoring solution and the affective feedback 
solution 
The main browser.xul file which is one of the key components of the extension links to the 
original MonitoringSolution.js file and the jQuery library embedded within the extension, as 
well as the new file, AffectiveFeedback.js.  As the name suggests, the AffectiveFeedback.js 
provides an affective feedback solution which is built on top of the existing Monitoring Solution 
framework.  
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As in section 5.2.2. , the Monitoring Solution already logs user behaviours when the user hits 
particular triggers.  These triggers are outlined in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 - triggers incorporated in the monitoring solution		
 
User action Triggers 
When a user enters a 
page 
 
• website encryption 
• if the site is a top 20 social media website 
• if the site is malicious 
• if malicious links are present on the page 
When a user enters a 
password 
• password length 
• password commonality 
• password personal details 
107 
 
Figure 33 - how methods in the original monitoring solution integrate with the affective 
feedback solution 
 
When integrating the AffectiveFeedback.js file into the MonitoringSolution.js file, a few 
changes had to be made to the MonitoringSolution.js file, so it could pass the relevant 
information to subsequently display affective feedback on-screen for the user. 
The key change that was made was that on each of the triggers, reference to a function called 
receiveTriggerText was made.  The receiveTriggerText function takes 2 parameters.  The first 
of these parameters passes specific pieces of trigger text over to the AffectiveFeedback.js file, 
so it knows which piece of feedback to display to the user (Figure 33).  The second parameter 
is also there to pass across any other information that might be relevant to the first parameter: 
more often than not, this parameter is given the value of null because there is no additional 
information available.  The AffectiveFeedback.js file handles all decisions relating to the 
display of the affective information the user sees on-screen. 
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6.5.2.  Clearing the affective content 
When a new page is loaded in the browser, the first function which is called from the 
AffectiveFeedback.js file is the clearAffectiveContent function.  This is called every single time 
to ensure the user does not see affective information which pertains to a previous website 
they have visited, reducing possible confusion. 
 
6.5.3.  Displaying affective feedback 
Once old affective feedback has been removed from the browser window, the affective text 
and image areas need to be replaced.  This is achieved when the addAffectiveBar function is 
called.  The affective toolbar itself is made up of separate areas.  Firstly, there's the main 
affective area at the bottom of the screen, which is split into 2 components: affective text, and 
the affective avatar.  The text box is then split into 3 distinct sections, to make it easier to 
provide information to users.  There's a password area, a malicious links area, and a general 
warning area.  Not all feedback will be in use at all times e.g. some extensions only provide 
text as a form of feedback.  In this case, the avatar box is blacked out, and the separate bars 
do not change colour. Figure 34 shows the structure of the affective feedback bar in the 
browser. 
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Figure 34 - positioning of affective feedback within the browser window 
 
The affective feedback toolbar has been placed at the bottom of the browser.  The reasoning 
behind this is that in previous versions of the Firefox browser (and various other browsers on 
the market), there was a status bar available, indicating if a website had fully loaded, where 
resources were being loaded from, and the location of hyperlinks users may have hovered 
over.  The aim of placing the bar at the bottom of the screen was to make it as unobtrusive as 
possible. 
Figure 35 shows the final version of the affective toolbar in the browser window. 
Figure 35 - final affective bar structure 
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6.5.4.  Triggering affective feedback 
When one of the triggers is activated in the MonitoringSolution.js file, information is then 
passed into the AffectiveFeedback.js file via the receiveTriggerText function.  The diagram 
displayed in Figure 36 shows how the skeleton of the affective bar is added to the screen, and 
how trigger keywords are passed across from the Monitoring Solution, eventually triggering 
the affective feedback mechanism. 
Figure 36 - how triggers generate affective feedback 
 
There are a number of triggers in place in the system, which are linked to known risky security 
behaviours. Table 13 provides an overview of the types of risky security behaviours the 
monitoring system is looking for, along with the keyword information which triggers delivery of 
affective feedback. 
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Table 13 - table of the trigger keywords 
 
Trigger Description Parameter 1 (trigger text) Parameter 2 
Password 
commonality 
Commonly used 
password 
“passwordcommon” null  
Not a commonly used 
password 
“passworduncommon” null 
Password with 
personal details 
Password contains 
personal details 
“passpersonal” null 
Password does not 
contain personal 
details 
“passnotpersonal null 
Password 
length 
Password is too short “passshort” null 
Password is longer 
than the minimum 
length 
“passlong” null 
Malicious links No malicious links 
found 
“nomallinks” null 
Malicious links found 
on page. 
“mallinks” Array of malicious 
links found 
HTTP site Site is served via HTTP “siteDetailsFound” Array of site details 
Social media 
site 
Site is a top 20 social 
media site 
“siteDetailsFound” Array of site details 
Malicious site Site is a known 
malicious site 
“siteDetailsFound” Array of site details 
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As part of the experimental design, a number of extensions were developed, containing 
multiple versions of affective feedback delivery.  A function was written for each of these 
methods.  In total, 5 versions of the extension were developed, however the system was 
designed so that an affective delivery function could be added for each delivery system.  The 
function calls to the inactive delivery system were simply commented out, leaving only one 
delivery system per extension.  Table 14 shows the function names and the types of feedback 
they were to deliver. 
Table 14 - affective functions and feedback delivered 
 
 
In terms of an explanation of how the affective feedback system works, the extension which 
delivers all available types of affective feedback will be explained in this section- text, colour 
and avatars.  Specifically, the function which will be discussed is named 
textColourAvatarAffectiveBar().  All other extensions developed make used of a smaller 
combination of these types of feedback. 
 
6.5.4.1.   Trigger- Commonly used password 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution deems it to be a 
commonly used password, the following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of the sad avatar. 
Affective function name Affective feedback delivered Notes 
<none> No feedback, monitoring only All affective functions 
commented out in code 
textAffectiveBar() text - 
textColourAffectiveBar() text, colour - 
textAvatarAffectiveBar() text, avatar - 
textColourAvatarAffectiveBar()   text, colour, avatar - 
113 
 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is “Structure- your 
password is a commonly used word and in an attack, it may be easier for hackers to 
guess”.  
3. get the hex value for a red colour, indicating a poor security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.2.   Trigger- Not a commonly used password 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution cannot find a 
match against a list of commonly used passwords, the following steps are carried out by the 
affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the happy avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value "Structure- Adequate 
password as it is not a common word”. 
3. get the hex value for a green colour, indicating a good security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
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6.5.4.3.   Trigger- Password contains personal details 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution matches 
personal information in the password against the database of information the user may have 
provided, the following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the sad avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is "Details- your 
password contains personal details.  In an attack, it may be easier for hackers to 
guess”. 
3. get the hex value for a red colour, indicating a poor security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.4.   Trigger- Password does not contain personal details 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution does not match 
any personal information in the password against the database of information the user may 
have provided, the following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the happy avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is "Details- Adequate.  
Your password does not contain personal details.   It will be harder for attackers to 
guess”. 
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3. get the hex value for a green colour, indicating a good security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.5.   Trigger- Password is too short 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution deems it to be 
too short, the following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the sad avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is “Length- your 
password is too short.  A weak password is insecure”. 
3. get the hex value for a red colour, indicating a poor security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.6.   Trigger- Password is longer than the minimum length 
If a password is entered whilst the tool is running and the monitoring solution deems it to be 
longer than the minimum length, the following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the happy avatar. 
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2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is “Length- your 
password is equal to or longer than the minimum length.  A strong  password is more 
secure”.  
3. get the hex value for a green colour, indicating a good security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen.  
117 
 
 
6.5.4.7.   Trigger- No malicious links found 
The monitoring solution checks all links on the web page the user is visiting to determine if 
any of the links are potentially malicious.  If no malicious links are found on the page, the 
following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of the happy avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is "Links found on the 
page have been validated and deemed safe.”.  
3. get the hex value for a green colour, indicating a good security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.8.   Trigger- Malicious links found on page 
The monitoring solution checks all links on the web page the user is visiting to determine if 
any of the links are potentially malicious.  If malicious links are found on the page, the 
following steps are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the sad avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of  
thecorrect affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is " "Harmful links 
have been found on the page”.  
3. call to find all links on the page. 
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4. checks links against the array of malicious links provided by the monitoring solution.   
5. get the hex value for a red colour, indicating a poor security choice. 
6. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
7. highlights malicious links in red warning colour. 
 
6.5.4.9.   Trigger- Site is served via HTTP 
If a site is served via HTTP, this is not inherently bad, unless the user is providing information 
which should be encrypted.  If they are browsing a web page without entering any information, 
this is not a problem.  Due to this, HTTP sites are considered to be general information by the 
feedback system.  When a HTTP page is detected, the following steps are carried out by the 
affective solution: 
1. no additional affective avatar is called 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is “Warning: this 
website is not encrypted. Other users can potentially see information you are sending 
to the site”. 
3. get the hex value for a orange colour, indicating a security choice which could be 
good or bad, depending on the site visited. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 	  
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6.5.4.10.   Trigger- Site is a top 20 social media site 
Visiting social media websites is not necessarily a poor security choice.  Provided users do 
not reveal too much personal information about themselves, they do not pose much of a 
security risk.  Due to this, social media sites are considered to be general information by the 
feedback system.  When a top 20 social media site is loaded, the following steps are carried 
out by the affective solution: 
1. no additional affective avatar is called 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is "Warning: this 
website is a popular social media site.  Consider how much information you are 
divulging about yourself- attackers can potentially use this against you to gain access 
to your accounts”. 
3. get the hex value for an orange colour, indicating a security choice which could be 
good or bad, depending on the information divulged by the user. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.11.   Trigger- Site is a known malicious site 
If the user visits a known malicious site whilst the tool is running, the following steps are 
carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of  the sad avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value is "The current 
website you are visiting is malicious and is potentially harmful”.  
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3. get the hex value for a red colour, indicating a poor security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 
 
6.5.4.12.   Trigger- Site is not a malicious site 
If the user does not visit a known malicious site whilst the tool is running, the following steps 
are carried out by the affective solution: 
1. call to affectiveAvatarImage function which gets URL of the happy avatar. 
2. call to the affectiveTextValue function.  The case statement gets the value of the 
correct affective text which matches the trigger.  The text value "The current website 
you are visiting is not malicious and is trusted”.  
3. get the hex value for a green colour, indicating a good security choice. 
4. call to textColourAvatarAffectiveBar() which displays the appropriate pieces of 
information on-screen. 	  
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6.5.4.13.   Traffic light system 
Within the affective feedback solution, there is also a system of flags in place, which is 
designed to provide an overall level of feedback, depending on the users’ actions. 
One example of this would involve the password feedback.  There are multiple areas of 
password feedback which can be shown to the user involving length, commonality, or if it 
includes personal details.  A password may be long (good), uncommon (good) but may 
contain personal details (potentially bad).  To prevent the system from providing users with 
positive feedback when they have failed any 1 of the 3 password security checks, the 
password flags are checked and provide an override.  So whilst users may have an 
uncommon, long password, they are still shown negative affective text, colours and avatars.  
They will only be shown positive feedback when they meet all 3 levels of the password 
security criteria.  Each bar has its own set of flags which determine the overall colours of the 
password, general info and malicious links bar. 
The avatar displayed on-screen also has its own set of flags.  Due to the fact there is only one 
avatar on display on-screen at any given time, security criteria have to be met for each of the 
password, general info and malicious links bars.  If all security criteria are met, the avatar will 
look happy.  If any security area fails, the flags built into the system will trigger an override and 
the avatar will remain with a sad expression until the risky security behaviours are avoided. 
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6.6.  Final tool developed 
A number of versions of the final tool were developed, as the project required the impact of 
affective feedback to be tested against a control environment.  In the end, 5 versions of the 
tool were created, and Table 15 provides an overview of each feedback type. 
• Spengler-Zuul (none)- monitors users but showed no on-screen feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text)- monitors users and displays text-based affective feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and avatar)- monitors users and displays text-based affective 
feedback, alongside an avatar situated in the bottom right of the screen. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and colour)- monitors users and displays text-based affective 
feedback, with a colour coded traffic light system background. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text and colour and avatar)- monitors users and displays text-
based affective feedback, with a colour coded traffic light system background.  
Additionally, an avatar is situated in the bottom right of the screen. 	  
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Table 15 - overview of types of feedback included in each extension	
 
Further information will be provided in this section, including screenshots for each of these 
tools, highlighting how they work and detailing the user experience. 
 
6.6.1.  Tool etymology 
The system consisting of the monitoring solution and the affective feedback mechanism has 
been termed the Spengler-Zuul tool.  XUL was developed by Mozilla and the name is a play 
on Zuul, a character from the Ghostbusters 1984 movie (imdb.com 2016).  Further references 
to the film can be found within the XUL documentation, with both the Keymaster and the 
Gatekeeper mentioned.  In addition to this, until October 2014, Mozilla Firefox contained a 
JavaScript debugger named Venkman, named after Dr. Peter Venkman from the film. 
In this tradition, since the extension developed for this project was constructed using XUL, the 
tool has been named Spengler-Zuul, referencing both Zuul and Dr Egon Spengler. 
Extension name Text-based 
feedback 
Colour-based 
feedback 
Avatar-based 
feedback 
Spengler-Zuul (none)    
Spengler-Zuul (text) X   
Spengler-Zuul (text and 
avatar) 
X  X 
Spengler-Zuul (text and 
colour) 
X X  
Spengler-Zuul (text, colour, 
and avatar) 
X X X 
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6.6.2.  Spengler-Zuul (none) 
The Spengler-Zuul (none) tool provides no affective feedback to the user, and instead acts as 
a control extension.  During the experimental process, users were required to visit the same 
websites, though they were given no cues as to the malicious links which may have appeared 
on the pages. 
The only different thing the user sees in comparison to a normal Firefox browsing environment 
is the addition of the small grey bar in the top-right of the screen which displays a unique log 
ID, which was utilised during the experimental process (Figure 37). 
 
Figure 37 - screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (None) tool running on the Facebook home 
page 
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6.6.3.  Spengler-Zuul (Text) 
The Spengler-Zuul (text) tool provides a single, text-based method of affective feedback to the 
end-user when security behaviours have been triggered.  Users are presented with a small 
grey toolbar which spans the bottom portion of the screen, alongside 3 segments of affective 
text (see section 6.3.3.4.  for details on affective text).  It is separated into a password section, 
general information section and malicious sites information section.  The user will also see the 
addition of the small grey bar in the top-right of the screen which displays a unique log ID.  
The toolbar at the bottom of the screen will deliver affective text based upon their actions in 
the browser e.g. that their password is too short (Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38 - screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text) tool running on the Facebook home 
page 
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6.6.4.  Spengler-Zuul (Text, Colour) 
The Spengler-Zuul (text and color) tool provides multiple methods of affective feedback.  Text-
based affective feedback is delivered, alongside colour-based feedback.  Users are presented 
with a toolbar at the bottom of the screen which is split into 3 segments: password 
information, general site information, and malicious site information.  The toolbar remains grey 
however, when a user exhibits positive or negative security behaviour e.g. has a lengthy 
password, the appropriate section of the bar will change colour, in this case indicating green 
for good.  Additionally, the text will also aid in confirming the behaviour the user has just 
exhibited. 
The password bar handles multiple triggers- length, if the password is common, or if the 
password contains personal details.  If the user fails any of these checks, the bar will remain 
red, for danger.  To give an example, a user may have a lengthy password that is not 
common, however it may contain personal information they have provided online.  By 
exhibiting risky security behaviour in the personal details section, an overall negative 
response is triggered. 
In the case of the screenshot shown in Figure 39, the user has a short password which is 
insecure.  This has both been highlighted on the toolbar at the bottom of the screen, and the 
background colour of the password box where the user enters their password has also 
changed colour to reflect a negative result. 
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Figure 39 - screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text and colour) tool running on the 
Facebook home page 
 
 
6.6.5.  Spengler-Zuul (Text, Avatar) 
Spengler-Zuul (text and avatar) tool provides multiple methods of affective feedback.  Text-
based affective feedback is delivered, alongside an avatar of an adult male, containing subtle 
facial cues, at the bottom-right of the screen. Again the toolbar at the bottom of the screen is 
split into 3 segments: password information, general site information, and malicious site 
information. 
Each segment of the toolbar remains grey, delivering textual feedback on triggers.  Should the 
user engage in risky security behaviour relating to one of the triggers, the avatar will also 
exhibit facial cues which appear to make him look sad.  Oppositely, if the user exhibits safe 
behaviour in each of the segment triggers, the avatar will change, with facial cues making him 
look happy. 
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In the example shown in Figure 40, the user has not yet typed a password in the password 
box.  Therefore, the extension detects the password as being too short, causing the 
appropriate textual feedback and sad avatar. 
 
Figure 40 - screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text and avatar) tool running on the 
Facebook home page 
 
6.6.6.  Spengler-Zuul (Text, Colour, Avatar) 
The Spengler-Zuul (text and avatar and colour) tool provides 3 different methods of affective 
feedback.  Text-based affective feedback is delivered, alongside an avatar of an adult male, 
containing subtle facial cues.  Furthermore, the toolbar at the bottom of the screen is split into 
3 segments: password information, general site information, and malicious site information. 
and each of these is colour-coded like a traffic light system, as outlined in section 6.6.4. . 
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Each segment of the toolbar starts off grey however it changes colour depending of the 
positive or negative security behaviour exhibited by the end user.  Additionally, the avatar 
included in the bottom-right of the screen, will also reflect the users’ choices, appearing sad or 
happy based up on the users’ decisions.  Finally, the affective text will provide an explanation 
in relation to what the user has done. 
In the example shown in Figure 41, the user has moved focus to the password field but has 
not yet started typing a password.  The extension flags this as a short password, causing the 
appropriate text to be delivered to the end user, and the password segment of the toolbar and 
the password field turn red, indicating negative behaviour.  Also, the avatar in the corner 
appears sad. 
 
Figure 41 - screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text and colour and avatar) tool running 
on the Facebook home page 
 
 
 
130 
 
 
6.7.  Summary of the affective feedback solution 
The core of the project is to assess whether the use of affective feedback enhances users’ 
awareness of risky behaviour.  In order to evaluate the impact of affective feedback, a method 
of delivering such feedback to users was required, in the context of a browser-based 
application. 
By building upon the existing monitoring solution framework outlined in Chapter 5, an affective 
feedback solution was also delivered within the confines of the browser environment.  
Depending on the specific extension the user is engaged with, users can be subjected to 
multiple different types of affective feedback, including text, colour and avatars, when 
previously identified behaviours trigger such feedback. 
The development of such an environment means each of the extensions with different 
combinations of affective feedback can be tested in an attempt to see which kind of feedback 
(if any) has the largest effect on users’ consideration of their risky behaviour, and whether or 
not affective feedback as a whole has any impact on risky security behaviour.  To this end, 
Chapter 7 will outline the methodology followed for this evaluation process before the results 
of using such a tool are outlined in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 7. Methodology and Evaluation 
To determine if affective feedback presented to users had any impact on their security 
awareness, and behaviours online, an evaluation regime was developed in an attempt to 
gather data in this respect.  The methodology will cover each stage of the evaluation process, 
and provide a rationale for the way in which the tests were carried out. 
The overarching strategy will be discussed, with further in-depth discussion of the sites used 
in the evaluation process, the participant selection process, and the development of the user 
questionnaire. 
 
7.1.  Basic evaluation strategy 
To give a brief overview of the evaluation process, participants were initially given the 
“Information For Participants” handout (see Appendix (iii) .  Following this they were then 
given a random USB stick, labelled with a number from 1-5.  Each of the USB sticks 
contained a portable version of the Firefox browser, with a version of the monitoring 
solution/affective feedback mechanism add-on pre-installed.  After signing the consent form, 
users were asked to work their way through the instruction sheet (see Appendix (v) .  On 
completion of the computer-based part of the experiment, participants were asked to complete 
a paper-based questionnaire regarding how well they thought they responded to the feedback 
they may or may not have been shown on-screen.  In the background, the users’ actions on 
the computer-based part of the experiment are also logged, meaning the information they 
provide in the questionnaire can be corroborated against the information found in each of the 
unique log files. 
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7.2.  Use of USB sticks 
Owing to the restrictive, though appropriately security-conscious nature of Abertay 
University's IT policy, the browser extensions could not be installed on individual machines, 
hence the reason why the experiments were carried out via the use of USB sticks.  Although 
plugging in an unknown USB stick can be deemed to be a risky security behaviour in itself 
(United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 2011), it was deemed necessary in 
this scenario to allow research to be conducted.  The USB sticks were plugged into university 
machines only and were not allowed to be used on participant’s personal machines. 
Running the experiments from the USB sticks also had an additional benefit.  Coupled with 
that fact that the logging mechanism created a unique log for each test participant on a central 
server, it meant the log files were easily gathered by the researcher conducting the project.  
Rather than having to collect log files from every single machine the participants used, they 
were simply gathered from one folder located on a university web server. 
As part of the experimental design process, 5 different extensions were created in a bid to 
determine of affective feedback had any impact on the end user.  For full details of each of 
these extensions, see section 6.6. During the experiments, participants were given a USB 
stick at random, which had numbers from 1-5 on them.  Each of these numbers corresponded 
to the type of feedback they would receive during the experiment (participants were never 
explicitly told what type of feedback they would receive, only that they may or may not receive 
on-screen feedback).  Below is a list of the USB stick numbers and corresponding types of 
feedback participants received (Table 16). 
 
Table 16 - USB stick number and corresponding feedback received		
USB stick number Affective feedback delivered 
1 No feedback, monitoring only 
2 text 
3 text, avatar 
4 text, colour 
5   text, colour, avatar 
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7.3.  Participants 
Initially, the study wished to investigate the impact of affective feedback on average computer 
users i.e. those who used computers regularly to perhaps browse the web, but did not have 
an advanced degree in the subject.  The study was eventually expanded to include those that 
were studying for degrees in subjects such as ethical hacking and computing, in an effort to 
see how participants in these fields reacted to affective feedback, and to see if their increased 
knowledge of computer security had any impact on the results of the study. 
Participants were mostly gathered from classes within the of School of Arts, Media and 
Games, the School of Science Engineering and Technology, and the Graduate School within 
Abertay University. 
All experiments took place within a quiet, desktop environment in an attempt to remove any 
external stimuli which could have distracted participants during the study. 	  
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7.4.  Form design 
This section will discuss the forms used in the experiment and the thought process behind 
using them. 
7.4.1.  Information for participants 
Participants were initially told, that the purpose of the 15-minute study was to assess whether 
or not specially developed Firefox extensions assist you whilst browsing the web.  To keep the 
explanation as simple as possible, participants were told the experiment would involve visiting 
certain websites and that during this time, a Firefox extension may provide you with on-screen 
feedback and it will record the sites you have visited.  Care was taken to avoid mentioning 
what kind of feedback would be provided or where it would appear on-screen.  The fact that 
risky security behaviours were also being measured was omitted from the information for 
participants, in order to avoid influencing them in any way. 
Participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time, with no questions asked.  Any 
information gathered during the project was held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998).  In addition to this, the information held within the system was not used to identify 
individuals taking part in the experiments.  On completion of the experimental process, the 
information provided by the test participants was removed from the server.  A complete 
version of this form can be found in Appendix (iii) . 
 
7.4.2.  Consent form 
As part of the experimental process, each test participant had to sign a consent form to verify 
they understood the instructions and volunteered to take part in the experiments.  A complete 
version of this form can be found in Appendix (iv) . 
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7.4.3.  Instructions for participants 
Initially, participants were warned Firefox might be slow to respond as it's running on a USB 
drive, rather than a HDD.  Participants are also guided to write down the number which can be 
found on their USB stick, along with the unique log ID for the user which appears in the top-
right of the screen when the Firefox browser loads. 
The next sub-section of the instruction sheet involves the web-browsing aspect of the 
experimental process.  Participants are asked to visit a number of websites (see section 7.5.  
for information on the websites visited), whereby they may be presented with additional 
information on-screen (depending on the test in which they are participating, they may see 1 
or more forms of affective feedback appearing on-screen, depending on their actions).  
Participants were asked to look at each website and read any information given carefully.  
Again, at no point do the instructions make reference to the fact the experiment is actually 
monitoring behaviour and is ultimately looking at security behaviour- such information would 
result in bias. 
On completion of the computer-based portion of the experiment, participants are guided to 
request a paper questionnaire from the researcher running the experiment.  A complete 
version of the form can be found in Appendix (v) . 
 
7.5.  Sites to visit 
During the computer-based portion of the experiments, users are asked to visit a number of 
websites.  This section will give an overview of each of the sites users were asked to visit, and 
will provided a rationale as to why each of these sites have been included in the evaluation. 	  
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7.5.1.  Experiment details page 
URL: http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/ 
This website is the start page for the experiment process, and is simply a repeat of the 
information for participants.  In order to continue with the study, participants must check a box 
at the bottom of the page, again agreeing to the terms and conditions. 
 
Figure 42 - partial screenshot of the experiment details page 
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7.5.2.  Initial user form page 
URL: 
http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/initial_form/index.php?agree
=on 
The initial user page was engineered and used in the evaluation methodology in an attempt to 
gain information about test participants, and create a profile of information.  Users were asked 
to divulge the following pieces of information on the form: first name, middle name(s), 
surname, mother’s maiden name, names of pets (if applicable), phone number, and hobbies. 
 
Figure 43 - partial screenshot of the initial user form 
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A paper by Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) previously defined a list of risky security 
behaviours which included using a dictionary word as a password, and using a password 
which contains some personal information such as a mother's maiden name or the name of a 
pet.  Additional research has noted that users divulge too much information about themselves 
on social networking sites (Kaspersky Lab 2013) and owing to these pieces of research, this 
particular web form was designed in a way to elicit personal information from the test 
participant. 
At the very top of the web page, it states “Please complete the following form.  All information 
is voluntary.”  so this also provides a test as to whether the participant has read all instructions 
carefully.  This means users do not have to complete the form or provide any personal details.  
It is possible to submit the form without completing any of the fields/revealing any personal 
information. 
The information gained from this page is written to a database.  Later in the experiment, if 
participants choose to enter a password during the tests, the password entered is checked 
against the information they may or may not have revealed during the experiments.  
Ultimately, this web page helps in identifying if a user has engaged in risky security behaviour. 
 
7.5.3.  Other site form page 
URL: http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/other_site/index.php 
The "other site" web page only asks users for their full name and their email address.  The 
paper by Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) deems using a private email address to 
register for a contest on a website as a risky security behaviour.  Whilst deceiving test 
participants about a fake competition may have been deemed unethical, as part of the 
experiments, the researchers chose to ask for an email address anyway. 
The web page does not provide any information about what the address will be used for 
therefore they are providing an email address without being informed what it could potentially 
be used for.  The website states "Please enter your email address.  Providing information is 
voluntary." at the very top of the page, meaning the form can be submitted without users 
revealing any information about themselves. 
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Any information can be entered into these fields, and a simple test performs a check to 
investigate if the user left these fields blank. 
 
 
Figure 44 - screenshot of the “other site” page 	  
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7.5.4.  Continue page 
URL: 
http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/other_site/continue.php 
The continue page is just a transition page which directs how the participant should progress 
throughout the experiment.  If the user has a Facebook account which they wish to use in the 
experiment, they are taken to the Facebook website.  Otherwise, they are directed to a 
sample Bad SSL web site. 
Figure 45 - screenshot of the continue page 	  
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7.5.5.  Facebook page 
URL: https://www.facebook.com 
If test participants had a Facebook account and were willing to use it as part of the 
experiment, they were asked to enter their password, and read any information they may be 
provided with.  Following this, users were asked to post a status update, and to then log out. 
This part of the test was not mandatory.  Users did not have to use their Facebook accounts if 
they did not wish to.  They could even log in and then log out without entering a status update.  
If participants did not have a Facebook page or do not want to log into their Facebook 
account, they could skip to the Bad SSL portion of the experiment. 
Research by Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) notes using a social networking website 
can be classed as a risky security behaviour.  Such a comment can be attributed to the fact 
people often reveal too much information about themselves online (Kaspersky Lab 2013), 
which has even prompted the FBI to warn the general public about the rise of spear phishing 
attacks (FBI 2013). 
The rationale behind this part of the experiment is to firstly guide participants to purposely visit 
a social media website.  By asking users to post a status update, it became an opportunity for 
them to potentially reveal personal information about themselves.  Finally, it provides an 
encrypted password to check against any of the personal information they might have 
revealed about themselves at the beginning of the experiment. 
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Figure 46 - screenshot of Facebook 
 
 
7.5.6.  Bad SSL page 
URL: http://http-password.badssl.com/ 
Test participants do not have to do anything on this page, other than read all the information 
provided on the page.  The page is a HTTP (unencrypted page) which asks for a password, 
highlighting that the information could be viewed and used for malicious purposes.  The page 
triggers the HTTP warning in a bid to determine if users notice the information they are 
provided with, which is the rationale. 
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Figure 47 - screenshot of the Bad SSL page 
 
7.5.7.  End experiment page 
URL: http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/end_experiment/ 
Participants are presented with a page containing 3 links: end link 1, end link 2, and end link 
3.  They are asked to click on one of these links to end the experiment.  On clicking any one 
of these links, participants are shown a page which asks them to complete a short 
questionnaire, and that they should ask the researcher running the experiment for a copy of 
the questionnaire. 
One of the links presented on the page is classed is a malicious link.  This was spoofed by 
placing one of the links into the database of malicious links which the monitoring solution 
references.  This triggers the malicious link warnings within the affective feedback 
mechanism, meaning that participants get a text-based, colour-based, or avatar-based 
warning about the malicious link.  If the user is part of the control group, which delivers no 
feedback, users have no idea which of the links they are presented with is malicious.  
Similarly, if the user is evaluating one of the extensions which do not deliver colour-based 
feedback, they are warned one of the links is malicious, but the link is not highlighted in a 
warning colour, again showing they might click on a malicious link without knowledge of what 
they've done. 
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The spoofed malicious link on the page is end link 1, with the address of 
http://driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/user_pages/end_experiment/end1.php 
Figure 48 - screenshot of the end experiments page 	  
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7.5.8.  Summary of the sites used 
Table 17 includes a summary of all the sites utilised during the experiments carried out with 
participants. 
Table 17 - Summary of websites used 
  
Name Website Purpose 
Experiment 
details 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/ 
A repeat of the 
experiment information 
for participants. 
Initial user 
form 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/initial_form/index.php?agree=on 
Gain information about 
test participants. 
Other site 
form 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/other_site/index.php 
Gain further information 
about test participants. 
Continue 	 driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ user_pages/other_site/continue.php 
Explains how the 
participant should 
progress through the 
experiment. 
Facebook www.facebook.com 
Explore awareness of 
social media websites. 
Bad SSL http-password.badssl.com/ 
Sample HTTP which 
asks for a password- 
feedback trigger. 
End 
experiment 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/end_experiment/ 
One links presented is 
spoofed malicious link. 
Experiment 
end 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/end_experiment/end1.php 
Spoofed malicious link.  
Ends the experiment. 
Experiment 
end 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/end_experiment/end2.php 
Ends the experiment. 
Experiment 
end 
driesh.abertay.ac.uk/~l514921/final_phd_work/ 
user_pages/end_experiment/end3.php 
Ends the experiment. 
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7.5.9.  Website flowchart summary 
Below is a flowchart to summarize how participants can progress through the websites 
involved in the evaluation process. 
 
Figure 49 - flowchart of website progression 
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7.6.  Extensions vs. participants 
There are 5 possible experiments regarding the monitoring solution and affective feedback 
system (outlined in 7.2. ).  Participants were only allowed to take part in the experiment once, 
in order to prevent habitualization, and to reduce the bias of knowing what to expect from the 
experiments. 		
7.7.  Questionnaire design 
In this section, each of the questions asked in the questionnaire will be discussed, highlighting 
why the question was asked, and what information was gained from asking the question.  The 
Likert-based scoring system for questions will also be discussed, providing a quantitative 
approach.  Finally, the questions will also be comparable to the information captured in the log 
files. 
 
7.7.1.  Questions asked and rationale- general information 
A series of questions were asked in order to gain background information about the 
participant, and determine if they knew much about security or risky behaviours.  Table 18 
shows the questions asked, and the rationale behind asking the question.  In this research 
project, questionnaires were chosen as opposed to interviews, as they granted the collection 
of quantitative data from the evaluation process, and allowed for objective analysis.  
Additionally, they allowed data to be collected from a larger range of participants in a shorter 
timescale. 	  
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Table 18 - general information questions and rationale 
 
Question asked Reason 
What number of USB stick did 
you receive? 
Verify the type of experiment took part in- which type of 
affective feedback, or if they were in the control group. 
What was your user ID? Link questionnaire to log. 
What course of study are you 
on? 
For general information. 
What year of study are you in? For general information. 
What age category are you in? With age, yellow pigments accumulate in the lens of 
the eye, causing it to absorb more blue light (Salvi, 
Akhtar and Currie 2006).  Age has been asked in the 
questionnaire to determine if this yellowing has an 
impact on security warnings. 
How would you rate your 
knowledge of computer 
security? 
Gain a general idea of how the knowledgeable the 
user thinks they are regarding security. 
Were you connected to a 
public wi-fi network when you 
participated in the 
experiments? 
Milne, Labreque and Cromer (2009) determines using 
public wi-fi can be a risky security behaviour.  As such 
this question was included to make users consider the 
type of connection used. 
Did you reveal any personal 
information about yourself 
online during the experiment? 
Again, Milne, Labreque and Cromer (2009) notes this 
is a risky security behaviour.  This answer can be 
compared against user logs. 
Are you colourblind? Similar to issues with aging (Salvi, Akhtar and Currie 
2006), colourblindness has an impact on the delivery 
of colour.  This was asked to assess if it impacted 
colour-based affective feedback. 
Did you enter a private email 
address into Firefox during the 
study? 
Milne, Labreque and Cromer (2009) deems entering a 
private email address a risky security behaviour.  
Users answers can be compared against the logs. 
If you logged into Facebook, 
did you use a password which 
can be found in a dictionary? 
Milne, Labreque and Cromer (2009) deems using a 
common password a risky security behaviour.  User 
answers can be compared against log files. 
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If you logged into Facebook, 
did you use a password 
containing personal details 
such as mother’s maiden 
name or the name of a pet? 
Milne, Labreque and Cromer (2009) deems a 
password containing personal details as a risky 
security behaviour.   User answers can be compared 
against log files. 
Did you visit any malicious 
websites? 
User answers can be compared against the log files. 
Did you click on any malicious 
links? 
User answers can be compared against the log files.  
Similar question to above. 
Did you notice any of the built-
in browser warnings? 
Assess if the user noticed any of the warnings in 
Firefox, opposed to those included with the affective 
feedback delivery system. 
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7.7.2.  Questions asked and rationale- feedback 
The second part of the questionnaire, asked participants questions specifically relating to the 
additional affective feedback they may or may not have been shown during the course of the 
experimental process.  Table 19 shows each of the questions and a rationale behind asking 
the question. 
Table 19 - feedback questions and rationale 
 
Question asked Reason 
Did you receive any on-screen 
feedback during the 
experiments? 
Observe if user noticed affective feedback delivered.   
Not evaluated- used to jog participant’s memory. 
If you received feedback, what 
type of feedback did you 
receive? 
Observe if user noticed the type of affective feedback 
delivered. 
If you received multiple types 
of feedback, which type had 
the biggest impact? 
Observe which type of feedback had the biggest 
impact on the user, if they received multiple modes of 
affective feedback. 
Did you receive any 
password-related feedback? 
Observe if user received feedback related to 
passwords.  Not evaluated- used to jog participant’s 
memory. 
If you received negative 
password-related feedback, 
did it make you consider 
changing your Facebook 
password? 
If user received password feedback, did it have an 
impact on their reasoning, or security behaviour? 
Did you receive any social 
media-related feedback? 
Observe if user received any feedback relating to 
social media sites visited. Not evaluated- used to jog 
participant’s memory. 
If you received social media-
related feedback, did it make 
you consider the information 
you share online? 
If user feedback about social media sites, did it have 
an impact on their reasoning, or security behaviour? 
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Did you receive any feedback 
about potentially malicious 
links on a page? 
Observe if user received any feedback relating to 
malicious links on a page.  Not evaluated- used to jog 
participant’s memory. 
Did you receive any feedback 
about visiting a malicious 
page? 
Observe if user received any feedback relating to a 
malicious page visited.  Not evaluated- used to jog 
participant’s memory. 
If you received feedback about 
malicious links on a page, did 
it make you consider which 
links you were clicking on? 
If user feedback about malicious links, did it have an 
impact on their reasoning, or security behaviour? 
Did the feedback make you 
hesitate to provide information 
online? 
Did feedback provided have an impact on their state or 
what they were thinking about their security behaviour? 
Did the feedback clearly 
highlight any issues with the 
page? 
Did feedback provided clearly highlight potential issues 
on the pages on which it was triggered. 
Do you think the feedback 
provided helped to increase 
your security awareness? 
Did feedback increase the security awareness of the 
end user? 
Did you find the feedback 
useful? 
Was the affective feedback provided useful and 
informative? 
Did the feedback encourage 
you to learn more about online 
security? 
Did the affective feedback encourage the user to think 
about learning about security in the future? 
Any other comments about the 
extension? 
Free-form question to gauge general opinions about 
the affective feedback system. 
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7.7.3.  Questionnaire vs. the log files 
A vast quantity of data was recorded for each of the participants who agree to take part in the 
experimental process. The monitoring solution stores user input to assess risky security 
behaviour, and also generates a log file for each of the users, based on a unique ID.  This 
unique ID was also copied over to the questionnaire which each participant complete.  The 
use of a logging process similar to (Fenstermacher and Ginsburg 2002) along with the use of 
a questionnaire means it is possible to check the answers participants gave in the 
questionnaire against the actual actions undertaken during the browser-based portion of the 
experiment by comparing log files, database entries and questionnaires. 
 
7.7.4.  Use of Likert scales 
The questionnaire made use of questions with possible answers which translate to the 
requisite points on a Likert scale.  The purpose behind the utilising Likert scale data was to 
produce quantitative, measurable results. 
The research study opted to employ use of Likert scales due to similar approaches found in 
multiple studies pertaining to affective research.  Such studies which have used a similar 
approach include those by Abeyratna et al. (2010), who utilised affective feedback and Likert 
scales in order to understand feedback received from customers.  Hernandez et al. (2014) 
have also used Likert scales when investigating how computer users felt.  In particular, this 
study specifically used them to detect and recognise when computer users were stressed.  
Finally, Lottridge, Chignell and Jovicic (2011) highlight the use of Likert scales when designing 
for affective interaction, and understanding human emotions.  Owing to the multiple papers 
which use Likert scales to measure users’ perception in affective interaction, a similar 
approach was taken for this research project. 
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7.8.  Analysis of information gathered 
 
7.8.1.  Assimilating information 
The data from the questionnaires and logs were gathered into one location to make the 
analysis straightforward.  To this effect, all questionnaire data was entered into a MySQL 
database.  Logs were also parsed and information pertaining to the triggers were stored in 
another MySQL database.  This allows questionnaire data to be compared against the log 
files e.g. check what participants said they did vs. what they actually did.  By utilising the 
PHPMyAdmin interface, MySQL queries were run to extract the appropriate data. 
 
7.8.2.  Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis was carried out on the results.  The analysis methods chosen are largely 
dependent on the normality of the data gathered during experiments.  Methods used are 
outlined throughout Chapter 8. 	  
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7.9.  Methodology summary 
This chapter has discussed the methodology and strategy behind the evaluation process, 
detailing the types of participants involved, how participants interact with the affective 
feedback system, and the delivery of the evaluation system.  Additionally, the design of the 
questionnaire has been discussed, providing a detailed justification as to why each of the 
questions were chosen for inclusion in the experiment.  The design has attempted to follow 
the precedents set by other studies which have looked into the role of affective feedback, with 
the use of quantitative data produced from Likert scales.  In combination with the log files from 
each of the experiments, comprehensive results will be shown, comparing how users thought 
they performed vs. how they actually performed. 
The following chapter will present the results gained from the experimental process, and these 
will be analysed in the discussion chapter. 
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Chapter 8. Results 
This section will detail the results of the experimental process.  Initially, bar charts are used to 
visualise data, looking at the basic figures obtained as a result of the questionnaire.  The 
results are then analysed via descriptive statistical in 3 key ways, before conclusions are 
drawn: 
• log files from the monitoring solution are compared with data from the questionnaire 
• log files from the control group are compared with log files from each of the groups 
from the experiments which delivered affective feedback 
• questionnaire results from the control group are compared with questionnaire results 
from each of the groups from the experiments which delivered affective feedback 
 
By analysing data in multiple ways, the results seek to determine: 
• users’ awareness of risky security behaviours i.e. do the log files reflect what users 
said they did in the questionnaires 
• if affective feedback provided had an impact on the data recorded in the log files 
• if affective feedback had an impact on the end-users, and their subsequent behaviour 
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8.1.  Pilot study 
Initially, a pilot study was conducted, to ensure the experimental process ran smoothly, and 
that the logging processes captured data appropriately, owing to the complexity of the system, 
and the reliance on the back-end servers.  In addition to this, there was a need to ensure 
multiple users could run the system at the same time, identifying any preliminary problems. 
10 participants were recruited for the small pilot study.  Since no issues were reported with the 
system, and no changes needed to be made to the experimental design, the results of the 
pilot study were simply included as part of the larger result set, which included 72 participants. 	  
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8.2.  General information section of the questionnaire 
This section presents the raw data gained from the general information section of the 
questionnaire.  The result of each question is displayed as a bar chart to reflect answers. 
 
8.2.1.  Experiments and participants 
Data shown in Figure 50Error! Reference source not found. reflects how many people took 
part in each of the 5 available experiments.  Care was taken to ensure each of the 
experimental groups were approximately the same size.  Experiment groups were 
independent i.e. no single participant took part in multiple different experiments. 
 
Figure 50 - participants in each experiment 	
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8.2.2.  Course of study are you on/year 
During the experiments, participants were asked which course they were studying at 
university, if this was applicable.  Asking this question provided a general indication of the 
level of computing knowledge a participant may possess. Figure 51 highlights many 
participants have some level of computing knowledge. 
 
Figure 51 -  courses participants are enrolled on 
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8.2.3.  Age categories 
The age range of the participant was asked in order to determine if colour-based affective 
feedback had a differing impact on older users owing to the yellowing of the eye lens with age. 
Figure 52 shows that the majority of participants were in the 18-34 years old ranges, meaning 
there was insufficient data to assess the relationship between age and the impact of colour-
based affective feedback. 
 
 
Figure 52 - age range of participants 	  
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8.2.4.  Knowledge of computer security 
Participants were asked to rate their own knowledge of computer security to gather an overall 
opinion. Figure 53 reflects that most participants thought they had an average or very good 
knowledge of security. 
 
 
 
Figure 53 - participants knowledge of security 	  
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8.2.5.  Public wi-fi network 
Participants were asked if they used a public Wi-Fi network during the experimental process 
(in reality only Eduroam or a home network was used for each experiment). Figure 54  reflects 
that most participants answered correctly however many were unsure or erroneously said 
“yes”, perhaps highlighting a gap in security knowledge. 
	
		
Figure 54 - wi-fi used 													
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8.2.6.  Revealing personal information 
Figure 55 displays the answers participants gave when asked if they provided any personal 
information during the experimental process.  In this scenario, the majority of participants 
openly admitted to revealing information about themselves online, even though it was 
voluntary part of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 55 - participants who revealed personal information 
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8.2.7.  Colour-blind participants 
The impact of certain pieces of affective feedback such as colour-based feedback may have 
had a differing effect on participants who were colour-blind. Figure 56 highlights 
overwhelmingly that the majority of experiment participants were not colour-blind, therefore 
the numbers are too low to assess the relationship between colour-blindness and colour-
based affective feedback.  It should be acknowledged that some people may be unaware that 
they are colour-blind, and simply asking participants may not reflect an accurate result. 
 
 
Figure 56 - colour-blind participants 
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8.2.8.  Used a private email address 
Participants were asked if they had entered a private email address during the experimental 
process.  What is classed as a private email address is highly subjective (e.g. some people 
may consider their work email address to be public, whereas they may consider a Gmail 
address which they use for online shopping to be private) however, the majority of participants 
admitted to entering an email address, as displayed in Figure 57. 
 
 
Figure 57 - participants who entered a private email address 
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8.2.9.  Entered a dictionary password 
When asked if participants entered a dictionary password during the experiments, the majority 
said “no”, as reflected by Figure 58. 
 
 
 
Figure 58 - participants who entered a dictionary password 
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8.2.10.  Entered password containing personal details 
When asked if participants included personal details in their passwords during the 
experiments, the majority said “no”, as reflected by Figure 59. 
 
 
Figure 59 - participants and personal details in passwords 
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8.2.11.  Visiting malicious websites 
When asked if participants had visited malicious sites during the experiments, the majority 
said “no”, as reflected by Figure 60. 
 
 
Figure 60 - participants who visited malicious sites 
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8.2.12.  Click on any malicious links 
When asked if participants had clicked on a malicious link during the experiments, the majority 
said “no”, as reflected by Figure 61. 
 
 
Figure 61 - participants who clicked on a malicious link 
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8.2.13.  Built-in browser warnings 
When asked if participants noticed standard built-in browser warnings during the experiments, 
the majority said “yes”, as reflected by Figure 62. 
 
 
Figure 62 - participants who noticed browser warnings 
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8.3.  Feedback section of the questionnaire 
This section presents the raw data gained from the feedback section of the questionnaire.  
The result of each question is displayed as a bar chart to reflect answers. 
 
8.3.1.  Received on-screen feedback 
When participants were asked if they had received on-screen feedback during the 
experiments, the majority of responses stated "yes", as shown in Figure 63. 
 
 
Figure 63 - participants who received on-screen feedback 
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8.3.2.  Feedback type received 
When participants were asked about the type of feedback they received during the 
experiments, the majority of responses said colour and text, with text alone coming in second 
place (Figure 64).  In comparison, Figure 65 shows the actual feedback participants received.  
In this case, text is shown to have the highest level, as 4 out of the 5 extensions created 
utilised some form of text-based feedback i.e. 60 of the 72 participants received text-based 
feedback.  The figure also illustrates occurrences of participants receiving text-based 
feedback when it was grouped with another feedback agent e.g. colours or an avatar. 
 
 
Figure 64 - feedback type received 
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Figure 65 - actual feedback type received by participants 	  
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8.3.3.  Feedback with biggest impact 
When asked what type of feedback had the biggest impact on participants, those who 
answered the question stated colour had the largest impact, followed by text (Figure 66). 
 
Figure 66 - feedback with the largest impact on participants 
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8.3.4.  Password-related feedback 
Participants were asked if they received password feedback during the experimental process: 
the majority of respondents said "yes" (Figure 67). 
 
 
Figure 67 - participants who received password feedback 
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8.3.5.  Changing Facebook password 
Participants were asked if password feedback received made them consider changing their 
Facebook password.  Those that answered the question largely agreed that it made that 
consider changing their password (Figure 68). 
 
 
Figure 68 - participants who considered changing their password 
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8.3.6.  Social media-related feedback 
Participants were asked if they received social-media feedback during the experimental 
process: the majority of respondents said "no" (Figure 69). 
 
 
Figure 69 - participants who received social-media feedback 
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8.3.7.  Consider information shared 
Participants were asked if the social-media feedback received made them consider the 
information which they shared online.  Those that answered the question were unsure in this 
scenario (Figure 70). 
 
 
Figure 70 - participants and consideration of information shared 
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8.3.8.  Malicious link feedback 
Participants were asked if they received feedback about malicious links during the 
experimental process: the majority of respondents said "yes" (Figure 71). 
 
 
Figure 71 - participants who received malicious link feedback 
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8.3.9.  Malicious page feedback 
Participants were asked if they received feedback about malicious sites during the 
experimental process: the majority of respondents said "no" (Figure 72). 
 
 
Figure 72 - participants who received feedback about malicious sites 
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8.3.10.  Clicking on links 
When asked if feedback provided made participants consider links they were clicking on, the 
majority answered "agree" (Figure 73). 
 
 
Figure 73 - participants who said feedback made them consider clicking on links 
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8.3.11.  Hesitation to provide information 
When asked if feedback provided made participants hesitate to provide information online, the 
majority agreed the feedback made them hesitate (Figure 74). 
 
 
Figure 74 - did feedback make participants hesitate to provide information? 
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8.3.12.  Highlighting issues on page 
When asked if feedback provided clearly highlighted issues on a particular web page, the 
majority of participants agreed (Figure 75). 
 
 
Figure 75 - did feedback clearly highlight page issues? 
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8.3.13.  Security awareness 
When asked if feedback provided increased the security awareness of participants, the 
majority of them agreed it did (Figure 76). 
 
 
Figure 76 - did feedback increase security awareness? 
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8.3.14.  Useful feedback 
When asked if feedback provided was useful, the majority of participants agreed it was useful 
(Figure 77). 
 
 
Figure 77 - was feedback useful? 
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8.3.15.  Learning more about security 
When asked if feedback provided encouraged participants to learn more about security, the 
majority of them agreed that it encouraged them to learn more (Figure 78). 
 
 
Figure 78 - did feedback encourage participants to learn more about security? 
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8.4.  Diverging bar charts for feedback questions 
Diverging bar charts have been created to show the spread of answers over the Likert scale 
more accurately for the following questions: 
• If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you consider 
changing your Facebook password? 
• If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you consider the 
information you share online? 
• If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make you consider 
which links you were clicking on? 
• Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
• Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
• Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security awareness? 
• Did you find the feedback useful? 
• Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security? 
 
Each of these bar charts can be found in Appendix (viii) - diverging bar charts based on Likert 
data. 
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8.5.  Assessment of log data vs. questionnaire data 
Information recorded by the monitoring solution in log files and database records made it 
possible to compare what users did during experiments against the answers they provided in 
the questionnaires.  To this effect, 5 questions were analysed in detail.  This section details 
the questions analysed, and the assumptions made with the data provided. Section 8.6. then 
goes on to discuss the statistical analysis methods used, before section Error! Reference 
source not found.states the results of the statistical analysis in comparing log files against 
questionnaire data. 
 
8.5.1.  Questions analysed in further detail 
8.5.1.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
In determining if the participant revealed personal information, at least one of the fields in the 
intial_form MySQL database had to contain a value 
 
8.5.1.2.   Did user enter email address? 
In determining if the participant revealed a private email address, at least one of the fields in 
the other_site MySQL database had to contain a value. 
 
8.5.1.3.   Did user enter a common password? 
This information was pulled from the unique log files generated by the monitoring solution. 
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8.5.1.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
This information was pulled from the unique log files generated by the monitoring solution. 
 
8.5.1.5.   Did user visit a malicious site? 
This information was pulled from the unique log files generated by the monitoring solution. 
 
8.5.2.  Comparison figures 
Figure 79 provides an overview of what participants did in the log files and databases, 
generated by the monitoring solution in comparison with the answers participants gave in the 
questionnaire.  The statistical significance of these figures will be discussed in Error! 
Reference source not found. 
Figure 79 - log file and database results vs. questionnaire data 
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8.5.3.  Breakdown of log comparison figures by feedback method 
Graphs in this section provide an overview of what participants did in the log files and 
databases, generated by the monitoring solution, in comparison with the answers participants 
gave in the questionnaire.  These figures are broken down by what was asked in the 
questionnaire.  The statistical significance of these figures will be discussed in Error! 
Reference source not found.  
Figure 80 shows the difference between participants who said they revealed personal 
information and the number who actually revealed personal information. 
 
Figure 80 - difference between participants who said they revealed personal 
information and the number who actually revealed personal information 	  
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Figure 81 shows the difference between participants who said they entered an email address 
and the number who actually entered an email address. 
 
Figure 81 - difference between participants who said they entered an email address and 
the number who actually entered an email address 
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Figure 82 shows the difference between participants who said they entered a 
common/dictionary password and the number who actually entered a common/dictionary 
password. 
 
Figure 82 - difference between participants who said they entered a common/dictionary 
password and the number who actually entered a common/dictionary password 	  
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Figure 83 shows the difference between participants who said they revealed personal details 
in their password and the number who actually revealed personal details in their password. 
 
Figure 83 - difference between participants who said they revealed personal details in 
their password and the number who actually revealed personal details in their 
password 	  
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Figure 84 shows the difference between participants who said visited a malicious site and the 
number who actually visited a malicious site. 
 
Figure 84 - difference between participants who said they visited a malicious site and 
the number who actually visited a malicious site 	  
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8.6.  Assessment of log vs. questionnaire data- statistical tests 
A number of statistical methods were used to analyse the data gained from the log files, 
databases and questionnaires. 
In this instance, a binary comparison method was required i.e. in the questionnaires, 
participants who answered “yes” in comparison to participants who did not.  Similarly, when 
parsing the log files and databases, a positive/yes result was searched for e.g. looking for 
users who revealed personal information about themselves in comparison to those who did 
not. 
Due to the need for a binary comparison, the N-1 Two Proportion Test based upon the N-1 
Chi-Square was utilised (Measuring Usability LLC 2016).  In deriving statistical significance, 
the alpha p-value was set at 0.05 and a two-tailed test was used in a bid to detect an effect in 
either direction.  Regarding the p-value, it is “the probability of finding the observed, or more 
extreme, results when the null hypothesis (H 0) of a study question is true” (Stats Direct 
2016). 
In the rare occasion where one of the counts falls below the value of 1, the Fisher Test is 
used, whilst still carrying out a binary comparison. 	  
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8.7.  Comparing the log vs. questionnaire 
This section details the statistical significance values between the log files and databases vs. 
the questionnaires.  To achieve statistical significance, the p value needs to register as p≤ 
0.05. Table 20  provides an overview of the results, showing which of the questions and 
experiment numbers raised a statistically significant result (difference between the log and the 
questionnaire).  Section 8.7.1. onwards states the full results. 
	
Table 20 - summary table of log data vs. questionnaire data results 
	
	
Statistical significance: log and databases vs. questionnaire 
Question Experiment 
1 (none) 
Experiment 
2 (text) 
Experiment 
3 (text, 
avatar) 
Experiment 
4 (text, 
colour) 
Experiment 
5 (text, 
colour, 
avatar) 
Did user reveal 
personal 
information? 
Yes No Yes No No 
Did user enter email 
address? 
No No No Yes Yes 
Did user enter a 
common password? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Did user have 
personal details in 
password? 
No No No No No 
Did user visit a 
malicious site?  
Yes Yes No No No 
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The main difference highlighted is that when asked if they used a common password, 
participants largely said “no”.  However, there is a significant statistical difference when the 
log files are viewed, indicating that many users did in fact have common elements in their 
passwords.   The same difference is seen across all experiments containing affective 
feedback, suggesting it did not have an impact on the actions of users in this instance. 
In terms of revealing personal information, there was a significantly higher number of 
participants who revealed personal information about themselves as per the databases vs. 
those who stated they revealed personal information in the questionnaire in experiments 1 
and 3.  This potentially highlights a lack of security awareness in end users who have not 
realised the information divulged.  This could also explain the similar results for “Did user 
enter an email address?” in groups 4 and 5, and “Did user visit a malicious site?” in groups 1 
and 2. 
 
8.7.1.  USB 1 Experiment- Control group 
8.7.1.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When participants were asked if they revealed personal information during the course of the 
experiments, 58.3% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed all participants in the control group revealed some form of data. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0232859.  This is p≤ 0.05 and therefore indicates a significant 
result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 97.671% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 98.836% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 	  
197 
 
 
8.7.1.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When participants were asked if they revealed a private email address during the course of 
the experiments, 83.3% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 80% of participants in the control group revealed an email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.843669.  p> 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 15.633% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 57.817% chance the 
questionnaire data contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.1.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
 When participants were asked if they entered a dictionary password during the course of the 
experiments, 8.3% of users said yes in the questionnaire.  When the log files were examined, 
it was revealed 41.7% participants in the control group entered a commonly used password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0649045.  p>0.05 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 93.51% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 96.755% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 	  
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8.7.1.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
 When participants were asked if they included personal details in their passwords during the 
course of the experiments, 16.7% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files 
were examined, it was revealed 8.3% participants in the control group has personal details in 
their password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.5456987.  p> 0.05 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 45.43% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 72.715% chance the 
questionnaire data contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.1.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When participants were asked if they visited a malicious site during the course of the 
experiments, 16.7% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 58.3% participants in the control group had visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0390372.  This is p≤ 0.05 and therefore indicates a significant 
result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 96.096% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 98.048% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 	  
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8.7.2.  USB 2 Experiment- text-based feedback  
8.7.2.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
 When participants were asked if they revealed personal information during the course of the 
experiments, 76.92% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed all participants in the text-based feedback group revealed data. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0821939.  p>0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 91.781% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 95.89% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion.  
 
8.7.2.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When participants were asked if they revealed a private email address during the course of 
the experiments, 76.92% of users said yes in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 69.23% of participants in the text-based feedback group revealed 
an email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.6646114.  p>0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 33.539% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 66.769% chance the 
questionnaire data contains a higher proportion. 
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8.7.2.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
 When participants were asked if they entered a dictionary password during the course of the 
experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were examined, 
it was revealed 53.85% participants in the text-based feedback group entered a commonly 
used password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0024061.  p≤ 0.05 and therefore this indicates a significant 
result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 99.7591% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.88% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.2.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
 When participants were asked if they included personal details in their passwords during the 
course of the experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files 
were examined, it was revealed 0% participants in the text-based feedback group has 
personal details in their password.  Owing to values equalling zero, Fisher Exact Test was 
utilised. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥ 1 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of test indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different between the 
questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 0% chance the log data contains a higher 
proportion. 
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8.7.2.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
 When participants were asked if they visited a malicious site during the course of the 
experiments, 15.38% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 61.54% participants in the text-based feedback group had visited a 
malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0177061.  This is p≤ 0.05 and therefore indicates a significant 
result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 98.229% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.115% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.3.  USB 3 experiment- text, avatar-based feedback 
8.7.3.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When participants were asked if they revealed personal information during the course of the 
experiments, 62.5% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed all participants in the text and avatar-based feedback group 
revealed some form of data. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0093746.  p≤0.05 therefore this is a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 99.063% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.531% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
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8.7.3.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When participants were asked if they revealed a private email address during the course of 
the experiments, 75% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 93.33% of participants in the text and avatar-based feedback group 
revealed an email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.1724471.  p> 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 82.755% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 91.378% chance the log 
data contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.3.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When participants were asked if they entered a dictionary password during the course of the 
experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files generated were 
examined, it was revealed 53.85% participants in the text and avatar-based feedback group 
entered a commonly used password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0013065.  p≤ 0.05 and therefore this indicates a significant 
result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 99.869% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.935% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
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8.7.3.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When participants were asked if they included personal details in their passwords during the 
course of the experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files 
were examined, it was revealed 6.25% participants in the text and avatar-based feedback 
group has personal details in their password. 
Owing to values equalling zero, Fisher Exact Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  
p≥1 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different 
between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 50% chance the log data contains 
a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.3.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When participants were asked if they visited a malicious site during the course of the 
experiments, 31.25% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 50% participants in the text and avatar-based feedback group had 
visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.2878704.  p≥ 0.05 and therefore is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 71.213% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 85.606% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 	  
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8.7.4.  USB 4 Experiment- text, colour-based feedback group 
8.7.4.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When participants were asked if they revealed personal information during the course of the 
experiments, 78.57% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed all participants in the text, colour-based feedback group revealed 
some form of data. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0718608.  p≥0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 92.814% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 96.407% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.4.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When participants were asked if they revealed a private email address during the course of 
the experiments, 71.43% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 100% of participants in the text, colour-based feedback group 
revealed an email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0284599.  p≤ 0.05 therefore this is a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 97.154% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 98.577% chance the log 
data contains a higher proportion. 
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8.7.4.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When participants were asked if they entered a dictionary password during the course of the 
experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were examined, 
it was revealed 78.57% participants in the text, colour-based feedback group entered a 
commonly used password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 2.94E-5.  p≤ 0.05 and therefore this indicates a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 99.997% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.999% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.4.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When participants were asked if they included personal details in their passwords during the 
course of the experiments, 14.29% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log 
files were examined, it was revealed 14.29% participants in the text, colour-based feedback 
group has personal details in their password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥ 1 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different 
between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 50% chance the log data contains 
a higher proportion. 
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8.7.4.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When participants were asked if they visited a malicious site during the course of the 
experiments, 21.43% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 50% participants in the text, colour-based feedback group had 
visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.1213351.  p≥ 0.05 and therefore is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 87.866% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 93.933% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.5.  USB 5 Experiment- text, colour, avatar-based feedback group 
8.7.5.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When participants were asked if they revealed personal information during the course of the 
experiments, 52.94% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 35.71% participants in the text, colour, avatar-based feedback 
group revealed some form of data. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.345397.  p≥0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 65.46% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 82.73% chance the 
questionnaire file contains a higher proportion. 
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8.7.5.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When participants were asked if they revealed a private email address during the course of 
the experiments, 52.94% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 86.67% of participants in the text, colour, avatar-based feedback 
group revealed an email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0432167.  p≤ 0.05 therefore this is a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 95.678% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 97.839% chance the log 
data contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.5.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When participants were asked if they entered a dictionary password during the course of the 
experiments, 0% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were examined, 
it was revealed 35.29% participants in the text, colour, avatar-based feedback group entered 
a commonly used password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.007832.  p≤ 0.05 and therefore this indicates a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 99.217% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 99.608% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion. 	  
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8.7.5.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
 When participants were asked if they included personal details in their passwords during the 
course of the experiments, 5.88% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files 
were examined, it was revealed 0% participants in the text, colour, avatar-based feedback 
group has personal details in their password.  Owing to values equalling zero, Fisher Exact 
Test was utilised.   
The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥ 1 and therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different 
between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 50% chance the log data contains 
a higher proportion. 
 
8.7.5.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When participants were asked if they visited a malicious site during the course of the 
experiments, 35.29% of users said “yes” in the questionnaire.  When the log files were 
examined, it was revealed 47.06% participants in the text, colour, avatar-based feedback 
group had visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.4923308.  p≥ 0.05 and therefore is not a significant result. 
Results of the chi-squared test also indicate there’s a 50.767% chance the proportions are 
different between the questionnaire data and the log file data, with a 75.383% chance the log 
data file contains a higher proportion.  
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8.8.  Comparing experiment groups- control group log data vs. 
affective feedback log data 
This section details the statistical significance values between the control experiment log files 
and databases, vs. the affective feedback log files and databases.  This will highlight 
differences between the actions of participants in the control group vs. participants who 
received some form of affective feedback.  To achieve statistical significance, the p value 
needs to register as p≤ 0.05.  Again the N-1 Two Proportion Test is used. 
Table 21Error! Reference source not found. provides an overview of the results, showing 
which of the questions and experiment numbers raised a statistically significant result 
(difference between the control log and the experiment log).  Section 8.8.1. explores the 
results in more detail.  
Table 21 - summary table of control log vs. affective log results 
 
Statistical significance: log files 
Question Control vs. 
Experiment 
2 (text) 
Control vs. 
Experiment 
3 (text, 
avatar) 
Control vs. 
Experiment 
4 (text, 
colour) 
Control vs. 
Experiment 
5 (text, 
colour, 
avatar) 
Did user reveal personal 
information? 
No No No Yes 
Did user enter email address? No No No No 
Did user enter a common 
password? 
No No No No 
Did user have personal details 
in password? 
No No No No 
Did user visit a malicious site?  No No No No 
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In comparing data from the control experiment log files and database records, against 
experiments containing affective feedback, the majority of results gained were insignificant.  
The only significant result gained was when the control experiment was compared against 
experiment 5, which contained text, colour and avatar-based affective feedback.  In 
experiment 5, fewer participants revealed information about themselves when compared to 
the control group. 
 
8.8.1.  Control log vs. text-based feedback log 
8.8.1.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 100% of users in the group were found 
to have revealed personal information.  In comparison, when the text-based group logs were 
reviewed, 100% participants revealed personal information. 
In comparing the two log files, there was a value equalling zero, therefore the Fisher Exact 
Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥0.05 therefore this is not a significant 
result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different between the 
control log data and the comparison text-based group log data, with a 0% chance the 
comparison text-based group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.1.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 80% of users in the group were found to 
have revealed a private email address.  In comparison, when the text group logs were 
reviewed, 69.23% participants revealed a private email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.568506.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
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Results of the test also indicate there’s a 43.149% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text-based group log data, with a 71.575% 
chance the control log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.1.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 41.67% of users in the group were found 
to have used a common/dictionary password.  In comparison, when the text group logs were 
reviewed, 53.85% participants revealed the use of a common/dictionary password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.5507273. p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 44.927% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text-based group log data, with a 72.464% 
chance the text-based log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.1.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 8.33% of users in the group were found 
to have personal details in their password.  In comparison, when the text-based group logs 
were reviewed, 0% participants had personal details in their password. 
Owing to values equalling zero, Fisher Exact Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 
0.48.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 52% chance the proportions are different between 
the control log data and the comparison text -based group log data, with a 52% chance the 
control log contains a higher proportion. 
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8.8.1.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 58.33% of users in the group were found 
to have visited a malicious site.  In comparison, when the text-based group logs were 
reviewed, 61.54% participants had visited a malicious site. 
 The two-tailed p-value: was 0.8727803.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 12.722% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text-based group log data, with a 56.361% 
chance the text-based group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.2.  Control log vs. text, and avatar-based feedback log 
8.8.2.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 100% of users in the group were found 
to have revealed personal information.  In comparison, when the text and avatar-based group 
logs were reviewed, 100% participants revealed personal information. 
In comparing the two log files, there was a zero value, therefore the Fisher Exact Test was 
utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different between the 
control log data and the comparison text and avatar-based group log data, with a 0% chance 
the comparison text and avatar-based log contains a higher proportion. 
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8.8.2.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 80% of users in the group were found to 
have revealed a private email address.  In comparison, when the text and avatar-based group 
logs were reviewed, 93.33% participants revealed a private email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.3247559.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 67.524% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and avatar-based group log data, with a 
83.762% chance the text and avatar-based log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.2.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 41.67% of users in the group were found 
to have used a common/dictionary password.  In comparison, when the text and avatar-based 
group logs were reviewed, 50% participants revealed the use of a common/dictionary 
password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.6674362.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 33.256% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and avatar-based-based group log data, 
with a 66.628% chance the text and avatar-based-based log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.2.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 8.33% of users in the group were found 
to have personal details in their password.  In comparison, when the text and avatar-based 
group logs were reviewed, 6.25% participants had personal details in their password. 
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Owing to a zero value, Fisher Exact Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥ 0.05 
therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different between the 
control log data and the comparison text avatar-based group log data, with a 31.746% chance 
the control log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.2.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 58.33% of users in the group were found 
to have visited a malicious site.  In comparison, when the text and avatar-based group logs 
were reviewed, 50% participants had visited a malicious site. 
 The two-tailed p-value: was 0.6674362.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 33.256% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and avatar-based group log data, with a 
66.628% chance the control group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.3.  Control log vs. text and colour-based feedback log 
8.8.3.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 100% of users in the group were found 
to have revealed personal information.  In comparison, when the text and colour-based group 
logs were reviewed, 100% participants revealed personal information. 
In comparing the two log files, there was a value equalling zero, therefore the Fisher Exact 
Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 1.  p≥0.05 therefore this is not a significant 
result. 
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Results of the test also indicate there’s a 0% chance the proportions are different between the 
control log data and the comparison text and colour-based group log data, with a 0% chance 
the comparison text and colour-based log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.3.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 80% of users in the group were found to 
have revealed a private email address.  In comparison, when the text and colour-based group 
logs were reviewed, 100% participants revealed a private email address. 
In comparing the two log files, there was a value equalling zero, therefore the Fisher Exact 
Test was utilised. The two-tailed p-value: was 0.15.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant 
result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 85% chance the proportions are different between 
the control log data and the comparison text and colour-based group log data, with a 85% 
chance the text and colour-based log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.3.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 41.67% of users in the group were found 
to have used a common/dictionary password.  In comparison, when the text and colour-based 
group logs were reviewed, 78.57% participants revealed the use of a common/dictionary 
password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0586504.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 94.135% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and colour-based-based group log data, 
with a 97.067% chance the text and colour-based log contains a higher proportion. 
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8.8.3.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 8.33% of users in the group were found 
to have personal details in their password.  In comparison, when the text and colour-based 
group logs were reviewed, 14.29% participants had personal details in their password. 
 The two-tailed p-value: was 0.642362.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 35.764% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and colour-based group log data, with a 
67.882% chance the text and colour-based group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.3.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 58.33% of users in the group were found 
to have visited a malicious site.  In comparison, when the text and colour-based group logs 
were reviewed, 50% participants had visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.676922.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 32.308% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text and colour-based group log data, with a 
66.154% chance the control group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.4.  Control log vs. text, colour and avatar-based feedback log 
8.8.4.1.   Did user reveal personal information? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 100% of users in the group were found 
to have revealed personal information.  In comparison, when the text, colour and avatar-
based group logs were reviewed, 35.71% participants revealed personal information. 
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The two-tailed p-value: was 0.0016917.  p≤0.05 therefore this is a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 99.831% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text, colour and avatar-based group log 
data, with a 99.915% chance the control log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.4.2.   Did user enter email address? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 80% of users in the group were found to 
have revealed a private email address.  In comparison, when the text, colour and avatar-
based group logs were reviewed, 86.67% participants revealed a private email address. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.6625203.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 33.748% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text, colour and avatar-based group log 
data, with a 66.874% chance the text, colour and avatar-based log contains a higher 
proportion. 
 
8.8.4.3.   Did user enter common/dictionary password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 41.67% of users in the group were found 
to have used a common/dictionary password.  In comparison, when the text, colour and 
avatar-based group logs were reviewed, 35.29% participants revealed the use of a 
common/dictionary password. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.732144.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 26.786% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text, colour and avatar-based group log 
data, with a 63.393% chance the control log contains a higher proportion. 
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8.8.4.4.   Did user have personal details in password? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 8.33% of users in the group were found 
to have personal details in their password.  In comparison, when the text, colour and avatar-
based group logs were reviewed, 0% participants had personal details in their password. 
 In comparing the two log files, there was a cell value equalling zero, therefore the Fisher 
Exact Test was utilised.  The two-tailed p-value: was 0.4137931.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not 
a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 58.621% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text, colour and avatar-based group log 
data, with a 58.621% chance the control group log contains a higher proportion. 
 
8.8.4.5.   Did user visit malicious site? 
When logs from the control experiment were viewed, 58.33% of users in the group were found 
to have visited a malicious site.  In comparison, when the text, colour and avatar-based group 
logs were reviewed, 47.06% participants had visited a malicious site. 
The two-tailed p-value: was 0.5565279.  p≥ 0.05 therefore this is not a significant result. 
Results of the test also indicate there’s a 44.347% chance the proportions are different 
between the control log data and the comparison text, colour and avatar-based group log 
data, with a 72.174% chance the control group log contains a higher proportion.  
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8.9.  Assessment of affective feedback attitudes- statistical 
tests 
A number of statistical methods were used to analyse the data gained from the experiments. 
8.9.1.  Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test 
To analyse the impact of affective feedback on the end-users, it was necessary to have a 
control group who visited all the same websites, but received no feedback.  This control group 
were given USB number 1, and the extension carried a monitoring solution only. 
Since the control group was to be compared against all the other groups, Likert data from the 
control group needed to be tested to assess of the data distribution was normal, and to obtain 
the p-value.  If the data did not include a normal distribution, a non-parametric test was 
needed to discern statistical significance.  As Table 22 indicates none of the Likert scale 
based questions featured a normal distribution in accordance with the Shapiro-Wilk Normality 
Test, therefore further analysis would require the use of a non-parametric method.  The p-
values in the table were obtained via the use of the shapiro.test method in the R statistical 
computing program (The R Foundation 2015). 
In terms of the Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test, if the p-value gained is less than or equal to the 
chosen alpha level (typically 0.01 or 0.05), the null hypothesis indicating the distribution is 
normal is rejected i.e. the data is not normal. 	  
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Table 22 - Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test control group results 
 
Question p-value Normally 
distributed? 
If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make 
you consider changing your Facebook password? 
0.003397 no  
If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you share online? 
0.004484 no 
If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it 
make you consider which links you were clicking on? 
0.009813 no 
Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information 
online? 
0.001431 no 
Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 0.003397 no 
Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your 
security awareness? 
0.004484 no 
Did you find the feedback useful? 0.009813 no 
Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online 
security? 
0.003715 no 
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8.9.2.  Mann-Whitney U Test 
Since the Shapiro-Wilk test indicated the data from the control/USB 1 group was not normally 
distributed, a non-parametric type of test was required to analyse the statistical significance of 
results gained. 
Laerd Statistics notes that "The Mann-Whitney U test is used to compare differences between 
two independent groups when the dependent variable is either ordinal or continuous, but not 
normally distributed." (Lund Research Ltd 2013).  This indicates the Mann Whitney U test 
(sometimes called the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test) is suitably applicable, in that the data 
from the Likert scale is ordinal.  Also, each group who took part in the experiments was 
independent i.e. participants were only allowed to take part once, regardless of the 
experiment they took part in.  Each group who received affective feedback was to be tested 
against the control group. 
To calculate the statistical significance, the online Social Science Statistics calculator 
(Stangroom 2016) was used, after performing a few calculations manually to ensure its 
integrity.  Tests were run using a 0.05 alpha level, and were two-tailed, in a bid to detect an 
effect in either direction.  To this effect, if a test achieved a p≤ 0.05, there was deemed to be a 
statistically significant result between the two samples. 
In the following section where the control group is compared against each of the affective 
extensions, the following terms are used: 
• Median- midpoint of a frequency distribution 
• U value- difference between two rank totals calculated by the Mann-Whitney U test 
• p-value- “the probability of finding the observed, or more extreme, results when the 
null hypothesis (H 0) of a study question is true” (Stats Direct 2016) 	  
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8.10.  Comparing experiment groups- affective feedback 
attitudes 
This section details the statistical significance values between the opinions of participants who 
took part in the control experiment (no affective feedback) vs. those who took part in 
experiments containing affective feedback.  To achieve statistical significance, the p value 
needs to register as p≤ 0.05.  
Table 23 provides an overview of the results, showing which of the questions and experiment 
numbers raised a statistically significant result (difference between control responses and the 
affective feedback responses).  Section 8.10.1. onwards describes the results in more detail. 	  
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Table 23 - summary table of control log vs. affective feedback attitude results 
 
Statistical significance by question and experiment 
Question Control vs 
Experiment 
2 (text) 
Control vs 
Experiment 
3 (text, 
avatar) 
Control vs 
Experiment 
4 (text, 
colour) 
Control vs 
Experiment 
5 (text, 
colour, 
avatar) 
If you received negative 
password-related feedback, did it 
make you consider changing your 
Facebook password? 
No No No No 
If you received social media-
related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you 
share online? 
No No No No 
If you received feedback about 
malicious links on a page, did it 
make you consider which links 
you were clicking on? 
No Yes No No 
Did the feedback make you 
hesitate to provide information 
online? 
No Yes No Yes 
Did the feedback clearly highlight 
any issues with the page? 
No No No No 
Do you think the feedback 
provided helped to increase your 
security awareness? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Did you find the feedback useful? Yes No Yes Yes 
Did the feedback encourage you 
to learn more about online 
security? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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In comparing data from the control experiment when participants were asked “Do you think 
the feedback provided helped to increase your security awareness?”, all affective experiments 
produced a positive, statistically significant result.  This indicates that in the opinion of the 
participants, the affective feedback has had an impact on security awareness. 
Similarly, when asked “Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security?”, 
again, all affective experiments produced a statistically significant result in comparison to the 
control responses.  This indicates that in the opinion of the participants, the affective feedback 
has had some form of impact on them, encouraging them to improve their behaviour in the 
future. 
In terms of finding the feedback useful, the only group which failed to produce a statistically 
significant result in this instance was experiment 3 (text and avatar-based feedback) in 
comparison to the control.  Other results were mixed, with text and avatar-based feedback 
proving successful in coercing users into hesitating to provide information online and making 
them consider the links they were clicking on.  Experiment 5 (text, colour, and avatar-based 
feedback) also appeared to make participants hesitate to provide information. 	  
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8.10.1.  Control vs. text-based affective feedback 
8.10.1.1.   If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you 
consider changing your Facebook password? 
This question assessed if negative password related feedback shown during the experiment 
had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  
Participants in sample 2 were shown text-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 2 (median=0).  The p-value is 0.53526 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 55.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 33.  Again the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.1.2.   If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you share online? 
This question assessed whether or not social media-related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 2 were shown text-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 2 (median=1).  The p-value is 0.8181 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 56. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 29.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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8.10.1.3.   If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make 
you consider which links you were clicking on? 
This question assessed whether or not malicious link feedback shown during the experiment 
had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  
Participants in sample 2 were shown text-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 2 (median=2).  The p-value is 0.71138 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 59.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 33.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.1.4.   Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
Participants were asked if any of the feedback shown during the experimental process made 
them hesitate to provide information online.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 2 were shown text-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=0) and sample 2 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.11184 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 44. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 37.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.1.5.   Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided clearly highlighted any issues with the web 
pages visited.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in 
sample 2 were shown text-based affective feedback. 
227 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 2 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.4354 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 58. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 37.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
 
8.10.1.6.   Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security 
awareness? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided increased their security awareness.  Participants 
in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 2 were shown text-
based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 2 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.04036 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 36. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 37.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 2 (text-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, which suggests 
users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.1.7.   Did you find the feedback useful? 
Participants were asked if the feedback they were provided with was useful.  Participants in 
sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 2 were shown text-based 
affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 2 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.04338 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 36.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 37.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 2 (text-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, which suggests 
users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.1.8.   Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security? 
Participants were asked if the feedback encouraged them to learn more about online security.  
Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 2 were 
shown text-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a marginal statistical significance between 
sample 1 (median=1) and sample 2 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.0466 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 37. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 37.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 2 (text-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, which suggests 
users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.2.  Control vs. text, and avatar-based feedback 
8.10.2.1.   If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you 
consider changing your Facebook password? 
This question assessed whether or not negative password related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 3 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.8493 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 74. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 41.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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8.10.2.2.   If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you share online? 
This question assessed whether or not social media-related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 3 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.4965 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 65. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 41 so again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.2.3.   If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make 
you consider which links you were clicking on? 
This question assessed whether or not malicious links feedback shown during the experiment 
had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  
Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.01928 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 41.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 49.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 3 (text, and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
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8.10.2.4.   Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
Participants were asked if any of the feedback shown during the experimental process made 
them hesitate to provide information online.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=0) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.0455 meaning the result is significant 
at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 52.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 3 (text, and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.2.5.   Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided clearly highlighted any issues with the web 
pages visited.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in 
sample 3 were shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.33204 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 74.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.2.6.   Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security 
awareness? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided increased their security awareness.  Participants 
in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and 
avatar-based affective feedback. 
231 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.01314 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 42. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 3 (text, and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.2.7.   Did you find the feedback useful? 
Participants were asked if the feedback they were provided with was useful.  Participants in 
sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 3 were shown text, and 
avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.05744 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 54.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.2.8.   Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security? 
Participants were asked if the feedback encouraged them to learn more about online security.  
Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 3 were 
shown text, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 3 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.01314 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 42. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 3 (text, and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
8.10.3.  Control vs. text and colour 
8.10.3.1.   If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you 
consider changing your Facebook password? 
This question assessed whether or not negative password related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 4 (median=1).  The p-value is 0.50926 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.The U-value is 49.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 29 so again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.3.2.   If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you share online? 
This question assessed whether or not social media-related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 4 (median=0).  The p-value is 0.80258 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 61.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 33 so again, 
the result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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8.10.3.3.   If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make 
you consider which links you were clicking on? 
This question assessed whether or not malicious links feedback shown during the experiment 
had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  
Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 4 (median=3.5).  The p-value is 0.238 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 60.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 45.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.3.4.   Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
Participants were asked if any of the feedback shown during the experimental process made 
them hesitate to provide information online.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=0) and sample 4 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.18352 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 53. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 41.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.3.5.   Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided clearly highlighted any issues with the web 
pages visited.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in 
sample 4 were shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
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The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 4 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.29372 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 63. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 45.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.3.6.   Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security 
awareness? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided increased their security awareness.  Participants 
in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and 
colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 4 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.01278 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 35. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 45.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 4 (text, and colour-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.3.7.   Did you find the feedback useful? 
Participants were asked if the feedback they were provided with was useful.  Participants in 
sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 4 were shown text, and 
colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 4 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.04236 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 44. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 45.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 4 (text, and colour-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.3.8.   Did the feedback encourage you learn more about online security? 
Participants were asked if the feedback encouraged them to learn more about online security.  
Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 4 were 
shown text, and colour-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 4 (median=3.5).  The p-value is 0.02202 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 39. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 45.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 4 (text, and colour-based affective feedback) has a higher rating, 
which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.4.  Control vs. text, colour and avatar 
8.10.4.1.   If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you 
consider changing your Facebook password? 
This question assessed whether or not negative password related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 5 were shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective 
feedback. 
236 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 5 (median=1).  The p-value is 0.71138 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 59.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 33.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.4.2.   If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you 
consider the information you share online? 
This question assessed whether or not social media-related feedback shown during the 
experiment had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 5 were shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective 
feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 5 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.5287 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 66. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 41 so again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.4.3.   If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make 
you consider which links you were clicking on? 
This question assessed whether or not malicious links feedback shown during the experiment 
had an impact on the end user.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  
Participants in sample 5 were shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 5 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.1141 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.The U-value is 61.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 53.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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8.10.4.4.   Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
Participants were asked if any of the feedback shown during the experimental process made 
them hesitate to provide information online.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback 
(control).  Participants in sample 5 were shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective 
feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=0) and sample 5 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.0271 meaning the result is significant 
at p≤ 0.05.The U-value is 51.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 57.  Again, the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 5 (text, colour and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher 
rating, which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.4.5.   Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided clearly highlighted any issues with the web 
pages visited.  Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in 
sample 5 were shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1.5) and sample 5 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.36282 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 81. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 57.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
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8.10.4.6.   Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security 
awareness? 
Participants were asked if feedback provided increased their security awareness.  Participants 
in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 5 were shown text, 
colour, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 5 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.04884 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 57. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 57.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 5 (text, colour and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher 
rating, which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.10.4.7.   Did you find the feedback useful? 
Participants were asked if the feedback they were provided with was useful.  Participants in 
sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 5 were shown text, 
colour, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was no statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 5 (median=4).  The p-value is 0.07346 meaning the result is not 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 61. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 57.  Again, the 
result is not significant at p≤ 0.05. 
 
8.10.4.8.   Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security? 
Participants were asked if the feedback encouraged them to learn more about online security.  
Participants in sample 1 were shown no feedback (control).  Participants in sample 5 were 
shown text, colour, and avatar-based affective feedback. 
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The Mann-Whitney U test indicated there was a statistical significance between sample 1 
(median=1) and sample 5 (median=3).  The p-value is 0.04136 meaning the result is 
significant at p≤ 0.05.  The U-value is 55.5. The critical value of U at p≤ 0.05 is 57.  Again, the 
result is significant at p≤ 0.05. 
This result indicates there is a difference between samples.  On further inspection of the 
median values, sample 5 (text, colour and avatar-based affective feedback) has a higher 
rating, which suggests users felt it had more of an impact in comparison to the control. 
 
8.11.  Comments about the extension 
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked “Any other comments about the 
extension?” as a free-form question, with a view to obtaining information which could be used 
to improve the monitoring solution and affective feedback delivery system in future research. 
Comments received provided mixed answers; a full list can be found in Appendix (vii)  - 
response to “Any other comments about the extension?”.  
 
 
8.12.  Limitations of the study 
The research goals for this project have been met, although consideration has been given to 
the limitations of the research. 
Owing to the number of participants who engaged with the study, and the division of 
participants into 5 experimental groups (experiment 1: n=12, experiment 2: n=13 , experiment 
3: n=16 , experiment 4: n=14 , experiment 5: n=17), the sample sizes were relatively low.  In 
addition to this, the demographics were not representative of the general population, with the 
majority of participants being younger, university students, with knowledge of a computing-
based subject. 
240 
 
There may also have been potential issues with the experimental design.  In some instances, 
participants reported receiving on-screen feedback, despite the fact they were part of a control 
group who did not receive feedback.  It is conceivable they thought some of the websites they 
were asked to visit provided feedback e.g. the red background of the Bad SSL site.  In relation 
to feedback questions users received, if they answered "no" to the first question of "Did you 
receive any on-screen feedback during the experiments?", they still had to answer the rest of 
the questions on the sheet of paper.  This may have led some of them into believing they also 
received on-screen feedback. 
Another limitation relates to the phrasing of some of the questions.  In order to ensure the 
questions were clear for the participants, it might have been useful to explain some concepts 
to them during the experimental process.  One such example of this is the definition of 
commonly used passwords (passwords which have been cracked, and appear on multiple 
wordlists e.g. “Trustno1”), and dictionary passwords (a word which can be found in the 
dictionary, or a password which has been cracked before e.g. “password”). 
Potential issues may also have arisen with the extension.  It cannot reliably know that 
personal information is contained within a password.  Instead, it can only check if personal 
information provided within the context of the experiment has been included within the 
password. 
The affective feedback delivery bar was placed at the bottom of the screen in an attempt to 
emulate the positioning of the status bars which previously appeared in browsers.  
Conceivably, the bar could have been made to appear more prominent on-screen, by 
modifying the colours presented, or by conducting a study to find the optimal position for 
imparting information to the end-user. 
The extension also suffers from scalability issues.  When running on pages containing a large 
number of links, the affective feedback mechanism can lag.  This is due to the fact each link is 
checked against the database to ascertain if it is malicious.  This issue was mitigated during 
the experimental phase- websites with a limited number of links were chosen, to ensure 
accurate results were gained, and that the monitoring solution and affective feedback 
mechanism did not encounter any errors. 
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8.13.  Overall results summary 
The results section has highlighted there were some significant differences between what 
users stated they did during experiments, versus what they actually did during the 
experimental process, in terms of security behaviour such as the information they revealed 
about themselves.  One issue is that there is a significant statistical difference between the log 
files when compared against the questionnaires when users were asked if they used a 
common password.  More users utilised a common password, than admitted to this fact 
across all affective experiments.  This means affective feedback did not have an impact on 
the end-user, and no affective feedback mechanism out-performed the other. 
A significantly higher number of users revealed personal information, than reported doing so 
in the questionnaire when comparing experiments 1 and 3.  Similar results were noted for the 
question of “Did user enter an email address?” in experiments 4 and 5, and “Did user visit a 
malicious site?” in experiments 1 and 2.  The mixed results in regards to different affective 
feedback mechanisms show that no affective feedback mechanism out-performed the other. 
Few significant differences were seen in the log files of the control experiment when 
compared to the log files of the experiments of participants who received affective feedback.  
A significant result was gained with experiment 5 (text, colour, avatar) in comparison to the 
control experiment.  Fewer participants in experiment 5 revealed information about 
themselves in comparison to the control experiment.  In this instance, affective feedback may 
have helped users consider their security behaviour, or participants in that group may have 
possessed an increased knowledge of security.  The demographics of the group show 
although there were some participants who studied a computing-based subject and may 
therefore know about security, there was an overall mix of people in the group. 
When asked about the impact the affective feedback had on the end users, some found that it 
made them hesitate to provide information online, or made them think about the links they 
were clicking on.  Also, a majority of participants indicated that providing affective feedback 
was useful, increased security awareness and encouraged them to learn more about online 
security.  Overall, results between groups generally highlighted that any affective feedback 
mechanism was viewed as potentially useful by the end-user. 
Chapter 9 will discuss the results fully, before conclusions are drawn about the overall 
success of the research project in Chapter 10.  
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Chapter 9. Discussion 
This chapter will discuss the results which were obtained and analysed in Chapter 8, 
scrutinising them in greater detail.  The discussion of the results will examine how they relate 
to the research question "Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users via 
dynamically provided affective feedback?". 
The discussion section will critique the what the participants said they did in the questionnaire 
provided compared to how the participants actually fared in terms of the log data.  In this 
particular part of the questionnaire, participants were asked simple yes/no questions which 
allow for a binary comparison of those who said “yes” against those who triggered a positive 
result in the appropriate log file.  This will aid in determining a general overview of participants’ 
security awareness level 
To link back to the research question, the results of the control group log data versus the 
affective feedback log data will also be discussed i.e. highlight if there's a difference between 
the log files of those who received affective feedback.  This will provide another aspect of an 
answer to the research question and will assess if the affective feedback had an impact on 
what the users actually did during the experiments. 
The Likert-based questionnaire feedback will also be inspected in an attempt to answer the 
research question.  In this instance, the Likert scale data from the control group was 
compared to the experiment groups which delivered affective feedback, in a bid to determine 
if participants thought the affective feedback provided had an impact on their security 
awareness levels. 
Potential issues related to the tool developed will also be discussed, using the general 
feedback gained from participants as a basis for the discussions.  Finally, future work will be 
explored, covering possible ways in which issues could be mitigated in future experiments, 
and how the developed solution could be used in future research. 
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9.1.  Discussion of results 
9.1.1.  Questionnaire results vs. the log and databases 
When the questionnaire results were compared to the log files and the MySQL database 
records, there was one key question regarding risky security behaviour which produced a 
statistically significant result (as shown in Table 20, section 8.7. ). 
During the experimental process, when participants were asked if they had used a dictionary 
password, the majority of those asked stated “no”.  However, after analysing the requisite log 
files, there was a noted statistical significance which indicated that the majority of the 
participants had a common element in their password.  The same statistical difference is 
noted across all of the experiments which delivered varying combinations of affective 
feedback. 
Since the same difference is seen across all experiments containing affective feedback, it 
suggests the delivery of the feedback did not have an overall impact on the actions of the 
participants in this instance, however, there is another potential explanation for such a result. 
This result highlights there is still a need to raise security awareness in end-users and 
educate people regarding security behaviours which are perceived to be risky (Hoffman 
2011).  One interpretation of the result is that participants may not have been aware of the 
term “dictionary word” in relation to password.  Additionally, they may not have been aware 
that dictionary words in passwords contribute to poor password hygiene (Milne, Labrecque 
and Cromer 2009).  These findings also link in with the research conducted by Ur et al. 
(2016).  This paper found that end-users had a number of misconceptions about common 
passwords and dictionary passwords. 
When participants were asked if they had revealed personal information about themselves 
during the course of the experiments, there was a significant difference between those who 
admitted to revealing information about themselves (as per the questionnaire data), in 
comparison to the number of participants who actually revealed personal information about 
themselves, as revealed by the appropriate database records. 
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In experiment 1 (control) and experiment 3 (text and avatar-based affective feedback), there 
was a significantly higher proportion of participants who revealed personal information about 
themselves in the database, in comparison to those who stated they revealed information 
about themselves when answering the questionnaire.  Again, this result could be explained by 
the fact participants had a poor understanding of risky security behaviour, and perhaps did not 
understand the consequences which could arise from sharing such information. Such findings 
link to work by Stanton et al. (2005) where a taxonomy of security behaviours was presented.  
One behaviour identified was "naïve mistakes" where the user does not realise that their 
behaviour is flawed.  
A poor understanding of risky security behaviours could also explain the similarly statistically 
significant results gained when participants were asked if they entered a private email address 
during the course of the study.  Whilst the concept of a private email address is purely 
subjective (what constitutes a private email address may differ depending on the user and 
purpose of the address), the database files were parsed in an effort to determine if the user 
had provided some form of information in the private email address field.  Experiment 4 (text 
and colour-based feedback) and experiment 5 (text, colour and avatar-based feedback) 
produced statistically significant results, with more users revealing email addresses in the log 
files. Milne, Labrecque and Cromer (2009) questioned users regarding information they 
revealed online and found similar results.  When participants in the study were asked if they 
had revealed information such as private email addresses, a large number of participants said 
they had.  Again, this also ties into work by Stanton et al. (2005) where users do not realise 
such behaviour could be problematic. 
When asking users if they had visited a malicious website during the course of the 
experiment, a statistically significant result was gained in experiment 1 (control) and 
experiment 2 (text-based feedback).   Essentially, more users visited malicious sites 
(according to the log files) than admitted to visiting malicious sites in the questionnaire.  Since 
experiment 1 does not contain any form of affective feedback whereas experiment 2 does, 
such a result could again be attributed to the participant’s lack of security awareness when 
browsing sites online.  The proportion of those visiting malicious sites in experiment 1 also 
highlights the requirement for a tool to help users- if users are not provided with any feedback 
(like in experiment 1), they will have no way of knowing a link they are clicking on is malicious. 
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All information provided during the experimental process was voluntary, and this statement 
was clearly displayed at the top of the web pages which asked for information such as 
mother’s maiden name, hobbies, email address, etc., which shows participants either chose to 
divulge sensitive information, or that they actively engaged in risky security behaviour by 
failing to read the page properly. It is known that often, users will reject rational security advice 
they are provided with, as they perceive the steps required to engage in secure behaviour to 
be burdensome (Herley 2009). 
 
9.1.2.  Control group log data vs. affective feedback log data 
When the log files and database records from the control experiment were compared to the 
log files and the database records from affective feedback-based experiments, the majority of 
results gained were insignificant (as shown in Table 21, section 8.8. ). 
When users were asked if they revealed information about themselves during the course of 
the experimental process, there was a statistical difference noted in the actual number of 
people who revealed information in the log files of experiment 5 (text, colour and avatar-based 
feedback).  In experiment 5, fewer participants revealed information about themselves when 
compared to the control group log files.   
Such a result potentially indicates the affective feedback delivered in experiment 5 may have 
encouraged and assisted participants in considering their security behaviour online, and 
increased their awareness.  On the other-hand, it is possible the particular group of 
participants already possessed a good knowledge of risky security behaviours.  Exploring the 
courses participants in experiment 5 were studying, there is a variety of subjects.  Of those 
who answered the question, there were 4 computing students, and 2 ethical hacking students.  
The rest were a mix of food nutrition and health, PhD Oil and Gas Economics, computer 
games application development, computer games technology, and forensic psychobiology 
students.  In this group, the ethical hacking students will have covered security extensively on 
their course, and the computing students should have some awareness of security.  The other 
subjects mentioned do not cover security in-depth, meaning affective feedback may have 
been useful in this instance. 
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9.1.3.  Questionnaire feedback and attitudes towards affective feedback 
When comparing the questionnaire results regarding the impact of the affective feedback, 
there were statistically significant differences when experiment 1 (control) participants were 
compared to those who engaged with the affective feedback-based experiments (shown in 
Table 23, section 8.10. ). 
When participants were asked “Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your 
security awareness?”, all affective questionnaire data produced a positive, statistically 
significant result when compared to the control group questionnaire data.  This indicates that 
in the opinion of the participants, the affective feedback was successful in creating a positive 
impact on the security awareness of the end-user. 
A similar statistically significant result was generated when participants were asked “Did the 
feedback encourage you to learn more about online security?”.  All affective questionnaire 
data produced a positive, statistically significant result when compared to the control group 
questionnaire data.  This result highlights again that the affective feedback appears to have 
influenced the participants into thinking about their security behaviours online, with the 
possibility of prompting them to engage in better security choices in future web-browsing.  The 
result also links back to the need for education: in this instance it appears the participants are 
eager to learn.  Affective feedback can trigger emotions and this is consistent with work 
presented by Iovane et al. (2012) and Arguedas et al. (2015) whereby they argue that emotion 
is a key part of the learning process. 
The results of the two questions “Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your 
security awareness?” and "Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online 
security?" produced statistically significant results for all affective experiments.  When 
interpreting the data, this indicates that no form of affective feedback delivered outperformed 
the other- essentially any form of affective feedback made an impact.  This is an interesting 
result as the raw results shown in 8.3.3. indicated users felt colour had the largest impact, 
though it was only used in 2 of the experiments. 
When asked if the feedback provided was useful, only one comparison group failed to 
produce a statistically significant result.  The group in question was experiment 3 (text and 
avatar-based feedback).  This result correlates with the graph in 8.3.3. where participants 
indicated that colour had the largest impact during the experimental process, though it should 
be noted that experiment 2 (text-based feedback) produced a statistically significant result, 
despite the lack of colour-based feedback. 
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The other results gained from the experiments were mixed.  When asked if the feedback 
made them hesitate to provide information online, both experiment 3 (text and avatar-based 
feedback) and experiment 5 (text, colour and avatar-based feedback) were successful to this 
end, again showing an impact on end-user security behaviour.  Experiment 3 also appeared 
to have an impact on the way they browsed online, making them consider the links they were 
clicking on, guiding them to avoid engagement in risky security behaviours.  On the other 
hand, work by Myers (2004) and Hini, Gendall and Kearns (1995) have noted there is a weak 
link between behaviour and attitude, and therefore is suggestive that the feedback provided 
may not necessarily cause users to change their behaviour.  The concept of "security fatigue" 
must also be taken into consideration.  Even if users are provided with affective feedback to 
raise security awareness, they may not comply with it.  Furnell and Thomson (2009) made a 
similar observation that employees within companies may fail to adhere to good practice, 
when they have been taught about security issues. 
In terms of the affective feedback delivered, some comments from the free-form section of the 
questionnaire state participants think the affective solution is a useful application, with 
comments such as “I find the extension useful for people who do not know much about online 
security”, "Very helpful, especially for strong passwords", and “I think this is a good idea to 
raise awareness on online security especially people that are new to technology”. 
 
9.2.  Potential issues 
9.2.1.  Avoiding bias 
Several steps were taken to avoid introducing any type of bias into the experiments. 
When partaking in the experiments, participants were initially told the purpose of the research 
was to assess whether or not specially developed Firefox extensions provided assistance 
when browsing the web.  They were also told that the Firefox extension might provide them 
with on-screen feedback. 
Participants were not told about the type of feedback they would receive, or the location it 
might appear in.  The term "risky security behaviour" was not mentioned on any part of the 
participant information sheet, to avoid introducing participants to a conscious bias. 
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The measures taken to reduce the level of bias involved in the experiments may have 
confused some participants, judging by some of the comments left in response to the free 
form question (see Appendix (vii) ) e.g. "I couldn't understand fully the experiment and what 
and why Facebook was involved in it.". 
 
9.2.2.  Control group experiments 
The control group experiments may have been construed as confusing, owing to the lack of 
feedback and the fact that participants still had to go through the same websites as a 
participant who received affective feedback.  This information was reflected in response to the 
free-form question included in the questionnaire e.g. “Personally I didn't notice anything out of 
the ordinary”, "I did not see any noticeable effects of the extension” and "I couldn't understand 
fully the experiment and what and why Facebook was involved in it.". 
If users had been informed that they were in the control group, or an affective feedback group, 
this could have introduced bias into the experiment (see 9.2.1. ), and may have skewed the 
final results.  Whilst control group users had to simply visit sites and received no feedback, 
this process ensured the integrity of the research.  Several of the participants in the control 
group stated they received some form of feedback which could not have been the case.  In 
this scenario, users may have misinterpreted part of a web page or part of the standard 
Firefox web browser window as some form of affective feedback delivery system.  
Potentially participants in the control group may have thought the BadSSL page (7.5.6. ) was 
providing feedback, in that it was a bright red page.  In future experiments, this page could be 
replaced with a simple, plain web page delivered via HTTP with a password field on it.  This 
would trigger the same feedback warnings however it may reduce the perception of the web 
page itself providing feedback. 
Participants may also have considered that built-in browser security warnings were part of a 
feedback delivery system.  The potential built-in browser warnings are discussed in the 
following section, 9.2.3.  
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9.2.3.  Impact of feedback vs. built in browser warnings 
Relating to participants in the control group, a few submitted questionnaire answers indicating 
they had received some form of feedback, which is not possible.  The types of built-in 
warnings and feedback which Firefox provides have been investigated in order to identify a 
source of the alleged feedback. Table 24 outlines the trigger embedded within the monitoring 
solution, and as of Mozilla Firefox version 43, provides potential warnings and information 
delivered by the browser. 
In this instance, Firefox provides no such feedback or warnings for common passwords, 
malicious links on pages, social media sites, or the use of public Wi-Fi.  It does provide 
feedback if a user visits a malicious website but since the malicious website used during the 
experimental process was spoofed, the Firefox malicious website warning did not appear on-
screen. 
Regarding HTTP and HTTPS websites, Firefox provides some colour and text-based 
warnings (and Table 24 reveals how to view such information).  The feedback here is not 
necessarily obvious and users may have failed to notice this. 
There is scope for future work in this respect, in comparing the affective feedback delivery 
system in comparison to the Firefox browser.  To access some of the security information in 
Firefox, several clicks are needed (outlined in Table 24).  The affective feedback delivery 
system has a fixed bar at the bottom of each page, and potentially provides a more direct 
feedback mechanism. 
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Table 24 - monitoring solution triggers compared to built-in Firefox feedback 
 Current Firefox Warning 
Trigger Action Result 
HTTP Site 
lynsayshepherd.com as an example Site loads 
Click globe icon on address bar 
Red text- “connection is not 
secure” 
Click arrow 
 
Text: “Your connection to this site 
is not private.  Information you 
submit could be viewed by others 
(like passwords, messages, credit 
cards, etc.)”. 
Click more information 
Text: “The web site 
lynsayshepherd.com does not 
support encryption for the page 
you are viewing.  Information sent 
over the internet without 
encryption can be seen by other 
people while it is in transit.” 
HTTPS 
Site 
Google.com as an example 
 
 
 
Site loads 
Click green padlock on address bar. 
 
Green text- “secure connection”. 
 
Click arrow.  “Verified by Google” 
Text: Connection Encrypted 
(encryption details)- “The page 
you are viewing was encrypted 
before being transmitted over the 
Internet”. 
 
Click more information 
Text: “Encryption makes it difficult 
for unauthorized people to view 
information travelling between 
computers.  It is therefore unlikely 
that anyone read this page as it 
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traveled across the network.” 
Common 
password 
No standard warning. No standard warning. 
Malicious 
link visited 
 
Malicious 
link on 
page 
No standard warning. No standard warning. 
Social 
media site 
No standard warning. No standard warning. 
Public wi-fi No standard warning. No standard warning. 
 
 
9.2.4.  Sample sizes 
Despite recruiting 72 participants, when these were divided into experimental groups 
(experiment 1: n=12 , experiment 2: n=13 , experiment 3: n=16 , experiment 4: n=14 , 
experiment 5: n=17), the sample sizes were low.  This may have had an impact of the 
granularity of the results. 
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9.2.5.  Efficiency of the tool developed 
The affective feedback mechanism can be inefficient when running on pages containing a 
large number of link, as each link is checked against a database to detect if it is malicious.  To 
mitigate any issues during the experimental phase, websites with a limited number of links 
were chosen, to ensure accurate results were gained, and that the monitoring solution and 
affective feedback mechanism did not encounter any errors.  Timeliness of feedback provided 
in a learning environment is paramount (McDarby et al. 2004)( Iovane et al. 2012).  By 
minimising the risk of the extension failing, this helped to ensure feedback appeared at the 
correct time. 
 
9.2.6.  USB security issues 
During the free-form question, one of the participants noted that they "Shouldn't have plugged 
the USB in to begin with.  Highly reduces threat.", referring to the fact the experimental 
process was run from a USB stick.  This participant is correct in noting that plugging in an 
untrusted USB stick into a computer is deemed to be a risky security behaviour (United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team 2011). 
However, the research was conducted within the confines of Abertay University, and there are 
restrictions placed upon the software which can be installed on lab machines.  Since the 
software developed was purely a prototype, it was not appropriate to install it on lab 
machines.  Steps were taken to mitigate the risks posed from using the USB sticks.  The USB 
sticks were plugged into university machines only and were not allowed to be used on 
participant’s personal machines. 
 
 
 
253 
 
9.2.7.  XUL-based extensions 
The monitoring solution and the affective feedback delivery systems were developed as XUL-
based extensions.  Towards the end of the research project, Mozilla Firefox announced a 
signing strategy, whereby extensions cannot be installed into the browser unless they have 
been signed and verified by Mozilla themselves, in an attempt to ensure extension are secure, 
and are not malicious.  Since the software developed as part of this research project is purely 
experimental, it would be unwise to release it publically, and submit it to Mozilla for signing. 
To mitigate any issues, the experiments were conducted via the Mozilla Firefox Developer 
Edition which has no such issues with requiring signed Firefox extensions. 
Some of the security issues which surround XUL arise from the way in which it allows 
developers to customise their extensions.  They allow the developer to extensively customise 
the user interface, create their own modified JavaScript files, utilise APIs which may not be 
supported by the Add-on SDK and access the XPCOM (cross platform component object 
model).  Figure 85 provides an overview of the Mozilla platform (Suggi, Liverani and Freeman 
2009). At this point it would be prudent for developers to consult the security model used in 
the creation of Firefox extensions but research presented in 2009 confirmed that worryingly, 
the "Mozilla extension security model is nonexistent" (Suggi, Liverani and Freeman 2009). 	  
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Figure 85 - an overview of the Mozilla platform 
 
The same piece of research notes that there are no boundaries between extensions, meaning 
that it's possible for one extension to modify another.  Additionally, the XPCOM C++ 
components are subject to memory corruption, and the vulnerabilities are platform 
independent.  Other applications which employ the use of the same extension system are also 
vulnerable to compromise e.g. the Thunderbird email client (Suggi, Liverani and Freeman 
2009). 
Similar sentiments have been echoed in a piece of research conducted in 2013, which 
highlights that little has been done to address the potential security flaws in extensions.  The 
research notes that "once an extension has been installed, it can enjoy the same privilege 
level as an administrator of a local machine", meaning that extensions, malicious or not can 
read/write/modify local file systems (Shahriar 2013). 
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Add-ons available from the Mozilla gallery website are deemed to be safe.  Extensions 
submitted to this gallery are checked over, and approved by Mozilla, in a bid to prevent users 
from installing malicious tools (Mozilla b) 2015).  However, in the past, this approach has 
failed to detect all malicious extensions.  It was reported in 2010 that Mozilla failed to detect 
malware in 2 extensions available from the Add-on gallery.  These were experimental 
extensions which were yet to undergo a public review process however, the extensions 
contained Trojan horses designed to hijack Windows PCs, and up to 4600 users may have 
been infected by the issue (Computerworld 2010). 
As of August 2015, Mozilla announced the company was effectively deprecating XUL-based 
extensions, and moving to a new API named WebExtensions, which will be compatible with 
Chrome and Opera (hence making it easier for developers to create cross-platform 
extensions) (Mozilla e) 2015).  This has been announced in an attempt to improve the security 
of the web-browsing experience for end-users. 
 
9.2.8.  Colour-blind participants 
Some people are unaware they are colour-blind, therefore this issue may have applied to 
some of the participants who took part in the evaluation process: simply asking if participants 
are colour-blind may not reflect an accurate result. 	  
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9.3.  Future work 
Comments yielded from the free-form section of the questionnaire, and issues encountered 
during the developmental and experimental processes have identified a number of areas 
which could be explored in future work. 
 
9.3.1.  Adaptation of the extension format 
As section 9.2.7. discusses, Mozilla Firefox is moving away from the XUL-based extension 
format.  Whilst Mozilla Firefox is merely the vehicle which is used to investigate the use of a 
monitoring solution and an affective feedback mechanism, if the underlying concepts are to be 
explored in the future, the system will need to be moved to the WebExtensions format.  One 
such benefit of this is that the system will be compatible with Chrome and Opera, meaning it 
can be tested across various devices, providing scope for further research. 
 
9.3.2.  Affective feedback delivered 
Further research could involve changing some of the affective feedback which was delivered 
to the participants during the experiment. 
The avatars used for this body of research were chosen from a paper by Sacharin et al. 
(2012), written at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences and which explored the perception 
of how people reacted to changing emotional expressions.  As part of the experimental 
process during this body of research, comments were received from participants stating "The 
avatar is creepy.".  The avatar utilised was a bald male.  One possible avenue for further 
research is the impact the gender of the avatar has in terms of affect.  Such studies have 
been explored by Gulz et al. (2007) and have the potential to be applied to the realm of cyber 
security. 
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Consideration could also be given to the specific phrasing and wordlist used in the affective 
feedback mechanism.  During the experimental process, one participant noted "I would like to 
understand the details of why the sites are decided as safe/unsafe", indicating they felt there 
may have been a potential issue with the way in which text-based feedback was delivered to 
them. 
The wordlist which helped in the construction of the affective phrases was called AFINN 
(AFINN-111.txt) (Nielsen 2011).  Potentially, further work could be carried out by applying 
another wordlist such as ANEW (Affective Norms for English Words) (Bradley and Lang 1999) 
to the affective phrases included in the affective feedback mechanism.  There are also a 
number of other wordlists available- running a comparison in terms of risky security behaviour 
could aid in establishing which is the most efficient and appropriate list to use when interacting 
with average end-users of the internet. 
 
9.3.3.  Positioning of the affective feedback on-screen 
When reviewing comments made by participants during the experimental process, there were 
conflicting opinions regarding the positioning of the affective feedback on-screen:  
• "It is fairly large across the bottom of the page, could potentially be made a little 
smaller" 
• "When concentrating on the questions and the login details, the feedback didn’t draw 
my attention immediately.  It was when I looked away that I noticed the colour then 
the face." 
The rationale behind placing the affective feedback delivery bar at the bottom of the screen 
was an attempt to emulate the positioning of the status bars which used to appear in 
browsers, stating that a site was loading, where it was loading content from, hyperlinks, etc.  
The affective feedback bar was made large in order to incorporate the various types of 
information it needed to deliver: password information, general information and information 
about malicious sites and links.  There was too much information to condense into a small 
sized bar however, the existing bar could be adapted.  In making it more transparent, it may 
seem like it is taking up less of the screen. 
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Further work carried out in this respect would involve delivering affective feedback on different 
parts of the screen, in an attempt to ascertain the optimal position for imparting information to 
the end-user. 
 
9.3.4.  Long-term study 
The results indicate that when the questionnaire data was compared to the log files and the 
MySQL database records, there were several areas where there was a statistical significance 
where users chose to divulge information about themselves across the experiments.  The 
main area in which this occurred was when participants were asked if they had used a 
dictionary password.  The majority of users said “no” in the questionnaire, however this was 
not reflected in the log files and database records. 
The same statistical difference is seen across all of the experiments which delivered varying 
combinations of affective feedback.  This suggests the affective feedback did not make an 
impact on the actions of the participants.  When control logs were compared to affective 
feedback log files, the majority of results which were returned were insignificant, again 
suggesting little difference was made by the affective feedback. 
However, in gauging the opinions of the participants in relation to affective feedback, positive 
results were gathered.  In asking the participants “Do you think the feedback provided helped 
to increase your security awareness?”, all affective experiment questionnaire data produced a 
positive, statistically significant result when compared to the control group questionnaire data.  
The same result was obtained by asking “Did the feedback encourage you to learn more 
about online security?” suggesting participants thought affective feedback had an impact.  The 
weak link between attitude and behaviour (Hini, Gendall and Kearns 1995) should be taken 
into consideration.  Although users felt affective feedback had an impact, this might not 
translate into a change of behaviour. 
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When combining these 3 analyses, in the majority of cases, the affective feedback did not 
change the behaviour of the users during the experimental process however, when polling the 
opinions of the participants, they indicated they felt like affective feedback could make an 
impact, and encouraged them to learn.  This result may be due to a social desirability 
response.  Participants may have answered the questions in a way that allows them to be 
perceived favourably by others.  Potentially, this suggests that a study over a longer period, 
utilising affective feedback could slowly raise awareness of risky security behaviour in end-
users, and the change would eventually be reflected in log files.  Research relating to security 
fatigue means this may not necessarily be the case however (Furnell and Thomson 2009), as 
generally speaking, users have issues with long-term retention of security information.  
Additionally, even if users are provided with security advice, they may reject the information 
they have been given (Herley 2009). 
 
9.3.5.  Specific groups 
A piece of feedback received during the experiments stated "I think this is a good idea to raise 
awareness on online security especially people that are new to technology.". 
Further research could be explored, in a way to modify the delivery and application of the 
affective feedback to make it appeal to specific groups.  The Office of National Statistics in the 
UK has noted the rise of Internet users who are aged 75 and over (Office for National 
Statistics 2016).  In 2011, the number of over 75s who recently used the internet was 19.9%.  
In 2016, this figure has risen to 38.7%.  Regardless of the age of the user, they still need to be 
educated about the dangers of risky security behaviour.  Modifying the extension to deliver 
more appropriate feedback e.g. have less of a focus on colour as the lens of older people tend 
to yellow, distorting colours (Salvi, Akhtar and Currie 2006) could provide another avenue for 
investigation. 
Similarly, the affective feedback could be modified to appeal to children, helping to educate 
them about staying safe online from a young age.  Some research has stated that fire safety 
awareness is important, and is taught in schools from a young age; the same should apply to 
staying safe online (Hoffman 2011). 
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9.4.  Discussion summary 
The results display there appears to be value to delivering affective feedback in the context of 
a browser-based environment, in an effort to enhance the security awareness of end-users, 
and to encourage them to learn more about online security.  Results reflect that according to 
participants the affective feedback delivery mechanism encouraged them to learn more about 
online security, and that it helped to increase their online security awareness.  Participants 
largely found the feedback useful, and it made some participants contemplate links they were 
clicking on, along with consideration of the information shared online.  Whilst the results of 
affective feedback were not directly reflected in the log files, the affective feedback solution 
could potentially be rolled out as a longer-term solution.  Using such a delivery system over 
the course of a year or more may yield further results, and changes may be reflected in the 
log files.   
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
10.1.  Research outcomes 
The research question driving this body of research was “Is it possible to enhance security 
risk awareness in end-users via dynamically provided affective feedback?”.  To fully 
investigate the issue, there were several facets which had to be explored:  
• users' awareness of risky security behaviours i.e. do the log files reflect what users 
said they did in the questionnaires; 
• whether affective feedback provided had an impact on the data recorded in the log 
files; 
• whether affective feedback had an impact on the end-users and their subsequent 
behaviour 
 
10.1.1.  User awareness: log files and questionnaires 
In addressing the first of these sub-issues, it was found that depending on the question asked, 
there was a statistical significance between the answer the participants gave in the 
questionnaire in comparison to the actions they carried out, as recorded in the log files and 
the database records.  Across several of the experiment groups, it was revealed via the 
database records that 100% of participants in some of the groups revealed personal 
information about themselves.  However, the values gained from questionnaires indicated 
participants had not realised they had provided such information.  This highlights that 
participants have engaged in risky security behaviour, and points to a poor level of security 
awareness in the end user. 
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Significant results were also gained among participants who answered the question asking if 
they had a dictionary word as a password.  Again, more participants had some common 
element in their password as determined by the log files than admitted to via the 
questionnaire.  The same difference is seen across all experiments containing affective 
feedback, and reveals a general level of poor password hygiene. 
A statistically significant number of users revealed an email address during the course of the 
experiments, specifically in experiment 4 (text and colour-based feedback) and experiment 5 
(text, colour and avatar-based feedback), whilst the other affective feedback-based 
experiments did not produce a significant result. 
In asking participants if they had visited a malicious website during the course of the 
experiment, a statistically significant result was gained in experiment 1 (control) and 
experiment 2 (text-based feedback) whereby users visited more malicious links than they 
admitted to.  The result for experiment 1 also highlights the requirement for a tool to help 
users- if users are not provided with any feedback, they will have no way of knowing a link 
they are clicking on is malicious. 
Generally speaking, what the participants said they did in the questionnaires fail to match with 
the information gathered in the log files.  In many cases, participants were found to have 
engaged in many more instances of risky security behaviours and it appears they were not 
aware that they were doing so.  The results gained here indicate a generally low level of 
awareness of risky security behaviour, highlighting a need to raise security awareness in end-
users and educate people about security behaviours which are perceived to be risky.  The 
results were uniform across some of the questions asked of the users, particularly 
surrounding the issue of the information they revealed about themselves.  Overall, it appears 
the delivery of affective feedback did not change the actual behaviour of the end users in this 
particular body of research.  
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10.1.2.  Impact of affective feedback on log files 
Affective feedback did not appear to have an impact on the behaviour of users as recorded by 
the log files and database records.  The majority of results gained were insignificant.  One 
anomaly was generated by experiment 5 (text, colour and avatar-based feedback) when 
participants were asked about the information they revealed about themselves, in comparison 
to the control log file.  This produced a significant result, where fewer participants in 
experiment 5 (text, colour, avatar-based feedback) divulged information and this suggests 
affective feedback may have made a difference.  Overall, it has been concluded affective 
feedback did not have an impact on participant behaviour, as per the log files and database 
records. 
 
10.1.3.  Impact of affective feedback on end-users 
Several questions indicated affective feedback successfully impacted on end-users’ 
awareness of risky security behaviours.  When compared to the control group, statistically 
significant results were recorded by those who received some form of affective feedback.  
Those who received affective feedback felt it helped to increase their security awareness, and 
that the feedback encouraged them to learn more about online security, a factor which could 
potentially improve their security awareness in the future, and modify their behaviour.  Overall 
this suggests that affective feedback had an impact on end-users’ awareness and will allow 
them to consider whether their online behaviours could be perceived as risky. 
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10.1.4.  Overall conclusions 
In the case of the log files and questionnaires, participants were found to have engaged in 
instances of risky security behaviours which they were unaware of, and this indicates a 
generally low level of awareness of risky security behaviour.  Whilst the results indicate the 
affective feedback did not make a difference to behaviour during the course of the 
experiments, participants felt that the affective feedback delivered had an impact and allowed 
them to consider whether their online behaviours could be perceived as risky.  To conclude, 
the affective feedback did not have an impact on behaviour, however it enhanced the users’ 
awareness of security risks online.  If affective feedback was delivered over a longer period of 
time, on a daily basis, the log files could potentially reflect positive behavioural changes as 
end-users become more knowledgeable regarding the subject matter. 
 
10.2.  Summary of work conducted 
The research goal of the project was to develop and apply knowledge of monitoring 
techniques and affective feedback, establishing if users’ awareness of risky security behaviour 
is changed, in the context of a browser-based environment.  The research question behind 
the project asked “Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users via 
dynamically provided affective feedback?”. 
To answer this question, consideration was given to the current level of awareness in end-
users in relation to risky security behaviour.  Differing affective feedback techniques were also 
examined, allowing for the development of a combined monitoring solution and affective 
feedback system.  This system was composed of several Mozilla Firefox extensions, which 
had the ability to monitor end-user behaviour, and delivered feedback via a combination of 
affective agents.  An experimental design was constructed, to address the research question.  
Participants took part in a user evaluation of the software tool developed, answering a 
questionnaire on completion.   
Outcomes of the research provided an understanding of users’ awareness of risky security 
behaviours, and determined if affective feedback provided had an impact on the data 
recorded regarding the behaviour of users.  This provided an overall conclusion as to whether 
affective feedback enhanced security risk awareness in end-users, improving security 
behaviour. 
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10.3.  Significance of the research 
Despite the widespread availability and deployment of anti-malware tools such as virus 
scanners and firewalls, end-user devices are still open to compromise via the risky security 
behaviour of the end-users themselves (Li and Siponen 2011). What constitutes risky 
behaviour is not necessarily obvious to all end-users and as such it is difficult to recognise. 
Computer users often perceive the security measures in place within a system to be 
obtrusive, restricting their ability to perform tasks effectively. Owing to this issue, they often 
attempt to circumvent these measures, at the risk of breaching system security (Pfleeger and 
Caputo 2012). In addition to this, computer users are bombarded with data, to the point of 
information overload, making it difficult for them to discern what is actually happening on their 
machines (Xu 2011).  This lack of awareness can cause a number of problems-  average 
users can easily click on malicious links which are purportedly secure; a fact highlighted by 
the number of users who have computers infected with viruses and malware. To complicate 
matters further, if system security has been compromised, an average user is generally 
unaware. 
In a study conducted by Ofsted in 2010 (cited by Hoffman 2011), it was reported that some 
children are now receiving security awareness education in schools, with a view to them 
maintaining such awareness when left unsupervised on machines. However, a large 
proportion of the population do not have access to this type of training. It is clear that 
education is required to help improve a user’s understanding of security, a sentiment which 
has been echoed by the likes of Leah Hoffman who questioned: “What if we had cybersecurity 
education programs, like we do for fire safety and AIDS?” (Hoffman 2011).  
The novel aspect of this body of research was to apply a combined monitoring solution and 
affective feedback delivery approach to a browser-based environment in an effort to ascertain 
if it could enhance the awareness of risky security behaviours in end-users.  Affective 
feedback was thought to be an appropriate method for improving security awareness in end 
users as it has parallels with techniques used in some types of online education based 
systems (Hall et al. 2005) (McDarby et al. 2004) (Robison et al. 2009).  
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This body of research has made a contribution to the field of affective computing and usable 
security.  Whilst the results indicate the affective feedback made no difference to behaviour, 
users said it had an impact on them, persuading them to say they would consider their 
security behaviours online, and encouraging them to pursue online security education. This 
may be due to a social desirability response, whereby participants answered the 
questionnaires in a way which allows them to be perceived favourably by others.  Since the 
affective feedback has shown the potential to raise security awareness in end-users, the work 
satisfies the research question “Is it possible to enhance security risk awareness in end-users 
via dynamically provided affective feedback?”.  
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Appendices 
Appendix (i)  - overview of the monitoring solution 
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Appendix (ii)  - overview of the affective feedback solution 
.  
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Appendix (iii)  - information for test subjects 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to assess whether or not specially developed Firefox extensions 
assist you whilst browsing the web. 
 
What do the experiments involve? 
You will be provided with a USB stick running a portable version of Firefox.   
The experiment will involve visiting certain websites.  During this time, a Firefox extension 
may provide you with on-screen feedback and it will record the sites you have visited.  
Following this, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire asking about your experience 
whilst browsing the web. 
The experiment will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. 
 
Can I withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you can withdraw from the study at any time, no questions asked. 
 
Confidentiality 
Data used within the system will be held in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998).  
Information held within the system will not be used to identify individual test subjects.  
Information provided by test participants will be removed from the server following the 
experiments.  Passwords are not stored on the server and cannot be viewed. 
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Risks involved 
There are no known risks of being involved with this study. 
Further information 
If you have any questions or queries regarding this study, contact Lynsay Shepherd – 
lynsay.shepherd@abertay.ac.uk 
 
Outcome 
The results of the study will be published in September 2016 when the dissertation is 
submitted. 
 
Ethical approval 
This study has been approved by the Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix (iv)  - consent form 
Consent Form 
I agree to take part in the Firefox Extension experiment. 
Print name: ____________________________ 
 Sign name: ____________________________ 
Date: ______________________________ 
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Appendix (v)  - instructions for test subjects 
Initial steps 
• Note: Firefox might be a little slow to respond/load because it’s running off a USB 
stick. 
• Insert USB stick 
• Click on Firefox developer edition on the USB (if you are unsure about this, please 
ask for help) 
• What number is on your USB stick?  Write it here: _________________________ 
• There should be a random ID in the top-right of your screen.  If the number isn’t there, 
ask for help. 
• Write down the ID from the top-right of the screen: ______________________ 
 
Web browsing 
• You will be required to visit a number of websites and you may be presented with 
additional information on-screen.  Read the website and information carefully. 
• When Firefox loads, you will be presented with a repeat of the information about the 
experiments.  Read the page and tick the box to continue.  A proceed button should 
appear on-screen. 
• You will be taken to the “Initial User Form” site which asks for some details.  Work 
your way through this page.  Click the button at the end of the form. 
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• After this page, “Other Site” will ask for more details.  Work your way through this 
page.  Click the button at the end of the form. 
• If you have a Facebook account, follow the instructions below.  If you don’t have a 
Facebook account, turn the page for further instructions 
 
If you have a Facebook account 
• There will be a link to Facebook on-screen.  Click on the link. 
• Enter your password but don’t log in just yet.  Read any information you’re provided 
with. 
• Login, post a status update and log out. 
• On the toolbar at the top of the screen, click on the Test1 link (see image.)  Read any 
information you’re provided with. 
 
• On the toolbar at the top of the screen, click on the “End Experiment” link (see 
image.)  Read any information you’re provided with. 
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• Click any of the links to end the web-based portion of the experiment. 
 
If you do not have a Facebook account 
• On the toolbar at the top of the screen, click on the Test1 link (see image below)  
Read any information you’re provided with. 
 
• On the toolbar at the top of the screen, click on the “End Experiment” link (see image 
below)  Read any information you’re provided with. 
• Click any of the links to end the web-based portion of the experiment. 
 
Next: complete the questionnaire 
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Appendix (vi)  - experiment questions 
General Questions 
 What number of USB stick did you receive? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
What was your user ID (see your “instructions for test subjects”) form? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
What course of study are you on (if applicable)? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
What year of study are you in (if applicable)? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
What age category are you in (circle one)? 
Under 18 years     18 to 24 years     25 to 34 years    35 to 44 years    45 to 54 years    55 to 64 
years    Age 65 or older 
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How would you rate your knowledge of computer security (circle one)? 
Excellent    Very good    Average    Poor    Very Poor 
 
Were you connected to a public wi-fi network when you participated in the experiments 
(circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Did you reveal any personal information about yourself online during the experiment 
(circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Are you colourblind (circle one)? 
Yes    No    Unsure 
 
Did you enter a private email address into Firefox during the study (circle one)? 
Yes    No    Unsure 
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 If you logged into Facebook, did you use a password which can be found in a 
dictionary (circle one)? 
Yes    No    Unsure 
 
If you logged into Facebook, did you use a password containing personal details such 
as mother’s maiden name or the name of a pet (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Did you visit any malicious websites (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Did you click on any malicious links (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Did you notice any of the built-in browser warnings (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
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Feedback Questions 
Did you receive any on-screen feedback during the experiments (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
If you received feedback, what type of feedback did you receive (circle all that apply)? 
Colour     Text    Avatar 
 
If you received multiple types of feedback, which type had the biggest impact (circle 
one)? 
Colour     Text    Avatar 
 
Did you receive any password-related feedback (circle one)? 
Yes    No    Unsure 
 
If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you consider changing 
your Facebook password (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree    Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
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Did you receive any social media-related feedback (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you consider the information 
you share online (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree    Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
 
Did you receive any feedback about potentially malicious links on a page (circle one)? 
Yes     No    Unsure 
 
Did you receive any feedback about visiting a malicious page (circle one)? 
Yes    No    Unsure 
 
If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make you consider 
which links you were clicking on (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
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Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
 
Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
 
Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security awareness (circle 
one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
 
Did you find the feedback useful (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
 
Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security (circle one)? 
Strongly Agree     Agree    Unsure    Disagree    Strongly Disagree    I didn’t receive feedback 
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Any other comments about the extension? 
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Appendix (vii)  - response to “Any other comments about the 
extension?” 
• "I couldn't understand fully the experiment and what and why Facebook was involved 
in it." 
• "No." 
• "I did not see any noticeable effects of the extension." 
• "Didn't highlight which links were malicious on the page or I didn’t notice it." 
• "It wasn’t clear at first what the extension was." 
• "I find the extension useful for people who do not know much about online security, 
not exactly for me though.  The bit about trustworthiness of the website is pretty ok 
but most browsers these days warn you when visiting untrusted websites." 
• "I don't know if the actual feedback comes from a trustworthy source, therefore 
whether believe it or not." 
• "Avatar feedback looked amazing but maybe make it less creepy." 
• "I thought the avatar was an interesting idea as it is certainly eye catching but think 
the addition of colour would be more effective also if the feedback box was slightly 
transparent to prevent so much of the screen from being obstructed." 
• "Very helpful, especially for strong passwords." 
• "Personally I didn't notice anything out of the ordinary/" 
• "Good to see feedback about password strength and the potential for visiting 
malicious links.  Think the warnings could have been more prominent.  I would 
recommend this to people." 
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• "More in depth explanation of what the extension does or how it differs from normal 
Firefox would have helped me understand the study better." 
• "It is fairly large across the bottom of the page, could potentially be made a little 
smaller and also possibly be a little more obvious when it detects a potentially unsafe 
site." 
• "Text and avatar was useful for password entry.  Would be very helpful for people 
without knowledge of internet security to ensure protection of data." 
• "Shouldn't have plugged the USB in to begin with.  Highly reduces threat." 
• "After taking test it did make me think more about security online." 
• "I think this is a good idea to raise awareness on online security especially people that 
are new to technology.  A browser extension is a good delivery method because it 
doesn't require a lot of setup.  I like the idea of the colour coded messages and 
separates colours for warnings or just general tips." 
• "When concentrating on the questions and the login details, the feedback didn’t draw 
my attention immediately.  It was when I looked away that I noticed the colour then 
the face." 
• "The toolbars at the bottom are clever but I would like to understand the details of why 
the sites are decided as safe/unsafe.  I don’t tent to trust statements about security 
without reasoning." 
• "There is a need to be very sure about the security nature of any site before giving out 
some personal information that are not made public." 
• "The avatar is creepy." 
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Appendix (viii)  - diverging bar charts based on Likert data 
If you received negative password-related feedback, did it make you 
consider changing your Facebook password? 
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If you received social media-related feedback, did it make you consider 
the information you share online? 
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If you received feedback about malicious links on a page, did it make 
you consider which links you were clicking on? 
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Did the feedback make you hesitate to provide information online? 
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Did the feedback clearly highlight any issues with the page? 
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Do you think the feedback provided helped to increase your security 
awareness? 
	  
290 
 
Did you find the feedback useful? 
	  
291 
 
Did the feedback encourage you to learn more about online security? 
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Appendix (ix)  - publications 
Below is a list of publications generated as a result of the research project: 
• Shepherd L. A., Archibald J., Ferguson R. I. Reducing Risky Security Behaviours: 
Utilising Affective Feedback to Educate Users. Future Internet. 2014; 6(4):760-772. 
• Shepherd, L. A. Archibald, J. and Ferguson, R. I. (2014). Reducing risky security 
behaviours: utilising affective feedback to educate users, Proceedings of 
Cyberforensics 2014, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, pp7-14, 2014 
• Shepherd, L. A. Archibald, J. and Ferguson, R. I. (2013). Perception of risky security 
behaviour by users: survey of current approaches. Human Aspects of Information 
Security, Privacy, and Trust: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 8030, pp176-185  	  
293 
 
Appendix (x)  - completed ethics form 
 
 
294 
 
 
 
 
295 
 
 
296 
 
 
 
 
297 
 
	
	 	
298 
 
	
	 	
299 
 
Appendix (xi)  - ethical approval email 
 
  
300 
 
References 
 
Abeyratna, S., Paramei, G. and Tawfik, H. 2010. An affective interface for conveying user 
feedback. KSim2010 - UKSim 12th International Conference on Computer Modelling and 
Simulation, pp.369–374.  
Adams, F. M., and Osgood, C. E. 1973. A cross-cultural study of the affective meanings of 
color. Journal of cross-cultural psychology, 4(2), pp. 135-156. 
Al-Ameen, M. N., Wright,M., and Scielzo, S. 2015. Towards Making Random Passwords 
Memorable: Leveraging Users’ Cognitive Ability Through Multiple Cues. [online]. Proceedings 
of the ACM CHI’15 Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 315–2324.  
Alexa (2016). The top 500 sites on the web. [online]. 
http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Computers/Internet/On_the_Web/Online_Communitie
s/Social_Networking [Accessed 10 May 2016]. 
Alkaldi, N., and Renaud, K. 2016. Why do People Adopt, or Reject, Smartphone Security 
Tools?. Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information 
Security & Assurance (HAISA 2016). Pp. 135-144 
ANEW. 2015. ANEW Message. [online]. http://csea.phhp.ufl.edu/media/anewmessage.html 
[Accessed 10 May 2016]. 
Arguedas, M., Xhafa, F., Daradoumis, T. and Caballe, S. 2015. An Ontology about Emotion 
Awareness and Affective Feedback in Elearning. 2015 International Conference on Intelligent 
Networking and Collaborative Systems, Taipei. pp. 156-163. 
ARS Technica UK. 2016. Firefox trundles past Microsoft browsers for first time- Chrome 
remains king. [online]. http://arstechnica.co.uk/business/2016/05/firefox-overtakes-microsoft-
internet-explorer-edge-browsers-first-time-statcounter/. [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
ARS Technica UK (2012). Firefox fights back, holds on to second place in world browser 
share. [online].  https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/07/firefox-fights-back-
holds-on-to-second-place-in-world-browser-shares/).  [Accessed 30 May 2016]. 
Arvolaa, A., Vassallob, M., Deanc, M., Lampilaa, P., Sabab, A., Lähteenmäkia, L., Shepherd, 
R. 2008. Predicting intentions to purchase organic food: the role of affective and moral 
attitudes in the theory of planned behaviour. Appetite 50:2. pp. 443-454. 
Kralik, J.D. 2011. Stop On Red! The Effects of Color May Lie Deep in Evolution…. [online]. 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/news/releases/stop-on-red-a-monkey-study-
suggests-that-the-effects-of-color-lie-deep-in-evolution.html 
301 
 
Avey, J.B., Wernsing T.S., and Luthans, F. 2008. Can positive employees help positive 
organizational change? Impact of psychological capital and emotions on relevant attitudes 
and behaviors. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 44:1. pp. 48-70. 
Balduzzi, M. 2011. Attacking the privacy of social network users. [online]. HITB. 
http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2011kul/materials/ 
D1T1%20%20Marco%20Balduzzi%20-%20Attacking%20the%20Privacy% 
20of%20Social%20Network%20Users.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2014]. 
Basnet, R.B. and Doleck T. 2015.  Towards Developing a Tool to Detect Phishing URLs: A 
Machine Learning Approach. 2015 IEEE International Conference on Computational 
Intelligence & Communication Technology, Ghaziabad. pp. 220-223. 
Beale, R, and Creed, C. 2009. Affective Interaction: How emotional agents affect users. 
[online]. In : International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 67, pp.755-776.  
Besmer, A. 2009. Social Applications: Exploring A More Secure Framework. In: Symposium 
On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2009), pp.1- 10.  
Bicakci, K., Yuceel, M., Erdeniz, B., Gurbaslar, H. and Atalay, N. 2009. Graphical Passwords 
as Browser Extension: Implementation and Usability Study. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy 
and Security (SOUPS 2009). pp.1-17.  
Bradley, M.M. and Lang, P.J. 1999. Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Instruction 
manual and affective ratings. Technical Report C-1. The Center for Research in 
Psychophysiology. 
Bubaš, G., Orehova, T. and & Konecki, M. 2008. Factors and Predictors of Online Security 
and Privacy Behavior. Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences. 32 (2), pp.79–98.  
Ciampa, M. 2013. A comparison of password feedback mechanisms and their impact on 
password entropy. Information Management & Computer Security. 21:5.   pp. 344–359. 
Canova, G., Volkamer, M. Bergmann, C. Reinheimer, B. 2015. Nophish app evaluation: lab 
and retention study. In: NDSS workshop on usable security. 
Cegan J., Soukal J., Drasar, M., and Vykopal J. 2012. PhiGARo – tool for phishing incident 
processing. Masaryk University. [Online]. Available from: 
http://www.muni.cz/ics/services/csirt/tools/phigaro [Accessed 02 April 2017]. 
Colour Lovers. 2016. http://www.colourlovers.com/. [online]. http://www.colourlovers.com/ 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
302 
 
Computerworld. 2010. Mozilla confirms infected Firefox add-ons slipped through security. 
[online]. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2520691/networking/mozilla-confirms-infected-
firefox-add-ons-slipped-through-security.html [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Daniel Miessler. 2014 . 10k_most_common.txt. [online]. 
https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Passwords/10k_most_common.txt 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
De Carné De Carnavalet, X. and Mannan M. 2015. A Large-Scale Evaluation of High-Impact 
Password Strength Meters. ACM Transactions. Information. Systems. Security. 18(1), Article 
1. 
Dehn, D. and Van Mulken, S. 2012. The impact of animated interface agents: a review of 
empirical research. [online]. International Journal of Human– Computer Studies. 52 (1), pp.1-
22. 
Derose, Steven J. 2005. The Compass DeRose Guide to Emotion Words. [online]. 
http://www.derose.net/steve/resources/emotionwords/ewords.html [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Dhamija, R. and Tygar, J. 2005. The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins. In: 
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2005)., pp.1-12.  
Doubleday, A., Ryan, M., Springett, M. and Sutcliffe. (1997). A comparison of usability 
techniques for evaluating design. [online]. In: Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on 
Designing Interactive Systems: Processes, Practices, Methods, and Techniques, DIS 1997, 
pp.101–110.   
Ekman, P. 1999. Basic emotions. [online]. Cognition. http://doi.org/10.1002/0470013494.ch3 
Egelman S., Sotirakopoulos A., Muslukhov, I., Beznosov, K., and Herley, C. 2013. Does my 
password go up to eleven?: the impact of password meters on password selection. In 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 
Paris. pp. 2379–2388. 
Farahmand, F., Dark, M., Liles, S., Sorge, B. 2009. Risk perceptions of information security: A 
measurement study. In: Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computational 
Science and Engineering, CSE 2009. pp.462–469.  
Farahmand, F., Atallah, M.J., and Spafford, E.H. 2013. Incentive Alignment and Risk 
Perception: An Information Security Application.   In:  IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, vol. 60, no. 2. pp. 238-246. 
Farter. 2011. Using localStorage in Firefox Extensions for Persistent Data Storage. [online]. 
http://fartersoft.com/blog/2011/03/07/using-localstorage-in-firefox-extensions-for-persistent-
data-storage/ [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
303 
 
FBI. 2013. FBI Warns Public That Cyber Criminals Continue to Use Spear-Phishing Attacks to 
Compromise Computer Networks. [online]. Retrieved from: http://www.fbi.gov/sandiego/press-
releases/2013/fbi-warns-public-that-cyber-criminals- continue-to-use-spear-phishing-attacks-
to-compromise-computer-networks. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Fenstermacher, K.D. and Ginsburg, M.A. 2002. Lightweight framework for cross-application 
user monitoring. [online]. IEEE Computer. pp.51–58.  
Fetscherin, M. 2009. Importance of cultural and risk aspects in music piracy: A cross-national 
comparison among university students. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research. 
Fischoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., Combs, B. 1978. How safe is safe enough? 
A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and benefits. Policy Sciences. 9 
(2), pp.127–152.  
Furnell, S., Jusoh, A. and Katsabas, D. 2006. The challenges of understanding and using 
security: a survey of end- users. Computers & Security, 25 (1), pp.27-35 
Furnell, S., and Thomson, K. 2009. Recognising and addressing ‘security fatigue’. Computer 
Fraud & Security. pp. 7-11. 
Gievska, S., Koroveshovski, K. and Chavdarova, T. 2014. A Hybrid Approach for Emotion 
Detection in Support of Affective Interaction. International Conference on Data Mining 
Workshop. pp.352-359.  
Gulz, A., Ahlner, F. and Haake, M. 2007. Visual Femininity and Masculinity in Synthetic 
Characters and Patterns of Affect. ACII 2007, LNCS. pp.654–665.  
Hadnagy, C. 2011. Social engineering: the art of human hacking. Indianapolis, Wiley 
Publishing.  
Hall, L., Woods, S., Aylett, R. and Paiva, A. 2005. Achieving empathic engagement through 
affective interaction with synthetic characters. In: TAO, J., Tan, T., Picard, R.W., (ed.). ACII 
2005, Heidelberg, LNCS Springer. pp 731–738.   
Heishman, R., Duric, Z. and Wechsler, H. 2007. Understanding cognitive and affective states 
using eyelid movements]. In: First IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, 
Applications, and Systems, BTAS 2007. pp.1-6.  
Herath, T. and Rao, H.R. 2009. Encouraging information security behaviors in organizations: 
Role of penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness. Decision Support Syst, 47 (2). 
pp.154–165.  
304 
 
Herley, C. 2009. So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security 
advice by users. Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop. 
ACM, 2009. 
Hernandez, J., Paredes, P., Roseway, A. and Czerwinski, M. 2014. Under Pressure: Sensing 
Stress of Computer Users. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ACM Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’14. pp.51–60. 
Hibshi, H., Breaux, T.D. and Broomell, S.B. 2015. Assessment of risk perception in security 
requirements composition.  2015 IEEE 23rd International Requirements Engineering 
Conference (RE), Ottawa, ON, 2015. pp. 146-155.  
Hilbert, D. and Redmiles, D.F. 2000. Extracting Usability Information from User Interface 
Events.  ACM Computing Surveys. pp.384-421.  
Hill, R. and Donaldson, D. R. 2015. Bridging the Trust Gap: Integrating Models of Behavior 
and Perception. NSPW '15 Proceedings of the 2015 New Security Paradigms Workshop. 
pp.148-155. 
Hini, D., Gendall, P., and Kearns, Z. 1995. The link between environmental attitudes and 
behaviour. Marketing Bulletin. 6.3. pp. 22-31. 
Hoffman, L. 2011. Risky business. Communications of the ACM, 54 (11). pp. 20-22.  
HpHosts. 2016. [online]. http://www.hosts-file.net/ [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Husák, M. and Cegan J. 2014. PhiGARo: Automatic Phishing Detection and Incident 
Response Framework. 2014 Ninth International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security, Fribourg. pp. 295-302.  
Iovane, G., Salerno, S., Giordano, P., Ingenito, G. and Mangione, G.R. 2012. A 
Computational Model for Managing Emotions and Affections in Emotional Learning Platforms 
and Learning Experience in Emotional Computing Context. 2012 Sixth International 
Conference on Complex, Intelligent, and Software Intensive Systems, Palermo. pp. 873-880.  
Imdb.Com. 2016. Ghostbusters. [online]. http://gb.imdb.com/title/tt0087332/ [Accessed 30 
April 2016]. 
Imperva. 2016. Cross-Site Scripting. [online]. 
http://www.imperva.com/Resources/Glossary?term=cross_site_scripting [Accessed 30 April 
2016]. 
Jameson, A. and Riedl, J. 2011. Introduction to the transactions on interactive intelligent 
systems. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems (TiiS). 1 (1), pp.1-6.  
305 
 
Kaspersky Lab A). 2013. Kaspersky Lab report: 37.3 million users experienced phishing 
attacks in the last year. [online]. 
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/press/2013/Kaspersky_Lab_report_37_3_million_ 
users_experienced_phishing_attacks_in_the_last_year [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Kaspersky Lab. 2013. Kaspersky security bulletin 2013. [online]. 
http://media.kaspersky.com/pdf/KSB_2013_EN.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Kelley, P. 2009. A “Nutrition Label” for Privacy. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and 
Security. pp.1-12.  
Kumaraguru, P., Cranshaw J., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L., Hong, J.,Blair, M. and Pham, T. 2009. 
School of Phish: A Real-World Evaluation of Anti-Phishing Training. In: Symposium On 
Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2009). pp.1-12.  
Kumi, R., Conway, C.M., Limayem, M and Goyal, S. 2013. Research Article Learning in Color: 
How Color and Affect Influence Learning Outcomes. IEEE Transactions on Professional 
Communication. Vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 2-15. 
Labunets, K., Massacci, F., Paci, F. and Tran, L.M.S. 2013. An Experimental Comparison of 
Two Risk-Based Security Methods. 2013 ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical 
Software Engineering and Measurement, Baltimore, MD. pp. 163-172.  
Larose, R., and Rifon, N. J. 2007. Promoting i-safety: Effects of privacy warnings and privacy 
seals on risk assessment and online privacy behavior. [Journal of Consumer Affairs, 41 (1), 
pp.127-149.  
Li, Y. and Siponen, M. 2011. A call for research on home users information security 
behaviour. In: PACIS 2011, Proceedings,. 
Lottridge, D., Chignell, M. and Jovicic. 2011. Affective Interaction: Understanding, Evaluating, 
and Designing for Human Emotion. In: Reviews of Human Factors and Ergonomics. pp.197-
237.  
Lund Research Ltd. 2013. Mann-Whitney U Test using SPSS Statistics. [online]. 
https://statistics.laerd.com/spss-tutorials/mann-whitney-u-test-using-spss-statistics.php. 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Maurer, M., De Luca, A. and Kempe, S. 2011. Using Data Type Based Security Alert Dialogs 
to Raise Online Security Awareness. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 
2011). pp.1-13.  
Mcdarby, G., Condron, J., Hughes, D. and Augenblick, N. 2004. Affective feedback. Media 
Lab Europe. [online].. http://medialabeurope.org/mindgames/publications/publication 
sAffectiveFeedbackEnablingTechnologies.pdf. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
306 
 
Measuring Usability Llc. 2016. A/B Test Calculator. [online]. http://www.measuringu.com/ab-
calc.php. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
 
Milne, G. R., Labrecque, L. I. and & Cromer, C. 2009. Toward an understanding of the online 
consumer’s risky behavior and protection practices. Journal of Consumer Affairs. 43 (3). 
pp.449–473.  
Milne, G. R., Rohm, A. J. and Bahl, S. 2004. Consumers’ Protection of Online Privacy and 
Identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs. pp.217–232.  
Mostyn, B. 1978. The attitude behaviour relationship.  Available from: 
https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/1826/2968/1/MCRC%2015.PDF.  [Accessed 02 
February 2017]. 
Mozilla A). 2015. History of the Mozilla Project. [online]. https://www.mozilla.org/en-
US/about/history/details/. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla B). 2015. Frequently Asked Questions. [online]. https://addons.mozilla.org/en- us/faq. 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla C). 2015. Code Snippet. [online]. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-
ons/Code_snippets/On_page_load. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla D). 2015. Local Storage. [online]. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-
ons/Overlay_Extensions/XUL_School/Local_Storage#Logging. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla E). 2015. The Future of Developing Firefox Add-ons. [online]. 
https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2015/08/21/the-future-of-developing-firefox-add-ons// 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla Developer Network A). 2015. Security best practices in extensions. [online]. 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add ons/Security_best_practices_in_extensions. 
[Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Mozilla Developer Network. 2015. SDK and XUL Comparison. [online]. 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-ons/SDK/Guides/SDK_vs_XUL. [Accessed 30 April 
2016]. 
Myers, D. 2004. Social Psychology with SocialSense, chapter 4. Available from: 
http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/dl/free/0070952027/363504/Ch04_Myers3Ce.pdf   
[Accessed 02 February 2017]. 
307 
 
Nalisnick and Baird. 2013. Character-to-Character Sentiment Analysis in Shakespeare’s 
Plays. Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational 
Linguistics. pp.479–483.  
Ng, B., Kankanhalli, A. and Xu, Y. 2009. Studying users’ computer security behavior: A health 
belief perspective. Decision Support Systems, 46 (4), pp.815–825.  
Nielsen, F. 2011. A new ANEW: evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in microblogs. 
Proceedings of the ESWC2011 Workshop on 'Making Sense of Microposts': Big things come 
in small packages. Volume 718 in CEUR Workshop Proceedings, pp.93-98. 
Novak, D., Nagle, A. and Riener, R. 2014. Linking Recognition Accuracy and User Experience 
in an Affective Feedback Loop.  IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing. Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 
168-172. 
Nyman, R. 2009. How to develop a Firefox extension. [online]. 
https://robertnyman.com/2009/01/24/how-to-develop-a-firefox-extension/. [Accessed 30 April 
2016]. 
Office For National Statistics. 2016. Internet users in the UK: 2016. [online]. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetusers/2
016#recent-internet-use-is-on-the-increase-for-those-aged-65-and-over. [Accessed 3 August 
2016]. 
Olson, J.M., and Zanna, M.P. 1993. Attitudes and attitude change. Annual review of 
psychology. 44(1) pp. 117-154. 
OWASP. 2016. Password length & complexity. [online]. 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Password_length_&_complexity. [Accessed 30 April 2016]. 
Ozdemir, C. and Bergler, S. 2015. A Comparative Study of Different Sentiment Lexica for 
Sentiment Analysis of Tweets. Proceedings of Recent Advances in Natural Language 
Processing. pp.488–496 
Padayachee, K. 2012. Taxonomy of compliant information security behavior. Computers & 
Security. 31 (5), pp. 673–680.  
Parkin, S., Krol, K., Becker, I. and Sasse, M.A. 2016. Applying Cognitive Control Modes to 
Identify Security Fatigue Hotspots. Twelfth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 
(SOUPS 2016). USENIX Association. 
Payne, B. and Edwards, W. 2008. A brief introduction to usable security. Internet Computing. 
12 (3), pp. 13–21.  
308 
 
Pfleeger and Caputo. 2012. Leveraging behavioral science to mitigate cyber security risk. 
Computers & Security. 
Picard, R. 2000. Affective Computing. MIT Press.  
Ranieri, C.M. and Romero, R.A.F. 2016. An Emotion-Based Interaction Strategy to Improve 
Human-Robot Interaction. 2016 XIII Latin American Robotics Symposium and IV Brazilian 
Robotics Symposium (LARS/SBR), Recife. pp. 31-36.  
Robison, J., McQuiggan, S., Lester, J. 2009. Evaluating the consequences of affective 
feedback in intelligent tutoring systems. In: Proceedings of International Conference on 
Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction, ACII 2009. pp. 37–42.  
Sacharin, V., Sander, D. and Scherer, K. R. 2012. The perception of changing emotion 
expressions. Cognition & Emotion. pp.1273–1300.  
Salvi, S. M., Akhtar, S., and Currie, Z. 2006. Ageing changes in the eye. Postgraduate 
Medical Journal, 971. pp.581–587.  
San-José, P. And Rodriguez, S. 2011. Study on information security and e-Trust in Spanish 
households. In: Proceedings of the First Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and 
Gathering Experience Returns for Security, BADGERS 2011. pp.1-6.  
Schechter, S.E., Dhamija, R., Ozment, A. and Fischer, I. 2007. The Emperor's New Security 
Indicators. Proc. 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 
Schneier, B. 2008. The psychology of security. [online]. Available: 
http://www.schneier.com/essay-155.html [Accessed 3 August 2016]. 
Selmi, M., Aïmeur, E. and Hage, H. 2013. Privacy Framework for Peer Affective Feedback. 
2013 International Conference on Signal-Image Technology & Internet-Based Systems, 
Kyoto. pp. 1049-1056. 
Shahriar, H., Weldemariam, K., Lutellier, T. and Zulkernine, M. 2013. A Model-Based 
Detection of Vulnerable and Malicious Browser Extension. In: Software Security and 
Reliability (SERE), 2013 IEEE 7th International Conference on. pp.1-17.  
Shay, R. Komanduri, S., Durity, A., Huh, P., Mazurek, M., Segreti, S., Ur, B., Bauer, L., 
Christin, N., Cranor, L.. 2016. Designing Password Policies for Strength and Usability. ACM 
Transactions on Information and System Security. 18 (4). 
Sheng, S., Magnien, B., Kumaraguru, P., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L., Hong, J. and Nunge, E. 
2007. Anti-Phishing Phil: The Design and Evaluation of a Game That Teaches People Not to 
Fall for Phish. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2007). pp.1-12. 
309 
 
Shepherd, L. A., Archibald, J. and R.I., Ferguson. 2014. Reducing Risky Security Behaviours: 
Utilising Affective Feedback to Educate Users. Future Internet, 6 (4), pp.760-772.  
Shepherd, L.A., Archibald, J. and Ferguson, R. I. 2013. Perception of Risky Security 
Behaviour by Users: Survey of Current Approaches. Human Aspects of Information Security, 
Privacy, and Trust, 8030.  pp.176- 185.  
Siegle, G. 1994. Genanew. [online]. http://www.pitt.edu/~gsiegle/wordlist/index.htm [Accessed 
3 August 2016]. 
Stangroom, J. 2016. Mann-Whitney U Test Calculator. [online]. 
http://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/mannwhitney/Default2.aspx. [Accessed 3 August 2016]. 
Stanton, J.M (2005). Analysis of end user security behaviors. Computers and Security 24, 
pp.124–133.  
Stanton, B., Theofanos, M., Prettyman, S. and Furman, S. 2016. Security Fatigue. IT 
Professional. 18(5) pp. 26-32. 
Stats Direct. 2016. P Values. [online]. http://www.statsdirect.co.uk/help/basics/pval.htm 
[Accessed 3 August 2016]. 
Steinbart P.J, Keith, M.J., and Babb, J. 2016. Examining the Continuance of Secure Behavior: 
A Longitudinal Field Study of Mobile Device Authentication. Information Systems Research. 
Straub, D., and Welke, R. 1998. Coping With Systems Risks: Security Planning Models for 
Management Decision Making.  MIS Quarterly (22:4), pp. 441-469. 
Suggi, R. and Freeman, N. 2009. Abusing Firefox Extensions. [online]. 
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/defcon-17-roberto_liverani-
nick_freeman-abusing_firefox.pdf [Accessed 3 August 2014]. 
Takemura, T. 2011. Empirical analysis of behavior on information security. In: Proceedings of 
the 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th International Conference on 
Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, ITHINGSCPSCOM, pp.358–363.  
The R Foundation. 2015. The R Project for Statistical Computing. [online]. https://www.r-
project.org/ [Accessed 5 August 2016]. 
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team. 2011. Using Caution with USB Drives. 
[online]. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST08-001 [Accessed 3 August 2014]. 
Ur, B., Bees, J., Segreti, S., Bauer, L., Christin, N, and Cranor, L. 2016. Do Users’ 
Perceptions of Password Security Match Reality? Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems - CHI ’16, pp.3748–3760.  
310 
 
Ur, B., Kelley, P., Komanduri, S., Lee, J., Maass, M., Mazurek, M., Passaro, T., Shay, R., 
Vidas, T., Bauer, L., Christin, N. and Cranor, L. 2012. How does your password measure up? 
The effect of strength meters on password creation. In: Security 2012 Proceedings of the 21st 
USENIX Conference on Security Symposium.  
Urban Dictionary. 2016. http://www.urbandictionary.com/. [online]. 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/ [Accessed 5 August 2016]. 
Vance A., Eargle D., Ouimet K., and Straub, D. 2013. Enhancing password security through 
interactive fear appeals: A web-based field experiment. In System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 
46th Hawaii International Conference on. IEEE, Hawai’i, 2988–2997. 
Volkamer, M., Renaud, K., Canova, G, Reinheimer, B, and Braun, K. 2015. Design and Field 
Evaluation of PassSec: Raising and Sustaining Web Surfer Risk Awareness. Trust and 
Trustworthy Computing: 8th International Conference, TRUST 2015, pp.104–122 
Volkamer, M., Renaud, K., and Reinheimer, B. 2016. TORPEDO: TOoltip-poweRed Phishing 
Email DetectiOn. IFIP International Information Security and Privacy Conference. Springer 
International Publishing. 
Willison, R., and Warkentin, M. 2013. Beyond Deterrence: An Expanded View of Employee 
Computer Abuse. MIS quarterly 37(1): pp. 1-20. 
Wixon, D. 2011. Measuring fun, trust, confidence, and other ethereal constructs: it isn’t that 
hard. Interaction, 18 (6), pp. 74-77.  
Wu, M., Miller, C. and Little, G. 2006. Web Wallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing 
User Intentions. In: Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2006). pp.1-12.  
Xu, M., Ong, V., Duan, Y. and Mathews, B. 2011. Intelligent agent systems for executive 
information scanning, filtering and interpretation: perceptions and challenge. Information 
Processing and Management: an International Journal, 47 (2), pp.186- 201.  
 	
